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Energy is of vital importance to the economy of the European Union (EU), 
safeguarding stability and prosperity for its Member States and citizens. 
Cooperation in energy policy was enshrined as a cornerstone in the EU's 
founding treaties, through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
and the Euratom Treaty. However, energy policy was initially characterised by 
limited and shallow integration, with the first measures to integrate the policy 
area implemented 40 years after the foundation of the ECSC. Within this 
context, the Commission has taken an ambitious stance and proposed an 
umbrella institution to embrace the various dimensions of energy policy: the 
European Energy Union. This thesis aims to assess the factors and 
mechanisms that lead to integration, including both the internal and external 
dimension of European energy policy. In order to achieve this, it utilises 
Historical Institutionalism as a theoretical tool, which stands between rational 
choice and sociological approaches to the study of institutions. Based on the 
notions of path dependence, institutional lock-in and institutional inertia, the 
project analyses how the institutional matrix both constrains and enables 
different actors’ political strategies. This is accomplished through a 
comprehensive analysis of primary and secondary legislation, historical 
documentation, communications, supplemented by primary data gathered 
from interviewing decision-makers and experts in Brussels. Process-tracing is 
applied to test four hypotheses regarding integration of the energy sector from 
the inception of the ECSC to the Energy Union. It assesses under what 
premises initial legislative proposals were made, identifies critical junctures 
that enabled institutional change, and determines which key players were 
pivotal in formulating policy proposals, ultimately culminating in the policy 
package for the Energy Union. Ultimately, this PhD thesis seeks to answer the 
question under what conditions does integration occur in the policy area of 







This doctoral thesis analyses the integration of European energy policy. 
Energy policy is of vital importance for the European Union (EU) as it 
safeguards the economic stability and prosperity of its Member States and 
citizens. Cooperation in energy policy was included in the EU's founding 
treaties, through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which 
sought to regulate coal and steel at the European level, and the Euratom 
Treaty, which established the European Atomic Energy Community. However, 
energy policy was initially characterised by limited cooperation at the European 
level. The first measures to integrate the policy area were implemented 40 
years after the foundation of the ECSC. Moreover, laws that would ensure a 
comprehensive approach to energy policy have not yet become a full reality. 
Be it the inefficiencies of policy measures to complete the internal market, or 
gas disputes between third country suppliers jeopardising the security of 
supply, the EU faces a multitude of challenges regarding energy policy. Within 
this context, the European Commission proposed an ambitious umbrella 
institution to govern the various dimensions of energy policy: the European 
Energy Union. In spite of these ambitions, differences in national preferences 
over the nature of European energy policy, often based on distinct energy 
systems and specific historic legacies, make it challenging to achieve the 
proposed goals. This thesis aims to assess the factors and mechanisms that 
lead to policy development in the energy sector. To achieve this, it utilises a 
historical approach to analyse the cooperation of Member States, from the 
inception of the ECSC and Euratom Treaty, to the proposals for a European 
Energy Union. The thesis analyses under what conditions initial legislative 
proposals were made, identifies critical moments that influenced the 
development of policies, and determines which players were key in formulating 
the policy proposals. This is accomplished through a comprehensive analysis 
of legislation, historical documentation, communications, and data gathered 
from interviewing decision-makers in Brussels. Ultimately, this doctoral thesis 
seeks to answer the question under what conditions does integration occur in 
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the policy area of energy over time? The project contributes to existing 
research on this topic by providing a thorough analysis of energy policy over a 
70-year period and furthering our understanding of the way initial policy 
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With measures to complete the internal market and gas disputes unsettling the 
security of a stable supply of energy, energy has become one of the most 
important and prominent issues on the agenda of the European Union (EU). 
Whether it was European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker, who 
prioritised Europe’s Energy Policy and committed himself to transforming 
energy legislation into a European Energy Union during his term in office 
(Juncker 2014: 5-6), or the on-going manifold disputes regarding the 
construction of pipelines and security issues associated with geopolitical 
unrest (Gloystein & Zhdannikov 2014), a common European Energy Union 
with a comprehensive policy approach appears to be at its dawn, promising 
momentum to significantly influence many other policy areas and enrich the 
acquis communautaire. The Energy Union, as a highly ambitious and 
contested project of the EU, may become one of the ultimate stress tests of 
political and economic integration. Much has been achieved on the internal 
and external dimensions of energy policy during the last decade. However, 
many issues remained in limbo between the aspirations of supranational 
institutions, national preferences of Member States in the intergovernmental 
domain, and geopolitical realities posed by third country suppliers to leverage 
their own political ends. To tackle various pervasive shortcomings, the 
Commission proposed plans in 2015 to deploy a fully integrated internal 
market, to ensure the security of supply, improve energy efficiency, 
decarbonise the economy, and implement a research, innovation and 
competitiveness strategy (European Commission 2015a-c). Energy policy has 
gained ample significance as major decisions have been implemented, and 
researchers have analysed different driving factors for, and obstacles to, 
further policy developments and integration in this area.  
 
This research project therefore contributes to a growing body of work on the 
politics of European energy policy. It seeks to answer the question under what 
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conditions does integration occur in the policy area of energy over time? 
Moreover, my research gauges to what extent integration has been 
accomplished – and which shortcomings can be identified that might become 
future target areas to coherently integrate energy policy. In addition to the 
overarching question, it also addresses the following sub-questions to add 
analytical depth to the analysis: why were external issues not addressed in the 
‘early days’ of energy policy? Why has integration on the internal dimension 
progressed so slowly? Why does the EU state the need for an Energy Union 
at this point in time? 
 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) will provide the theoretical backdrop of this 
research; EU scholars have increasingly utilised HI to analyse temporal 
aspects of European integration, including feedback mechanisms, lock-ins, 
and path-dependence (Pollack 2008). The approach is recognised for its 
potential to explain specific characteristics of the policy making process, 
drawing from both macro-historical insights (HI), and from micro foundational 
(rational choice) assumptions (Thelen 1999). The latter is actor centred and 
conceives outcomes as the actions and strategic behaviour of individuals, 
whereas the former stresses the assumption that interests are structurally 
given (ibid.). Thelen (ibid.) argues that a cross-fertilisation should take place, 
whereas researchers might “strive for creative combinations that recognize 
and attempt to harness the strengths of each approach” (ibid.: 380). Pollack 
(2008) goes even a step further as he “does not consider historical 
institutionalism as a distinct and competing school of thought, but rather as a 
particular variant of rational-choice theory emphasizing the importance of time, 
feedbacks, sequencing, and path-dependence in the study of politics” (ibid.: 
4). 
 
The concept of path dependency is a key concept in this research, suggesting 
that 'lock-ins' hamper actors' abilities to amend policies once they are 
introduced (Pollack 1996, Stacey & Rittberger 2003, Pierson 1996). In 
addition, norms and values are incorporated in the model to answer questions 
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about the preference formation of different actors, reflecting a sociological 
approach (Bulmer 1998, Thelen 1999). This step is particularly beneficial as 
many proposals and decisions on energy policy refer to ideational factors, like 
the notion of solidarity and trust between Member States. The decision to 
employ and incorporate both rational choice and sociological approaches is 
derived from historical institutionalism’s ambition to stand between these two 
views, however, placing an emphasis on temporal processes and the historical 
context of institutional evolution (Pollack 2008, Steinmo 2008, Wiener & Dietz 
2009). This choice is discussed in greater detail in the theory section of this 
paper. 
 
Building on existing HI approaches, this research project offers three 
significant theoretical contributions by developing a more fine-grained and 
nuanced ontology of core concepts and a systematic approach to their 
operationalisation. The notions of temporal processes including path-
dependence, critical junctures, increasing returns and positive feedbacks, 
institutional stickiness and institutional lock-ins are concepts that are closely 
associated with HI to capture the phenomenon of institutional persistence and 
transformation. They are used to answer the question of why institutions stay 
on a specific path over time, and how and when change is instigated (Arthur 
1988, Scharpf 1988, North 1990, Thelen & Steinmo 1992, Pollack 1996 & 
2008, Pierson 2000 & 2004, Peters et al. 2005, Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, 
Fioretos et al. 2016). Although path dependence is such a central component 
of HI, the literature can fall short regarding how to operationalise the concept 
and render these temporal processes visible. Thus, this project’s first 
contribution is the development of a methodological model to overcome this 
shortcoming and proposes a way to operationalise path dependent processes. 
Secondly, the project offers insight into the notion of critical junctures. It 
deploys a model which distinguishes between distinct forms of critical 
junctures, which in turn address different levels of the institution. It posits that 
critical junctures exist for the institutional matrix in its entirety, amending 
primary legislation in the form of treaty law; and they exist as smaller events, 
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which have an impact on a specific sector, but do not alter the institutional 
trajectory as a whole, therefore affecting secondary legislation. The third 
contribution of this research project is the application of a framework that 
proposes that the logic of preference formation is rooted in the situational and 
institutional context, instead of predefined motivations for preferences. Both 
choices based on rationality and calculated self-interest on the one hand, and 
normative and ideational factors on the other, define the actions of different 
institutional players and inform the decision-making process. According to the 
applied framework, the situational context is an important factor influencing 
these patterns, along with the proposition that the role of timing and the specific 
sequence of events determine the institutional trajectory.                
 
These theoretical contributions are obtained through a comprehensive 
analysis of driving factors that sparked developments in energy policy. The 
Lisbon Treaty, which changed the requirements on how legislation is proposed 
and adopted, and the three Energy Packages, together with the creation of the 
Single European Market (SEM) through the Single European Act (SEA) (the 
internal dimension), will be central points of reference. Lisbon changed the 
voting rules in a wide range of policy areas, and energy policy per se became 
a formal competence of the EU. Hence, with the adoption of an energy chapter 
in the Lisbon Treaty, energy policy was explicitly brought into the remit of the 
EU for the first time (Duffield & Birchfield 2011). It will be fruitful to depict the 
factors that made such a development possible and, from a Member State’s 
perspective, desirable or even necessary. The introduction of co-decision in 
the Lisbon Treaty (Maltby 2013) might have informed integrative steps in the 
field of energy, or put differently, might have made further steps possible. The 
three Energy Packages were adopted to create and subsequently complete 
the internal energy market, and will serve as a means to put the policy field 
into a historical context. The packages were the initial steps taken by the EU 
after the inception of the SEM programme and a direct consequence of the 
SEA. Furthermore, for an analysis from an HI perspective, it is also worthwhile 
assessing the timespan when the predominant alignment of the EU was 
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characterised by stark institutional inertia with respect to policy development 
in the energy sector. Such an analysis furthers our understanding about the 
factors that lead to lock-ins and lay bare institutional predispositions and 
settings that impede deeper integration of a policy area. Especially, from an HI 
perspective, the analysis of factors that evoke institutions to be locked-in and 
immobilised is an expedient endeavour. The HI scholar sees the present as 
an outcome of, and dependent on, sequential events from the past. Hence, in 
order to fully understand deeper integration of a policy area, or the absence 
thereof, it is paramount to embed past events into the analysis as 
contemporary policy developments are contingent on preceding incidents. The 
feature to incorporate the past as an analytical reference point for the present 
is often inadequately addressed (or omitted entirely) when explaining 
contemporary policy developments. Hence HI fills this gap to understand 
temporal processes in terms of institutional change. 
 
Both the internal and external dimension of energy policy are intrinsically 
interwoven and, thus, should not be analysed separately. The internal 
dimension directly affects the external dimension and vice versa. For instance, 
if legal provisions are implemented to regulate certain features of the internal 
energy market, like the requirement of unbundling energy suppliers from 
generators in the Third Energy Package, investors from third countries might 
find fewer incentives to get involved in the exploration of the European markets 
as they might not concur with their own preferences. This in turn has a direct 
effect on the security of supply and the stability of the energy system. In 
addition, third country suppliers might use the ‘supply leverage’ to exert 
pressure on EU’s policy makers. The EU is heavily reliant on energy imports; 
a disadvantageous situation that can be exploited by supplier countries to 
achieve political ends. As put forward in this short example, an analysis of both 
dimensions and their interconnectedness will enable a more comprehensive 
and holistic understanding of the policy area. Moreover, I am incorporating 
exogenous factors and external shocks / constraints as possible critical 
junctures in the analysis (e.g. Russian/Ukrainian gas disputes; different oil 
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crises in the 1970s; etc.) as they will help to derive an explanation for 
preference formation of actors and how ideas about deeper integration are 
generated due to external forces. 
 
It should be noted that a decision to exclude environmental policy was made 
early on in the project, due to concerns regarding feasibility, and to enable 
more empirical depth in the analysis. It was beyond the scope of this project 
to analyse environmental concerns and climate change in the context of 
energy policy due to the sheer volume of legislation. The breadth of legislation 
from the Coal and Steel Community to Euratom, the Single European Act to 
the Lisbon Treaty, up to the Energy Union, provided extensive empirical data 
for a longitudinal study. Adding an additional layer would have jeopardised the 
quality and depth of the analysis. However, one can posit that institutional 
stickiness also affects environmental policy in the context of energy policy. For 
instance, the phenomenon of carbon lock-in and the path dependent 
processes of specific technological developments in renewable energy 
warrants further research1. Furthermore, it should be noted that environmental 
issues could be seen as another external factor / variable influencing policy-
making in energy. It is the author’s intention to examine this dimension in future 
research. 
 
The contribution of this project to the existing empirical literature on European 
energy policy is its unique approach to gauging temporal processes and its 
appraisal of the role of institutions together with different actors. Such an 
undertaking will contribute to the structure/agency debate, deploying an in-
depth understanding of institutional inertia, path dependent processes, and 
critical junctures in accordance with European integration. A central focus of 
this research project is a way to operationalise various degrees of institutional 
inertia, understood the degree of institutional stickiness. An intriguing aspect 
of this analysis is the inherent fluidity of energy policy due to an on-going 
 
1 See: Unruh (2000): Understanding carbon lock-in and Lockwood et al. (2017): Historical 
institutionalism and the politics of sustainable energy transitions: A research agenda. 
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discourse among Member States, the ‘incompleteness’ of the policy area and 
the demand of certain Member States for further integration (along the lines of 
more integrated policy fields like the common commercial policy/ customs 
union/ competition/ monetary policy). 
 
 
Research puzzle  
 
Energy policy has been an attribute of the European integration project from 
the very beginning, through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
and the Euratom Treaty. Regional integration was meant to serve as a means 
to secure peace in Europe through the creation of a common market for coal 
and steel. The rationale behind this step was to forge resilient economic and 
political ties between France and Germany to facilitate the reconstruction of 
Europe. The common market for coal and steel, the two commodities 
constituting the backbone for the industry at that time, would advance pace 
building efforts through economic integration and mutual interdependence. 
Simply put, without coal and steel, no war. Furthermore, the Euratom Treaty, 
which was implemented in 1957, was established to create a community policy 
regarding the supply of nuclear power and to develop a potent nuclear industry 
(Matlary 1996). Although energy policy could be considered part of the very 
core of the EU, it is a near-paradoxical situation that energy policy was not as 
comprehensively and effectively integrated from the beginning as were other 
policy areas. Put differently, Commission recommendations that were made 
between the 1960s and the 1980s (European Commission: 1968, European 
Commission: 1972b, European Commission: 1981) were “largely ignored by 
the Council and the Member States” (Maltby 2013: 438, see also: Kirchner and 
Berk 2010). However, it is necessary to mention at this point that energy 
legislation was not completely absent as regulations and decisions were 
implemented. Energy policy was rather stuck in a structurally induced gridlock 
due to certain adverse conditions posed by the institutional design and choices 
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regarding the energy mix, which I will discuss in greater detail in the following 
analysis. 
 
Energy was part of the European project from the outset but has over the years 
not been supranationalised like other policy areas (for instance, the common 
commercial policy or the common agricultural policy; also, energy markets 
were incorporated quite late into the internal market programme). It seems to 
have successfully resisted various ‘neofunctional’ pressures to a certain 
degree, the specific impetus based on economic interdependence, which 
students of European politics might identify as causes for further integration, 
from the 1950s until the early 1990s. In the first 40 years following the creation 
of the EU, Member States considered energy a sovereign business (McGowan 
2008). Nevertheless, issues surrounding energy markets and energy security 
arise in functioning economies as a fundamental backdrop (due to the vital 
importance of energy to their economic performance) and constitute pivotal 
core issues of every EU Member State. Simply put, without energy and a 
reasonable policy on energy, a sovereign state and its markets are simply not 
viable. And yet, although other core policies in the EU developed further, 
comprehensive integration did not take place in this area, and where 
integration was attempted it only achieved limited and rather modest success.  
 
National solutions dominated the policy landscape, which were contrived 
through bilateral and intergovernmental agreements with supplier countries. 
Electricity and gas markets were monopolised, National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) championed the national markets and led to highly concentrated 
energy markets, with no room to manoeuvre for external investors. There were 
few if any technical regulations and infrastructure plans, and the absence of 
physical interconnections and grids made trade between Member States 
cumbersome or simply impossible. Community action was virtually not set out 
until the 1990s (Maltby 2013). The creation of the Single European Market 
(SEM) eventually incorporated the internal dimension of energy policy under 
the single market umbrella. This move made it possible for the EU to take a 
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more ambitious stance. Major decisions were implemented in the mid 1990s 
relating to the internal market but demanded further legal provisions as they 
did not prove to be effective enough to tackle various issues concerning the 
regulatory environment and the security of supply. On the external dimension, 
no effective community action whatsoever was laid out until 2010 (with an 
ineffective Council Directive implemented in 2004), which seems surprising 
given the salience of issues concerning the security of natural gas supply. As 
with other policy areas, there is traditionally a reluctance to give away 
information on how Member States conduct their energy policy regarding 
relations with third countries, and under which contractual premises these 
bilateral agreements were made. This reticence raises some important 
questions for the understanding of the policy area: why were external issues 
not addressed in the ‘early days’ of energy policy? Why has integration on the 
internal dimension, although formulated and initiated, progressed so slowly 
(and is still not complete)? Why does the EU state the need for an Energy 
Union at this point in time?  
 
This research is particularly timely given that major legal provisions were made 
within the last 20 years, thereby making data/sources accessible for academic 
scrutiny. The project will help to understand the driving factors towards deeper 
integration in a contested policy area that is characterised by divergent 
interests of Member States (due to their respective energy mixes and historical 
legacies), and their expectations about how a common policy should be 
created and what it should comprise. Moreover, it will investigate the factors 
that caused the institution to remain in considerable inertia for almost 40 years 
and which made policy development almost impossible. 
 
 
Literature review  
 
The following section provides an overview of existing literature that is relevant 
for this thesis, which can be divided into four categories: historical accounts 
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and comprehensive volumes on the evolution of energy policy towards an 
Energy Union (for the sake of brevity in some instances referred to by their 
editors); research that addresses the external dimension of energy policy; 
efforts to create and liberalise a common internal energy market; and the 
European Commission as a policy entrepreneur and driver of deeper 
integration. 
 
Although the academic literature on the historical evolution of the policy field 
is rather scarce, some scholars have been intrigued by the topic and used 
different approaches to analyse it. The first thorough assessment of energy 
policy in the ECSC, EEC and Euratom was conducted by Lucas (1977). This 
comprehensive research, is an invaluable account of the proceedings of 
various actors and institutions from the inception of the ECSC until the mid-
1970s. Not only did the research meticulously depict Member States’ 
preferences regarding their policy instruments, it also takes account of the 
different energy sectors (coal, oil, gas, nuclear energy). Lucas ultimately 
argues that the most important crossroad was the missed opportunity to 
confide in petroleum products instead of blind faith in nuclear energy that 
ultimately hampered deeper integration in the early days.  
 
The second invaluable book-length assessment of the policy area within the 
historical context was provided by Matlary (1997). By using competing 
theoretical perspectives, amongst them Neofunctionalism, Multi-Level 
Governance and Policy Network Analysis, she provided a comprehensive 
analysis of energy policy of the 1950s to the mid-1990s, with an emphasis on 
the policy developments after the Single European Act. She identifies energy 
suppliers and Member States, with their specific historic legacies and diverging 
preferences based on economic reasons and security concerns, as the main 
opponents of a common energy policy, however, stressing the fact that the 
energy sector became more integrated due to the single market programme.  
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Addressing different dimensions of energy policy, Schubert et al. (2016) 
provide a thorough and holistic account of historical developments; the main 
actors concerned with the process of decisions making; the common internal 
energy market; climate change, energy efficiency, and renewable energy 
sources; and the external policies of the Union. Their research provides an 
overview of all the prominent themes to be found in the energy sectors, 
drawing from an impressive range of legislation, primary sources and 
secondary literature. Buchan & Keay (2015) deploy a coherent analysis of the 
EU’s endeavours towards a common energy policy and its plan to create an 
Energy Union. They address all the main themes of the policy field and 
conclude that a move towards more Europeanisation is necessary to avoid 
renationalisation of energy policy. To this end, the authors call for a new 
overarching institutional arrangement under which Member States should 
concede more competences to the Union.  
 
The second important book-length contribution which analyses the path to, and 
the status quo of, the Energy Union is edited by Andersen et al. (2017). The 
volume analyses the stimuli and factors that contribute to the demand creating 
an Energy Union, the security dimension of energy policy, policy tools that are 
at the EU’s disposal, and the main actors that contest the Energy Union. The 
main argument promotes the proposition that the Union, although pursuing a 
liberal approach to international political economy, transformed its regulatory 
approach towards a regime that the authors call ‘liberal mercantilism’, to 
augment its own power. In this respect, the Energy Union marks a crossroad 
away from an approach based on market-building and competition (a pure 
liberal model) towards one in which the EU utilises its market power for political 
ends in the shape of increasing energy security. 
 
The second important group of contributions that are relevant for this thesis 
focus on energy security issues and, as an adjacent theme, the EU’s relations 
with Russia and other major supplying countries (Winzer 2012, Kaveshnikov 
2010). Winzer (2012) conducted a comprehensive assessment of existing 
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literature on energy security to garner different conceptualisations of the term 
that allowed for a translation into quantifiable measures. As different 
conceptual frameworks led to stark variations in outcome, they highlight the 
need to carefully define the concept of energy security dependent on the 
research and proposed a narrower definition. Different dimensions of energy 
security in Europe are addressed in an edited volume by Szulecki (2018), 
providing a comprehensive contribution to the literature, which depicts the 
multitude of issues concerning internal dynamics and external policy 
challenges. Youngs (2009) focused specifically on the foreign policy 
dimension of energy security by bridging three areas of the debate: market-
based versus geopolitical strategies; the relationship of energy security 
contingent on the governance in producer states; and the EU’s capacity to act 
as a foreign policy actor. The findings suggest that, although energy security 
gained in importance to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
since the mid-2000s, divisions between Member States regarding the scope 
and nature of external action made it quite difficult for the Union to speak with 
one voice and attain predefined goals. In a similar vein, Haghighi (2007) 
provides a comprehensive account of the internal and external measures 
concerning the security of oil and gas supply in Europe up to the mid-2000s, 
utilising case law and relevant legislation. The research also addresses 
relations of the EU with the major oil and gas producing countries of Russia, 
the Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf countries. 
 
Following Regional Security Complex Theory and gauging the pros and cons 
of regional and inter-regional energy cooperation, Kirchner and Berk (2010) 
propose that a comprehensive common energy policy and greater European 
cooperation can be expected due to liberalisation of energy markets, efforts to 
introduce a super grid of power supplies, and the spin-off from environmental 
policy, but that EU-Russian energy relations will stagnate rather than improve. 
From a rational choice perspective, it has been shown that aggregated rational 
self-choices of Member States steer EU collective action towards Russia 
(Bozhilova & Hashimoto 2010). Situated in an Intergovernmentalist approach, 
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Pointvogel (2009) argues that there has been a shift in priorities in energy 
policy towards emphasising supply security. The main drivers for deeper 
integration are Member States' perceptions of energy supply security, which is 
in turn significantly shaped by energy business' considerations. These factors 
shape and influence the willingness of Member States to further integrate 
energy policy and implement existing legal provisions, most significantly 
regarding the creation of the internal energy market. Utilising a regime 
theoretical approach, Padgett (2011) evaluates to what degree the EU's 
endeavour to diversify sources of supply and delivery routes are successful. 
The EU approaches potential energy partners across wider Europe within an 
institutionalised regime based on the norms of the internal market. His findings 
suggest that energy consumers in the EU’s neighbourhood are willing to 
implement multilateral institutions, but co-operation with energy producers is 
constrained by asymmetries of interest and regional geopolitics. 
 
Drawing from literature on the EU as a civilian power and from a system of 
governance perspective, Lavenex (2004) suggests that the EU should be 
conceived as a polity in the making, with its own perceptions of roles, 
responsibilities and threats. Against this backdrop, it was shown that the EU's 
neighbourhood policy serves as an external governance tool in energy policy 
through which the EU disseminates parts of its norms, rules and policies. 
However, using a new institutionalist framework together with the notion of 
socially constructed ideas, Kuzemko (2014) argues that the market liberal 
approach is not the only influential factor for the evolution of energy policy and 
contested by the ability of ideas to be influential in energy matters. Ideas are 
important explanatory variables concerning relations with Russia that go 
beyond materialist explanations of deteriorating relations based on Russia 
having resource assets (conducting incorrect market reforms) and the EU 
being an importer. Here, Russian energy governance changes are not the 
product of superior fuel assets and power politics, but are the consequence of 
embedded ideas about the socioeconomic role of energy. 
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Another prominent theme in the literature, which is relevant for this thesis, 
addresses the internal market. Scholars agree that efforts to liberalise energy 
markets are inherently interconnected with the external dimension. Completing 
the internal market, and in this context, the full unbundling via the 
implementation of the Third Energy Package was defined as a measure not 
only to enhance energy security but also to align Member States’ preferences 
towards third countries. Moreover, the creation of real gas markets with 
solidarity provisions would diminish Gazprom’s ability to play Member States 
off against each other (Grätz 2009). In a similar vein, market liberalisation was 
identified as the momentum for further integration, a principle of internal policy 
making and energy diplomacy. As the internal and external dimension are 
intrinsically interwoven, the strategy of market opening has been important to 
maintain energy security – and has been successful, especially in respect to 
countries which aspire to join the EU. However, this strategy might not be 
effective regarding countries who do not strive for membership (McGowan 
2008). 
 
Other scholars analyse the regulatory framework and the rules governing 
energy markets. Del Guayo et al. (2010) took stock of the effect that Ownership 
Unbundling (OU) – the separation of supply/generation activities from 
transmission network activities – has on property rights of gas and network 
owners. The research provides an account of the process of energy 
liberalisation in the EU over time, and the ramifications OU (as part of the Third 
Energy Package and the wider approach to liberalise energy markets) has for 
Member States with different preferences and opinions towards this potent 
policy tool. Yafimava (2013) assesses the Third Energy Package, including the 
Gas Target Model (a collection of regulatory steps to achieve a single EU gas 
market), the network code for a Capacity Allocation Mechanism (EU-wide rules 
on harmonising auctions selling access to pipelines), and the regulatory 
challenges it imposes on non-EU-suppliers, in particular for Russia, who is 
most affected by the energy package. By conceptualising national energy 
policy as a path dependent process, Baumann and Simmerl (2011) gauge the 
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potential of the EU's internal energy policy and the different attitudes of the 
Member States towards the external dimension of a common energy policy. 
Their findings suggest that the finalization of the internal energy market is a 
priority but can only be successful if accompanied by progress in the external 
dimension.  
 
Utilising the three-tiered agenda-building model, and embedded in a 
systematic historical analysis, Ciambra & Solorio (2015) have shown that the 
current paradigm to energy policy in the EU has its roots in the goals, 
regulatory customs, and market-driven approach derived from policy-making 
in the United Kingdom. A valuable contribution for this research project was 
provided by Eising (2002), who empirically showed how institutional norms 
affected the process of liberalisation of the European electricity supply 
industry. He concluded that shared norms (the consensus norm and reciprocity 
norm) and the concept of market integration permeating the institutional 
framework were constraining factors for Member States, however, at the same 
time making cooperative outcomes easier to reach and ensuring that actors’ 
fundamental concerns would be addressed.  
 
A thorough and concise analysis was deployed by Eikeland (2011b) who 
addressed the entire evolution of the process of liberalisation of internal energy 
market comprising all three energy packages, including the proposal and 
outcome of the Third Energy package, and a worthwhile account on Ownership 
Unbundling. Based on his findings he concluded, and in-line with the research 
of other scholars (e.g. Buchan & Keay 2015), that, although considerable 
progress has been achieved on the internal dimension, institutional reforms 
have been insufficient, accounted for by implementation failure of actors and 
because reforms have not yet gone far enough. Buchan & Kaey (2015) 
therefore propose a reform of the electricity markets, as the Commission, 
although recognising the need for change and the shortcomings of the current 
institutional design, does not address fundamental issues in its entirety. In 
addition, they argue for a more market-friendly regulatory regime, away from 
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technology-based approaches (realised through market intervention by 
Member States as these technologies are often costly), towards one in which 
state intervention is reduced to create a genuine level playing field and a solid 
basis for competition and free trade. Wood (2010), although not harnessing a 
distinct theoretical approach, gives a detailed account and thoroughly useful 
overview of Europe's energy mix - including economic and regulatory matters, 
environmental concerns (in particular CO2 emissions), relations with suppliers, 
public opinion, and concerns regarding nuclear power. Here, energy policy is 
conceived as a multi-dimensional field, inextricably interconnected with other 
policy areas.  
 
The fourth significant group of contributions addresses the Commission as the 
driving factor for institutional development. Eikeland (2011a) using a 
theoretical framework comprised of a supranational perspective and a policy 
network approach, rendered visible the Commission's capabilities to take a 
more ambitious stance in the proposal for the Third Energy Package. The 
Commission was able to exert more pressure towards unwilling Member 
States and exercised more independent will compared to the proposals from 
2003. In addition, the work has shown that the Commission utilised non-state 
agents and transnational networks both strategically to influence Member 
States and inform the proposal itself. Based on an analysis of the first gas 
directives employing a multiple streams framework, Herweg (2015) concluded 
that the rise of energy legislation on the institutional agenda resulted from the 
Commission’s success in framing energy matters as a competition issue, 
hence, providing a different view about the toolbox the Commission utilised to 
further deeper integration. In this analysis, the Commission exploited a policy 
window evoked by the uncompetitive state of energy markets and applied a 
competition clause of the EEC Treaty to foster an agreement between Member 
States who were reluctant to liberalise gas markets. Another explanation for 
the Commissions enhanced role in energy affairs was provided by Mayer 
(2008). Drawing from a HI framework, he argues that the Commission utilised 
path dependent dynamics to augment its role in the energy sector and to 
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establish itself as an important international player. The Commission 
presented itself as “an experienced ‘solution provider’ and productively 
engaged in coalition building with significant state actors” (ibid.: 271). Hence, 
the Commission shaped external energy policy toward an outcome that would 
not have transpired otherwise and it seemed less and less desirable for 
Member States to maintain an intergovernmental institutional framework.  
 
A different view is provided by Eberlein (2008) who conceives the Commission 
as a principal (as opposed to the ‘traditional’ view by scholars that Member 
States are considered the principals which delegate powers to the Commission 
as an agent) who delegates powers to sectoral governance actors and to build 
coalitions with private stakeholders and sub-state regulatory agencies. The 
Commission endorsed this strategy to create network mechanisms that can 
coordinate Member States’ policies and to acquire expertise of sectoral actors. 
Baumann & Simmerl (2011) argue that the Commission constantly increases 
its regulatory output to create a common energy policy. Key to success on the 
external dimension should be shared objectives about energy security 
collectively defined between Member States and the Commission, and the 
institutionalisation of sound procedures and instruments for maintaining 
external energy security. They conclude that an active role of the Commission 
is paramount in both cases; it is the Commission’s responsibility to identify and 
spell out the value of pooling resources on the external dimension; and the 
Commission should have a coordinative role utilising a toolbox that provides a 
set of diplomatic, political, and other measures in case of a supply disruption. 
Brutschin (2016), by focusing on the liberalisation of the gas market and the 
evolution of policies concerning trans-European gas infrastructure, argued that 
the Commission, utilised network governance to better coordinate energy 
policy. The creation of ACER and ENTSO-G - an agency and an association 
entrusted with the management and coordinated operation of the European 
gas network, and initiated by the Third Energy Package - has proved to be 
very successful and helped the Commission to link market liberalisation and 
measures concerning gas infrastructure. As shown in the research, the 
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Commission’s strategies depend on the environment in which it operates: hard 
power measures (competition law, infringement procedures) are used when 
there is a demand for security policies; soft-power measures (ad-hoc groups, 






This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter I presents the theoretical 
framework of this research. It elaborates on theories about European 
integration, then turns to Historical Institutionalism to discuss its key features, 
and explains and critically engages with the theoretical framework and its 
specificities vis-à-vis the rational-choice and sociological strand of 
institutionalism. Notably, the concepts of interest and preference formation, the 
calculus and cultural approaches, path dependency, institutional stickiness, 
lock-ins, inertia and equilibria, and the concept of critical junctures are 
expounded upon. Chapter II introduces the research design and methods and 
operationalisation of the main concepts; the dependent variable of integration 
in energy policy and how it is measured is explained. The logic informing the 
causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables is 
discussed. Finally, four hypotheses are developed and the independent and 
dependent variables are defined. The last section in the chapter deals with the 
applied methodology and case selection.  
 
The subsequent four empirical chapters look at the case studies and test the 
four hypotheses. The first empirical chapter, Chapter III, analyses the 
institutional developments in the period between the late 1940s/early 1950s 
until the 1980s and test the first hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that if no 
critical juncture occurs in a setting of high institutional stickiness, low 
integration can be expected. The chapter explores the inception and 
institutional design of the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom 
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and the institutional inertia that followed. Chapter IV investigates the 
implementation of the Single European Act (SEA) and its impact on energy 
policy. In doing so it tests the second hypothesis, which assumes that a locked-
in institution needs a critical juncture in order to be jolted-out of the 
dysfunctional institutional path. Chapter V explores the incremental policy 
change that occurred following the implementation of the SEA, the three 
energy packages and the introduction of legislation on the external dimension 
of energy policy. This chapter tests the third hypothesis that posits that if no 
critical juncture occurs in a path dependent institutional setting, incremental 
change of secondary legislation can be expected. The last empirical chapter, 
Chapter VI, analyses the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and factors that 
led to policy provisions under the Energy Union. It tests the fourth and final 
hypothesis regarding when high integration of primary law can be expected 
and the subsequent impact on the institutional trajectory. 
 
Finally, the Conclusion revisits the theoretical and empirical contributions of 
this thesis. It begins with an overview of the four hypotheses and the extent to 
which they are supported by the analysis of the empirical evidence. 
Subsequently, the main contributions of the project are discussed in more 
detail and placed within larger theoretical considerations within Neo-
Institutionalism. Finally, the main challenges and areas of potential criticisms 
are discussed and avenues for further research are highlighted. 
 
 
Chapter I: Historical Institutionalism as a Theoretical 
Framework 
 
The debate about the nature of the EU has created a remarkable output of 
theoretical assumptions about the governing processes and the factors 
explaining further integration. Two grand theories that have dominated the 
academic discourse for several decades and arguably resulted in a rather 
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sterile and gridlocked debate on what the EU is or how transformation within 
its institutional setting occurs. The two diametrically opposed approaches 
focus on either the dominance of Member States’ powers - the (Liberal-) 
Intergovernmentalist view - or emphasise the supranational momentum of 
integration - the multi-level governance (MLG) / policy network / (Neo-) 
Functionalist model. They provide a good backdrop to further elaborate on 
theoretical approaches, as some of their assumptions were incorporated in 
subsequent theories (markedly, New Institutionalism). 
 
 
1.1 European integration theory 
 
Neofunctionalism was conceived as a theoretical framework to contribute to 
the study of European regional integration. It rejects Realism and Neorealism, 
retains affinities to neo-liberal institutionalism and liberalism, and accepts a 
kind of soft rational choice ontology (Haas 2001). As Haas contends, states 
engage in cooperative behaviour according to their intended goals and their 
preferences: 
“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is 
a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing 
ones” (Haas 1958: 16). 
 
Neofunctionalists believed that integration would occur in the form of an 
automatic process as a consequence of societal and institutional actors who 
create a demand for services that the institutional setting can provide (Haas 
2001). Neofunctionalism focuses on the process of integration in general as 
opposed to focusing on background conditions or the end product of the 
process of European integration (Cram 1996: 44). This process of integration 
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is facilitated through the automatic process of spillover, which is self-
sustaining, rational and teleological, and which denotes the process in which 
actors shift their expectations for further integration towards supranational 
institutions. Actors support these new supranational institutions because they 
provide outcomes that are in line with their own sets of preferences. Based on 
economic integration, initial decisions to integrate a sector create pressure for 
deeper and wider integration. A given action of an actor to realise a predefined 
goal creates the situation in which the original goal can only be attained by 
taking further actions, which in turn creates demand for more action, and so 
forth (Rosamond 2006: 244). An important factor contributing to the spillover 
effect is the increase of economic interdependence between actors who find 
themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and resolve these by 
conceding more powers to the regional organisation (Schmitter 2005: 257).    
 
On the other hand, the diametrically opposed theoretical framework of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) sees Member States in the driving seat of regional 
organisations, without functional pressures automatically contributing to 
deeper integration. According to LI, Member States have the capacity to shape 
EU institutions to their will as a consequence of their respective bargaining 
powers. At the core are three essential elements: the assumption of rational 
state behaviour, a liberal approach to the formation of preferences, and an 
Intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. Member States have 
primacy over their institutional choices and decisions at all times and, hence, 
“the EC is best seen as an international regime for policy coordination” 
(Moravcsik 1993: 480). In order to achieve their predefined goals, Member 
States engage in interstate bargaining and goal-attainment is not dependent 
on a centralised authority, as suggested by Neofunctionalism. Strategic state 
choices are the reason for cooperation and Member States constantly evaluate 
potential alternative choices during negotiations (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 
2009: 68).  
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These discourses resulted in a binary and one-sided perception of the actors 
involved, emphasising either the dominance of Member States over 
supranational bodies or vice versa. The Intergovernmental approach did not 
take into account why certain proposals by institutions eventually resulted in a 
change in policy, and the Functionalist rationale was not able to explain why 
at some point integration slowed down or came to a halt. Apart from their 
purpose to explain integration from their particular standpoint, these two 
approaches were not able to analyse possible intervening variables or 
occurrences that conflicted with their assumptions. For instance, 
Neofunctionalism is not suited to explaining energy policy in its historical 
context, as it assumes that integration in one sector exerts functional pressure 
(or ‘functional spillover’) to integrate other sectors. Following this rationale, 
energy policy should have been integrated much earlier as, for instance, 
certain sectors were integrated at the EU level but a common approach was 
not instigated until the 1990s. Therefore, the concept of economic spillover 
does not provide much explanatory value (at least not until the 1990s). On the 
other hand, Liberal-Intergovernmentalism provides a slightly better tool to 
analyse energy policy and decision-making, as the framework considers 
Member States in the driving seat with no institutional pressure influencing 
their decision-making – an assumption that can be observed in the 
1960s/70s/80s. However, it does not provide much explanatory value for later 
periods. In the 1990s the institutional framework and institutional powers were 
considerably strengthened. Hence, the improved institutional design 
influenced and constrained actors’ options in terms of decision-making, much 
more than in the previous decades, and Member States were not always in the 
driving seat. Moreover, and most importantly, the framework is more suited to 
explaining big decisions – like Treaty changes – and is not suited to analyse 
day to day politics or smaller events that might be relevant for the policy area. 
 
To account for the shortcomings of the aforementioned theories, my research 
proposes to utilise HI, a mid-range theory that is part of the new institutionalist 
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literature. The following section will offer a comprehensive discussion about 
the features of historical institutionalism. 
 
 
1.2 Historical institutionalism as a theoretical framework for 
the study of energy policy 
 
HI will be applied as the overarching theoretical approach used in this 
research. It emerged with the revival of institutional theories in the late 1980s, 
which found their way into European studies by the early 1990s. It must be 
noted here that the ‘old’ institutionalism (the ‘predecessor’ of new 
institutionalist forms; before the behaviourist revolution of the 1950s) could be 
deemed a rather descriptive approach, incorporating descriptive juxtaposing 
accounts of institutional settings in its analysis, with no explanatory capacities 
that could facilitate comparative research, unlike the new institutionalist tenets 
(see Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Peters 2012). The new institutional 
approaches and their success in political science can be attributed to 
“overcoming the impasse of intergovernmentalists/ neofunctionalist debate” 
(Pollack: 1996: 430), offering viable analytical tools to understand and gauge 
the role European institutions play during the integration process.  
 
This project builds on the work of Arthur (1988), Scharpf (1988), North (1990), 
Thelen & Steinmo (1992), Pollack (1996, 2008), Thelen (1999), Peters et al. 
(2005), Capoccia & Kelemen (2007), Pierson (2000, 2004), Steinmo (2008), 
and Fioretos et al. (2016). It fits into the wider literature on HI by further 
developing concepts of temporal processes, such as path-dependence, critical 
junctures, increasing returns and positive feedbacks, institutional stickiness 
and institutional lock-ins. It expands on the phenomenon of institutional 
persistence and the constraint actors face over time, to answer the question 
of why, once a specific path is taken, departures or deviations from this path 
become less likely and how and when change occurs. Moreover, it elaborates 
on the formation of actors’ specific preferences.   
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Institutions are understood as actors and structures in which agency is 
embedded (Saurugger 2014). Although very diverse in their assumptions, 
institutionalists agree on one premise, namely, that 'institutions matter'. 
Different strands evolved within the approach, such as rational choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and 
discursive institutionalism (Hall & Taylor 1996, Saurugger 2014). These 
theories evolved as a reaction to behavioural approaches that dominated 
political science in the 1960s and 1970s (Hall & Taylor 1996), which 
considered political phenomena the aggregate consequence of behaviour at a 
group or individual level, defining actor's preferences and power exogenous to 
the political system, and portraying formally organised institutions simply as 
arenas in which political behaviour occurs (March and Olsen 1984). 
Institutionalists, on the other hand, consider institutions not just as facilitators 
of exchange between actors, but rather as entities developing strategies based 
on self-interest (Saurugger 2014). But how should we define institutions and 
what are their exact features? 
 
Such considerations are important as, contended by Mayer (2008), who used 
HI to study the evolution of the EU’s external energy policy, institutions have 
an impact as they shape political outcomes (ibid.). When considering what HI 
could offer to the study of sustainable energy transitions, Lockwood (2017) 
suggests that institutions not only constrain individual choice or affect 
individual strategies, but also shape attempts by groups of actors to collectively 
pursue their interests. Hence, it is paramount to define how we can 
conceptualise institutions (especially, given that the word ‘institution’ could 
mean many things) and why they have a strong capacity to influence political 
outcomes. Steinmo (2008) succinctly proposes that “the most common 
definition for institutions is: rules” (ibid.: 159). Some scholars (see Streeck and 
Thelen 2005) bestow these rules a formal character, whereas others (see Hall 
1989, Marcussen 2000) stress the informal nature of rules and norms.  
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“Whether we mean formal institutions or informal rules and norms, they 
are important for politics because they shape who participates in a given 
decision and, simultaneously, their strategic behaviour” (Steinmo 2008: 
159). 
 
Against a backdrop of a new institutionalist definition encompassing both 
formal organisations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct 
(Thelen & Steinmo 1992), HI seeks to emphasise two overarching principles 
that define politics: policy development unfolds over time and many of these 
processes are embedded within institutions (Pierson 1996). HI stresses the 
difficulties in reversing or substantially altering particular choices once they 
have been made. It depicts policymaking as a process that is characterised by 
long periods of substantial stability, referred to as 'path dependency', which is 
interrupted and punctuated by turbulent 'formative moments' (North 1990, 
Pierson 2000, Peters et al. 2005). This cycle is subsumed within the notion of 
'punctuated equilibrium', namely that processes are characterised by stability 
but expect short bursts of rapid institutional change after which institutional 
stasis sets in again. New structures are formed during crisis, imposed through 
conquest or implemented by the prevailing social structure, and once in place, 
they develop a life of their own (Krasner 1984). These formative moments, also 
called 'critical junctures', are critical because they place institutional settings 
on trajectories which are subsequently very difficult to alter. Critical junctures 
are treated as the starting points for processes that follow a path dependent 
rationale. They are "relatively short periods of time during which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the 
outcome of interest" (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007: 348). Critical moments are 
characterised by a situation in which structural pressure (economic, cultural, 
ideological, organisational) is significantly reduced for a relatively short period. 
Most importantly, in these moments, the scope and range of possible choices, 
to be made by powerful actors, increase substantially, and the consequences 
of their choices are much more significant; "Contingency […] is paramount" 
(ibid.: 343). Actors face constraints regarding their choices during phases of 
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equilibirum, whereas they are free during phases of change. The critical 
moment must be brief in relation to the equilibrium. The duration has an impact 
on actors' capabilities to act more freely: the shorter the juncture, the more 
open it is (ibid.). Critical moments can be created by both internal and external 
forces (Collier & Collier 2002). 
 
The theory emphasises the 'stickiness' of historically evolved institutions 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992). They tend to be ‘sticky’ as the designers of 
organisations do not want ‘their’ organisation to fall into the hands of 
opponents (and be altered by them), and, due to the nature of modern 
democracies, can only shut these opponents out by shutting themselves out 
too. Once initial steps are taken, or institutional reform is initiated, it is difficult 
to undo these steps although they might be costly for MS or infringe on state-
sovereignty (Pierson 1996). Thus, although actors posses initial primacy 
during institutional formation, and seek choices that align with their 
preferences to maximise their benefits (Pollack 1996), they nevertheless carry 
out policy and institutional reform (or in this regard, create institutions) that 
alter their position in an unanticipated or undesired way (Pierson 1996). 
Pierson identified several arguments why gaps – divergences between 
institutional and policy preferences of Member States and European 
institutions – emerge and why these gaps restrict Member States’ control 
capabilities. In this regard he lists the following accounts as sources of change: 
the short-time horizons of decision-makers, the formation of unanticipated 
consequences (e.g. high issue density – the sheer scope of decision-making 
in the EU diminishes the ability of Member States to control policy trajectory), 
the possible shift of Member States policy preferences, unanticipated sunk 
costs and – based on a principal agent rationale – the partial autonomy of 
institutions (ibid.). Pierson defines path dependency, the rigidity of institutional 
trajectory, as “dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which generate 
multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which 
events unfold” (Pierson 2004: 20). 
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As a source for a narrow conception of the term, he refers to Levi’s (Levi 1997 
as citied in Pierson 2004) definition of path dependence: 
“Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a 
country or region has started down a track, the cost of reversal are very 
high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. 
Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the 
same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. 
Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other 
– and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a 
climber begins is the one she tends to follow” (ibid.: 20). 
 
Pierson elaborates on the notion of path dependence, in which preceding 
steps into one direction lead to further movement in that direction, with the 
concept of ‘increasing returns’. Routed in economics, it suggests that due to 
self-reinforcing and positive feedback processes, the probability of further 
steps along the same path increase with every step, as the relative benefits – 
compared to alternatives – rise. Or put differently, the cost of exit increases 
(Pierson 2000). In his seminal work on the evolution of technology, Arthur 
(1994) defined several indicators for the rationale behind increasing returns: 
large set-up or fixed costs (actors have incentives to stick with a choice where 
initial costs were high), learning effects (acquired knowledge leads to higher 
returns), coordination effects (benefits increase with the number of actors), and 
adaptive expectations (expectations about joint usage among actors 
reinforces a choice) (Arthur 1994: 112). In a subsequent analysis, North (1990) 
argued that Arthur’s categories can be applied to institutional settings. There 
are large costs involved when institutions are created, learning effects apply 
due to the opportunity set provided by institutions, contracts with other 
organisations increase coordination, and expectations will be ‘streamlined’ as 
the prevalent contractual environment creates stability (ibid.). “In short, the 
interdependent web of an institutional matrix produces massive increasing 
returns” (North 1990: 95). 
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He points out that both efficient (meaning certain mechanisms provide the best 
choices) and unproductive paths may exist (ibid.) The concept of increasing 
returns by Arthur and North provides valuable insight and explanations for an 
analysis of energy policy, both from an institutional and a technical 
perspective. Initial costs of creating a formal institutional structure to implement 
and coordinate different policies, production, electricity grids and transmission 
lines, pipelines and infrastructure are high, as are the technological solutions 
themselves due to competitiveness and length of time for their development 
(Kirchner & Berk 2010). Once initiated, learning effects among different actors 
improve the efficiency of institutional settings and, as contractual agreements 
with other institutions are made, coordination between actors increase and 
expectations about future events lead to stability in the system (North 1990: 
95).  
 
This model provides a useful explanation for stability and a state of equilibrium, 
but it tells us little about institutional change. However, to give a possible 
explanation for change, we have further to think about equilibrium institutions. 
As Pollack (1996) points out, once institutional choices are made, derived from 
intergovernmental bargaining based on rational expectations, institutional 
inertia, the consequence of equilibrium institutions, emerges due to a 
“combination of uncertainty, transaction costs and institutional barriers to 
change” (Pollack 1996: 438). Along similar lines, Scharpf (1988) provides an 
explanation for ‘lock-ins’ (to be understood in this research as the most rigid 
form of institutional inertia), which can ultimately block institutional evolution. 
He refers to these as resulting in a ‘joint-decision trap’. These “pathologies of 
substantive public policy” are based on two institutional conditions: “first, the 
fact that national governments are making European decisions and, second, 
that these decisions have to be unanimous” (Scharpf 1988: 267). In this sense, 
as long as policies are placed in the intergovernmental domain (as opposed to 
supranational decision-making), and unanimous voting rules apply (as 
opposed to qualified majority voting), policy choices tend to be rigid and 
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unresponsive to change and “have an inherent (non-accidental) tendency to 
be sub-optimal” (Scharpf 1988: 267). In addition, in an ongoing joint-decision 
system in which unanimity applies (or any other decision rule) and in which the 
exit option is foreclosed (to withdraw from the system), the ‘default condition’ 
of the institutional arrangement pre-empts institutional development if an 
agreement is not achieved. This means that in an event of non-agreement the 
continuation of existing policies entrenches actors and creates the adverse 
condition that they have to stick to the institutional commitments even in the 
event of sub-optimal outcomes. As Scharpf poignantly illustrates, 
“In a dynamic environment, the implications for the substantive quality 
of public policy are obvious: when circumstances change, existing 
policies are likely to become sub-optimal even by their own original 
criteria. Under the unanimity rule, however, they cannot be abolished or 
changed as long as they are still preferred by a single member” (ibid.: 
257). 
 
This explanation for policy development offers some promising insights for 
energy policy: as long as Intergovernmentalism and unanimous voting rules 
applied in the historical context, the analysis will treat policy development as 
substantially hampered. A central focus of this research project is a way to 
operationalise various degrees of stickiness. In this work Scharpf’s joint 
decision trap only applies to ‘substantial’ lock-ins: in this sense, the highest 
possible state of stickiness. As it distinguishes between different degrees of 
institutional inertia (stickiness), it also provides different explanations for 
institutional change when these ‘sticky’ institutions are punctuated by critical 
junctures. 
 
On the other hand, North’s definition of path dependency, and the logic of 
increasing returns, will be deployed for explaining mechanisms that lead to 
certain path-dependent policy choices, but nevertheless allowing for 
incremental change: in this case, a low state of stickiness can be ascertained. 
In the words of North: 
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“Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand 
today’s choices (and define them in the modelling of economic 
performance) without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions” 
(North 1990: 100). 
 
North helps us to explain certain processes of path dependence when 
Scharpf’s definitions of substantial ‘lock ins’ do not apply 
(intergovernmentalism / unanimous voting), as, although these processes 
establish institutional inertia, North’s explanation still leaves room for change 
through “continuous marginal adjustments” (ibid.: 101). To consolidate the 
model: there are two modes of institutional stickiness: high (Scharpf) and low 
(North). Furthermore, sticky institutional arrangements, whether high or low, 
are subsequently punctuated by critical junctures, placing the institutional 
arrangements on new trajectories. 
 
The above-proposed explanations about increasing returns are rooted in 
rational choice theory. However, as a complementary analytical unit, this 
research will also ask the question to what extent ideational factors contributed 
to policy decisions. In this sense, it will go beyond mere rationalist 
interpretations of institutional choices. It will employ both a rational choice 
approach and a non-rational choice approach, allowing for an analysis of both 
‘worlds’: the strategic calculations of actors and how norms and values may 
have informed policy choices. Historical institutionalists tend to be eclectic in 
structuring their theoretical concepts; they draw their insights from both a 
‘calculus’ approach (rational and strategic choices) and a ‘cultural’ approach 
(behaviour dependent on roles/norms/cognitive scripts/individual’s worldview 
- derived from sociological institutionalism) (Hall & Taylor 1996, Pierson 1998). 
The common denominator of HI is its emphasis on temporal processes 
(Pierson 1998). But a fundamental question is: why should we apply either one 
(or both) of these two approaches to gauge institutional choices in a historical 
context? If there is a long-standing rivalry between these two strands in 
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theories of politics, especially in new institutionalist literature (see Blyth et al. 
2014), what do we gain from engaging with theoretical dichotomies? 
 
HI stands right in between these two views and gives us a thoroughly viable 
and comprehensive explanation: human beings are both norm-abiding rule 
followers (the cultural approach – norms & values) and self-interested rational 
actors (the rational choice approach). It very much depends on the individual 
actor in a given situational context, on how the actor behaves, which norms 
and rules to be identified as the possible causal mechanism(s) behind his/her 
actions, or what particular rational choice(s) the actor makes – there is no a 
priori knowledge on how to study politics or which of the two theoretical 
approaches should be applied (Steinmo 2008). 
"A historical institutionalist does not believe that humans are simple rule 
followers or that they are simply strategic actors who use rules to 
maximise interest. A historical institutionalist can even be rather 
agnostic to these issues. What the HI scholar wants to know is why a 
certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred. Most 
likely, any significant political outcome is best understood as a product 
of both rule following and interest maximizing" (Steinmo 2008: 126). 
 
March and Olson (1989), directly draw attention to this duality in their seminal 
work about institutions and posit that, 
"political actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or 
instead of, by calculated self-interest; politics is organized around the 
construction and interpretation of meaning as well as, or instead of, the 
making of choices; routines, rules, and forms evolve through history-
dependent processes that do not reliably and quickly reach unique 
equilibria; the institutions of politics are not simple echoes of social 
forces; and the polity is something different from, or more than, an arena 
for competition among rival interests" (March and Olsen 1989: 159). 
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Hence, the difference between Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological 
Institutionalism and HI is that HI takes a position in between both camps, 
embracing and incorporating assumptions of both theoretical frameworks into 
the theoretical body, however, emphasising the effects (both enabling and 
constraining) that institutions have on actors over time (Pollack 2008). To 
understand both theoretical camps better, this chapter will now turn to an 
assessment of central assertions of the calculus approach (rational choice 
approach) followed by analysis of the cultural variant (sociological approach) 
before drawing inferences for HI based on these findings. 
 
1.2.1. The calculus approach – logic of consequence  
 
The ‘calculus approach’ embraces the notion that institutions persist because 
they constitute a Nash equilibrium. Individual actors would be worse off if they 
deviated from an institutional choice; therefore, an inherent logic of adherence 
of actors to the previously agreed institutional rules is prevalent. Institutional 
choices are made to overcome collective action problems; they lend stability 
to institutions, decrease transaction costs and diminish uncertainty (Hall & 
Taylor 1996). Actors have their spheres of influence; the interaction of these 
spheres of influence and their overlap of preferences and capabilities is 
assumed eventually to create the policy outcome. Interests lie at the core and 
shape these preferences. It is necessary to highlight that a distinction has to 
be made between the preferences of Member States and their interests in 
order to provide theoretical clarity. It is furthermore crucial to elaborate on 
preference formation, as the calculus and cultural approach diverge in this 
matter.  
 
In rational choice theory, interests are the fundamental values and are to be 
understood as the most basic objectives an actor can have (Woll 2008). Milner 
(1997) elaborates that these basic objectives change little and actors strive to 
maximise their fundamental interests. However, preferences are subject to 
change and derive from interests, they are “the specific policy choice that 
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actors believe will maximise either their income or chances of re-election on a 
particular issue […] [p]references are a variable; interests are not” (Milner 
1997: 15). As a consequence of this assumption, actors might share the same 
interests in the first place but nevertheless have divergent preferences (that is 
between Member States), and vice versa (between a Member State and the 
Commission). Based on these preferences it is possible to accurately depict 
how agents act rationally (Dietrich & List: 2012) and why they make certain 
policy and institutional choices. 
 
Furthermore, the calculus approach posits that preferences are exogenously 
given (Thelen & Steinmo 1992, Thelen 1999). Whatever process informs and 
creates preferences precedes the choice process and can be regarded as 
independent from it (March & Olsen 1989). This idea is a fundamental one in 
modern choice theory, in the "revealed preference" version of the theory 
(actors are not directly asked about policy choices but they are revealed when 
gauging choices), preferences must be stable to be testable. In other variants 
of choice theory, preferences can change, but the "choice itself does not 
produce a change in preferences" (ibid: 163). Due to this stability, current 
preferences are good predictors for future preferences, they are in addition 
unambiguous and consistent, and thus choices will be clearly indicated (ibid.).  
 
To sum up the core assumptions: interests are fixed, actors never change their 
fundamental interests, at most they might change preferences over actions 
after learning new information about a likely outcome. In addition, they are 
exogenously given; a standard rational choice theory cannot explain how they 
are formed. Preferences are a crucial feature, however, they are an “essential 
but inexplicable feature of the agent’s personal identity” (Dietrich & List 2012: 
2). 
 
Where can we locate institutions in a continuum of rational choices? The 
rational choice approach considers "institutions as exogenous constraints, or 
as an exogenously given game form" (Shepsle 2005: 24). An assumption that 
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denotes a unique feature of rational choice theory is its emphasis of 'equilibria' 
and 'equilibrium order' to gauge political phenomena (and institutions). 
Institutions are coordinating mechanisms, which maintain and sustain these 
equilibria (Thelen 1999). Rational choice institutionalism assumes that once 
actors chose an institution, they are in equilibrium. No actor within the 
institutional setting, and with a constitutional right to amend the institution, has 
an incentive to do so (Pollack 1996) due to the argument of rational choices 
made at an earlier stage. "Institutions are simply equilibrium ways of doing 
things. If a decisive player wants to play according to different rules (…) then 
the rules are not in equilibrium and the 'institution' is fragile" (Shepsle 2005: 
26). These claims are made by strong versions of rational choice theory, 
"which begin with a (universal, not context specific) rationality assumption" 
(Thelen 1999: 375).  
 
However, as Pollack (1996) emphasises, we see institutional choices to be 
consciously and successfully amended by actors, thus assuming that 
institutions must have fallen into disequilibrium. The question is why change in 
prevailing institutions happens. North’s rationale (allowing for incremental 
change based on path dependent processes) and Scharpf’s joint decision 
argument made earlier in this chapter already gave us some answers. The 
following section, however, will give us more indicators on how such 
phenomena can be explained. 
 
 
1.2.2. The cultural approach – logic of appropriateness 
 
The ‘cultural approach’, without neglecting that actors behave rationally and 
on a purposive basis, imputes humans to act according to their particular 
worldview. Actors are ‘satisficers’ as they opt for the solution that satisfies a 
certain threshold of needs, and not utility maximisers, who search for an 
optimal solution depending on a trade-off of all available information. They tend 
to make decisions depending on the interpretation of a given issue, and not 
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just merely upon an evaluation of a set of rational criteria and thoroughly 
instrumental calculations. Against this backdrop, institutions provide moral and 
cognitive templates, allowing for individual construction of possible action (Hall 
& Taylor 1996). The actors are deeply embedded in these institutions, which 
transport norms, values, symbols and scripts, and these ideational factors 
create filters for interpretation and define possible action. Actors gauge not 
only the situations but also assess themselves (their actions) within a given 
context. Institutions provide strategically useful information about possible 
choices and they shape the identities, self-images and preferences of actors 
(ibid.). 
 
Traditional rational choice theory can explain preferences, but it tells us little 
about preference formation per se (Dietrich & List: 2012). As mentioned above, 
the cultural approach, on the other hand, offers valuable insights: 
"Most research on preferences (…) indicates that preferences and 
meanings develop in politics, as in the rest of life, through a combination 
of education, indoctrination, and experience. They are neither stable, 
nor precise, nor exogenous. If political preferences are moulded 
through political experiences, or by political institutions, it is awkward to 
have a theory that presumes that preferences are exogenous to the 
political process" (March & Olsen 1989: 163) 
 
Let us have a look at this issue from the cultural approach first, which will 
subsequently guide us towards a rational choice explanation. The cultural 
approach claims that preferences are endogenously given. As diametrically 
opposed to the assertion of modern choice theory, it proposes that institutions 
are not mere means to channel policy and structure political conflict. Rather, 
institutions shape interests and objectives endogenously in addition to the 
aforementioned primary structural functions.  
 
Hence, preferences are shaped by, and created within, institutions. Preference 
formation is informed by societal processes and, in contrast to rational choice 
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theory, is endogenously given. Bulmer (1998) analyses the development of the 
Single European Market (SEM) and ascribes explanatory value to ideas, 
values and norms embedded in institutional settings. Likewise, he theorises 
that ideational values are deeply embedded within institutions, which inform 
actors and the evolution of ideas, hence substantiating the ideational rationale 
of preference formation. Institutional structures are permeated by norms and 
codes of conduct, and it is difficult to demarcate formal institutional rules from 
their normative context.  
 
Institutions operate as gatekeepers and structure access to political 
processes. They induce a kind of bias and, due to the institutions of intrinsically 
anchored norms, symbols and values, shape the behaviour of actors. In 
addition, institutions develop a certain endogenous momentum for policy 
change that goes beyond a mere mediating role between different actors, 
helping us to conceive why European institutions can serve as agenda-setters. 
Hence, institutions can distribute policy ideas, e.g. market integration was 
conceived as a central norm promoted by the Commission, which helped to 
create a new policy agenda in the case of the SEM (Bulmer 1998).  
 
The behaviour that can be observed in political institutions reflects the routine 
way in which people do what they are supposed to do. Simple stimuli cause 
certain standardised behaviour amongst individuals who do not extensively 
assess the situations on grounds of rationality. Institutions have a set of norms 
that they convey, to be imposed either by direct coercion or authority, or they 
may be part of a code of ‘appropriate behaviour’, which is learned and 
distributed through processes of socialisation or education. In social science, 
it is a commonplace observation that action is often based on gauging the 
normatively appropriate behaviour rather than on calculating the expected 
returns (March & Olsen 1989). Political actors associate “specific actions with 
specific situations by rules of appropriateness” (ibid.: 23). A strong focus has 
to be placed on duties and obligations, rather than calculated decision-making. 
Against this backdrop, political and social institutions define, and transmit 
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through a process of socialisation, the appropriate behaviour for a person in a 
specific situation. Political institutions follow, and are organised by this “logic 
of appropriateness” (ibid.: 160). 
 
How can change be explained through a cultural approach? As mentioned 
above, HI emphasises the importance of ideas in the process of preference 
formation in institutional arrangements. If an institution is successful in 
institutionalising a set of ideas, the institutional trajectory becomes difficult to 
change. Peters et al. (2005) point out that in order to do so, it needs leadership 
or external shocks. Change can happen if a certain policy choice becomes 
dysfunctional; a disjuncture between norms and performance must be 
perceived by different actors. Subsequent to the perceived failure, actors must 
have the opportunity to choose from new ideas, given that new ideas are 
available - they must be at hand in the first place. Ideas can be a significant 
source for punctuations in established equilibria, and it is crucial to understand 
that conflict over these ideas within institutions plays a significant role. Ideas 
do inform political conflict over an agenda, either regarding what issues are on 
a political agenda or what form the issues will take. In this sense, political 
conflict can be a motivator and a momentum for change (ibid.). Within this 
context, “[i]deas do matter a great deal in explaining institutional change” (ibid.: 
1296).  
 
Hall (1989), in his seminal work on Keynesian ideas, analyses how ideas 
informed institutional change in several countries. The striking and fascinating 
notion is that, although ideas might not be expected to be found in economic 
phenomena, they are substantial factors influencing policy choices, even in a 
highly ‘technical’ environment normally associated with material interests, 
monetary capacities and money flows. Ideas are commonly seen as a part of 
the superstructure rather than the base of political economy (in this respect the 
institutional frame), however, they are important constituting parts of 
institutions. “To neglect the role of ideas (…) is to miss an important component 
of the economic and political worlds” (Hall 1989: 361). It is ideas that inform 
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political leaders and institutions. Structural accounts of institutions give us tools 
to understand the constraints policy makers face, but “policy making is based 
on creation as well as constraint”, since new policies have to be developed 
(ibid.: 361). However, to ascertain ideas’ explanatory value and simply to cite 
them is not enough. It is paramount to also pay attention to the question of why 
certain ideas succeeded over others in order to bestow them explanatory value 
(ibid.). It is important to mention Hall’s work, as the world of energy policy 
resembles the world of economics, with rigid structures and actors that might 
be expected to be rationally based rather than ideationally guided. 
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood” (Keynes 1936: 383). 
 
 
1.3. The Historical Institutional approach towards preferences 
 
As already explained in the section on the core assumptions about HI, the 
difference between Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological 
Institutionalism and HI is that HI takes a position in between both camps, 
embracing and incorporating assumptions of both theoretical frameworks, 
however, emphasising the effects that institutions have on actors over time 
(Pollack 2008). In HI, scholars work within the boundaries of both traditions. 
This is the central and most important observation that must be made when 
comparing the three theoretical approaches and compartmentalising their 
similarities / differences. Long-standing rivalries, especially between the 
sociological and rational choice strand, make it necessary to untangle any 
ambiguities. Moreover, in contrast to Rational Choice Institutionalism, HI in 
general rejects pure ‘functionalist’ explanations to why institutions are created. 
Functionalist explanations tend to stress that institutions are created by 
contemporary actors in order to efficiently delegate specific functions to 
institutions, and pay little to no attention to historical legacies (ibid.). Thus, 
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rational choice explanations emphasise the continuation of equilibrium 
institutions that generate optimal outcomes at any point in time. 
 
HI, on the other hand, proposes that institutional choices made in the past can 
persist at a later point in time and shape and restrain the possible options for 
actors. That said, HI Scholars like Pierson fully integrate assumptions about 
actors and their preferences that are in-line with rational choice theory. Pollack 
(2008), another proponent of the rational-choice strand of HI, considers HI not 
as a school of thought, 
“but rather as a particular variant of rational-choice theory emphasizing 
the importance of time, feedbacks, sequencing, and path-dependence 
in the study of politics” (Pollack 2008: 4). 
 
Rational choice approaches within the HI literature emphasise the rule-based 
nature of institutions and that all actors are fully aware of the terms and 
conditions upon which the institution is based. On the other hand, as Hall 
(2010) emphasises, the sociological strand of HI stresses the assumption that 
institutions are inherently ambiguous and open to interpretation and re-
interpretation rather than based on distinct rules. This shift in perception is not 
dependent on an active agreement between a coalition of actors. Rather, it 
can occur through a process of re-interpretation, which causes the meanings 
actors attribute to a specific institution to change over time, in conjunction with 
shifts in patterns of action (Hall 2010).  
 
The central questions to be answered in an institutional analysis is how an 
institution affects the behaviour of individuals, and how actors behave within a 
predominant institutional setting. As broached in the section above, historical 
institutionalists can apply both the ‘calculus approach’ and / or the ‘cultural 
approach’ in their institutional analysis (Hall & Taylor 1996). The calculus 
approach contends that human behaviour is based on strategic calculations 
and preferences are given exogenously. The cultural approach, on the other 
hand, posits that behaviour is not fully strategic but contingent on an 
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individual’s world view and that preferences are given endogenously (ibid.). 
Can we reconcile both strands by striving “for creative combinations” (Thelen 
1999: 380), and if ‘yes’ is the response, to what degree? How do we know 
which rationale sets the stage for the behaviour of actors – self-interest or 
norm-based actions – and which principle is the predominant rationale in a 
situation? Steinmo (2008) gives a succinct answer to this question: 
“[t]he historical institutionalist would go to the historical record (also 
known as evidence) and try to find out” (ibid.: 126). 
 
Actors are both rational actors and norm-abiding rule followers. Thus, 
behaviour is dependent on the individual, the context, and the rule (ibid.). This 
research project will therefore not foreclose the possibility of taking advantage 
of both theoretical strands. Rather, the empirical evidence will be analysed 
inductively with the help of a variant of HI that allows for both rational choice 
and sociological explanations. Building on the seminal work of Hall and Taylor 
(see Hall & Taylor 1996: 940), this project adopts an eclectic approach to the 
three institutionalisms, driving by the empirical content observed 
 
Along these lines, and contingent upon the evidence, the analysis will therefore 
assess whether decisions to amend the legal framework of EU energy policy 
(both primary and secondary law) are based on rational calculations or 
ideational factors - or whether a combination of some sort is evident. Does this 
mean that the Historical Institutionalist must fully engage in an all-
encompassing synthesis of the two strands? The simple answer is no. Rather, 
as Thelen (1999) suggests, “we might instead strive for creative combinations 
that recognize and attempt to harness the strengths of each approach” (ibid.: 
380).  
 
For instance, a preliminary analysis of secondary data, such as press releases 
affiliated with European affairs, suggests that on some occasions actors 
showed a reluctance to provide technical assistance to each other during crisis 
situations and strived to tackle the crises with disproportionate measures 
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creating the institution to be in disequilibrium (Roggenkamp et al. 2016). Crises 
here can be understood as exogenous factors disrupting the functioning of 
energy markets, namely cold spells during harsh winters. The omission of 
cooperation in turn led to market failure and, in the end, proved to be 
disadvantageous and very costly for the actors involved. From a rational 
choice standpoint, committed to the notion that institutions are in equilibrium 
and that actors always have the necessary information available to maintain 
the status-quo, such behaviour cannot be sufficiently explained. As actors are 
considered rational and self-interested utility-maximisers, they should have 
opted for cooperation to tackle the issue and to minimise the impact of the 
exogenous threat on the markets.  
 
Consequently, proposals for improvement of the regulatory framework were 
made. Thus, it will be expedient to enhance the theoretical model and ask 
about how ideational factors contributed to the development of policy 
instruments capable of tackling special circumstances, such as energy crises 
/ situations where the ‘regulatory demand’ of an institution is high (surpassing 
the regulatory means of markets under normal circumstances), and which 
push the capabilities of institutions to its limits. Simply put, the analysis of policy 
development and the way that institutions respond to crises might benefit from 
a carefully adjusted framework that combines materialist explanations with 
ideational factors. Steinmo (2008) understands ideas as “creative solutions to 
collective action problems” (ibid.: 131). New ideas can help actors to solve 
immanent problems. This implies that institutional change is about to happen 
when powerful actors have the ability and the political will to change the 
institution in favour of new ideas. A ‘good idea’ is understood as one where a 
group of actors come to a common understanding that there is a problem that 
needs to be solved and that the idea, the ‘creative solution’, actually addresses 
the problem. Thus, “[s]een in this way, ideas are not ‘irrational,’ but instead are 
best understood as creative adaptations that can be evaluated both on rational 
and emotive grounds” (ibid.: 131). 
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The strategy to endorse both theoretical camps is particularly fruitful as such 
an examination of the historical record will reveal which kind of preferences 
actors endorse and why an institution follows a certain trajectory. The rational-
choice approach helps to account for stability and continuity in the institutional 
setting, facilitating incremental change; the notion of exogenous factors 
generating the possibility for critical junctures investigates how institutional 
change can be reasoned through factors that lie outside the institution. 
Ideational factors, on the other hand, will contribute to the analysis by revealing 
that certain decision-making processes and institutional change might be the 
product of changes in ideas about the institution and on what grounds it should 
be governed. Such considerations have important ramifications for our 
understanding about institutions and policy development. 
 
Steinmo (2008) trenchantly comments on the divide in the literature: 
“[t]here has been an unfortunate and unnecessary tendency to pit 
‘ideational’ analysis against ‘rational’ choice in a way that appears to 
argue that one bases decisions either on ideas or on rational 
calculations. This is an absurd distinction” (ibid.: 138). 
 
In order to substantiate such considerations, Blyth (2016) cites Hall and 
Lamont and postulates that a thorough and comprehensive explanation of a 
decision should abstain from a choice between  
“ideas or interests in the study of politics; rather, the contemporary 
condition is marked by the interaction between neoliberal ideas about 
states and markets and the material endowments of actors and groups” 
(Hall & Lamont 2013 as cited in Blyth 2016: 159). 
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Chapter II: Research Design 
 
This work is located in a positivist epistemology and the theoretical framework 
laid out above will be used to generate testable hypotheses. The following 
section will therefore present four hypotheses which aim at testing the effects 
of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The proposed 
dependent variable (DV) is the measured variation of the process of integration 
in European energy policy over time. It can be described as the outcome of 
the decision-making process; the agreements reached between the different 
actors and the legal provisions implemented to enrich the acquis. The 
proposed independent variables (IVs) are the interplay of both institutional 
stickiness and critical junctures and directly affect the DV. But how will 
integration be measured in the first place? To this end, this work develops a 
framework that distinguishes between three analytical units that are important 
in the institutional continuum: intended goals (the desired targets a policy 
should achieve), policy output (the core output of the institution), and policy 
outcome (the level of effectiveness of the policy output). The latter two units of 
analysis will help us to form a solid basis for the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the DV. 
 
The following paragraphs will establish a model to conceptualise the DV and 
the IV and establish the four hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section. 
Firstly, the three analytical units will be discussed, of which intended goals and 
policy outcome form the basis for measurement of the process of integration, 
which is defined as variations of the DV. Secondly, we will look at a way how 
we could conceive feedback processes as these are dependent on, and 
closely related to, the aforementioned three units forming the basis for the 
measurement of the DV. This could also be done in the section on the 
methodological approach, however, as positive feedback processes are a 
central concept in the HI analysis, and play a prominent role in shaping the 
level of integration of institutional development, the decision was made to 
discuss these in this section of the thesis. Thirdly, the IVs will be defined and 
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operationalised; specific functions of institutions and institutional stickiness will 
be discussed; and critical junctures will be operationalised. Lastly, and based 
on the IV and DV, four hypotheses are proposed that will contribute to 
answering the research question. 
 
 
2.1. The dependent variable – measuring integration 
 
Intended goals are understood as the goals that the institution collectively tries 
to accomplish. These desired targets are agreed upon by all the actors 
governed by the institution and are conceived as the means to overcome 
specific energy-related issues / problems. Energy policy is comprised of 
different sub-fields. For instance, the contemporary proposal for the Energy 
Union addresses five distinct sub-fields, referred to in the official 
documentation as ‘dimensions’: Security solidarity and trust; a fully-integrated 
internal energy market; energy efficiency; climate policy; research, innovation 
and competitiveness. Each of these specific attributes of energy policy have 
their own goals and policy instruments at their disposal. However, the 
dimensions are also closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Historically, 
this segmentation / distinction between the dimensions has not been as 
pronounced as it is in the current proposal for the Energy Union and certain 
dimensions have gained prominence over the years, as the regulatory demand 
towards the institution increased. Nevertheless, each segment of energy policy 
has its own set of intended goals that the institution strives to accomplish. The 
predefined goals are addressed through, and should be attained with, specific 
legal provisions (the policy output) that the institution implements and adjusts 
when deemed necessary. 
 
Policy output is associated with the legal provisions the EU published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. These provisions are the rules and 
guidelines all the different actors must adhere to - or at least should adhere to 
- and are conceived as the very core of the institution. As we will see in the 
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empirical chapters, although the EU provides the legal framework for a wide 
range of aspects of energy policy, and which are constantly expanding, 
suboptimal outcomes, manifesting themselves in form of infringement 
procedures instigated by the European Court of Justice, or emerging as the 
consequence of the failure of markets, are not uncommon and lay bare the 
weaknesses of legal provisions. In summary, the policy output denotes the 
encompassing and overarching regulatory framework that strives to govern the 
behaviour of the actors with specific ends to be attained. Thus, the policy 
output (the rules) is the core of the institution. We now engage with the next 
analytical problem of how to measure policy outcome. 
  
Policy outcome is understood as the actual result of how different actors 
transform the policy output into concrete action. The policy output, as laid out 
in the preceding paragraph, sets out the fundamental underlying rules that 
regulate, enable and restrain the course of their actions. Thus, an analysis of 
the policy outcome reveals the accomplishments, implications and 
shortcomings that the conversion of legal provisions into actors’ activity entails. 
It is crucial to understand and assess the effectiveness and ‘quality’ of the 
policy output –  the scope and the depth of the legal provisions - and how they 
play out in reality. The policy output does not necessarily translates into legal 
provisions that sufficiently provide sets of rules capable of creating the most 
optimal and desired outcomes for the institution. Rather, legal instruments are 
‘snapshots’ of the present, conceived to address issues at a certain point in 
time, and future implications and pitfalls are not, or cannot be, sufficiently 
addressed due to a certain degree of historical contingency. Historical 
contingency is an important factor influencing institutions as, although in 
hindsight historical developments seem to be inevitable and logically 
connected, institution and actors have to face and respond to events that they 
could not anticipate in advance. From a HI standpoint, institutions and human 
beings are a subject of change as they adapt and are affected by history itself 
(Steinmo 2008). Exogenous factors and critical junctures could be events 
creating contingency. This means that exogenous events, either relatively 
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small or on a large scale, can impact a policy field in a way that was not 
anticipated when certain policy choices were made. Pierson (2000) elaborates 
further on the impact of small events creating contingent responses by the 
institution and states that, “relatively small events, if they occur at the right 
moment, can have large and enduring consequences” (ibid.: 263). Moreover, 
and most importantly, shortcomings in the regulatory framework might emerge 
due to the fact that a coalition of actors might not share the same preferences 
in the first place and, hence, policy proposals by the Commission might be 
watered down during the negotiation process. Thus, an assessment of the 
policy outcome is important to develop an understanding about the 
effectiveness of the institution regulating specific aspects of energy policy. 
 
The analysis of the policy outcome, the ‘effectiveness’ of the policy output, in 
the empirical section will not digress into a critical or normative appraisal of 
what the EU should or could have done, but rather provide a solid benchmark 
on how successful the legal framework was in regulating energy policy at a 
certain point in time. As previously outlined, the effectiveness of the policy 
output determines how well the activity of actors is governed and whether 
positive pay-offs are evident for all parties involved; whether policies lead to 
desirable and tangible results that help to achieve predefined goals; whether 
policies are able to deal with exogenous factors and threats; and whether 
policies lend stability to the institutional trajectory and contribute to institutional 
equilibrium. Indeed, the analysis provides an account of whether the policy 
framework is actually suited to, and effective in, tackling imminent issues and 
attaining a set of proposed goals. Effectiveness is directly connected to the 
policy outcome (and has a strong correlation with it). As a consequence, the 
policy outcome, understood as variation in effectiveness, defines how well a 
certain dimension of energy policy is integrated. Put differently, in this PhD 
thesis, integration is understood as the degree to which a policy proves to be 
effective in attaining a set of predefined goals. An explanation of how to 
measure the policy outcome (the effectiveness) and the level of integration will 
be outlined later in this section. In summary, the policy outcome is the extent 
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to which primary and secondary legislation (the policy output) is capable of 
effectively governing different dimensions of energy policy.  
 
As previously stated, whether the provisions (the policy output) are capable of 
effectively regulating the dimension of energy policy concerned, is dependent 
upon the policy outcome (the level of effectiveness of the policy output). To 
summarise the interplay of all three analytical units: the policy outcome is 
dependent on the effectiveness of the policy output, and the policy output in 
turn is dependent on the intended goals envisioned by the coalition of actors.  
 
Now that we have defined these three analytical dimensions, how can we 
measure the level of integration in practice? To enhance the model still further, 
the level of the process of integration is defined as the difference between 
policy outcomes addressing the same policy area in different points in time – 
the difference measures the variation in the DV. To recall, the policy outcome 
is in turn dependent on the effectiveness of the policy output (the core of the 
institution). Intended goals are the predefined goals set out in order to 
effectively regulate / improve a certain dimension of energy policy; the policy 
outcome is the implementation of legal provisions by various actors in a real-
world situation. Thus, the level of integration is measured and defined as the 
difference between different levels of policy outcome (effectiveness of the 
policy output) at different points in time. The higher the difference of these 
policy outcomes, the more the area of energy policy concerned is effectively 
integrated. In turn, and to put it differently, the less disparity there is between 
policy outcomes, the less integration happened. 
 
 
2.1.1. Measuring the DV / integration – an example 
 
Let’s say, for the sake of argument and to illustrate how the analysis will be 
conducted in the empirical section, that we want to measure the degree of 
integration of energy markets over time. Firstly, we would look at policies that 
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relate to the internal energy market, for instance, the so-called Three Energy 
Packages could be the point of reference. We would define the intended goals 
of the institution as the means to remove barriers for market participation (and 
market entry) for all actors and to create unhindered flows of energy and 
capital throughout the internal market. Moreover, another intended goal would 
be the creation of a level playing-field, without market-distorting practices in 
place that are executed by powerful actors. Intended goals are delimited in 
policy proposals and preambles of legal provisions and indicate the objectives 
that are envisioned by the institution. 
 
Secondly, having defined the intended goals, the analysis can turn towards the 
policy output. To accurately analyse whether policy provisions effectively 
accomplished the intended goals, we would look at secondary legislation that 
was published in the Official Journal over time. The analysis of the legal 
provisions would entail a ‘stocktaking’ of the policy instruments at disposal 
addressing the concerned ends for each legislative package. Each of the three 
packages has explicit means to be deployed which the actors deemed 
appropriate to liberalise the markets at a certain point in time. 
 
Thirdly, the analysis would turn to indicators that measure the degree of market 
liberalisation. For instance, the degree of competition is a good indicator for 
market liberalisation. A high number of suppliers and low market concentration 
indices are seen as indicators of competitive markets. Another indicator is the 
level of market coupling as this is an important driver for wholesale electricity 
price convergence (ACER 2014). Accompanied by this, the development of 
interconnections of different energy grids also serves as a good indicator for 
market liberalisation. In addition, as some of the legal provisions come with the 
obligation to report its impact back to the Commission, such accounts can 
serve as a very good basis for the said assessment. Moreover, and most 
importantly, all new proposals issued by the Commission point to the 
shortcomings of the preceding legislative means and, thus, are also invaluable 
indicators concerning the effectiveness of policies, introducing feedback 
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mechanisms. The aforementioned indicators would be used to measure the 
policy outcome, the results that happen when various actors and stakeholders 
translate provisions into concrete action. 
 
Lastly, the level of integration could be rendered visible based on the 
difference between policy outcomes over time, the policy outcome is the 
effectiveness of published legislation (the Three Energy Packages); the 
measurement is based on the aforementioned indicators that directly 
correspond with the degree of successful market liberalisation. The closer the 
two analytical units are, and the higher identifiable variation takes place, the 
better energy markets are integrated over time.  
Although the policy output already provides a good indication of whether 
certain issues attract policy makers’ attention, it would be inaccurate to 
measure the difference between policy outputs over time, as the policy output 
does not tell us anything about how effective legal provisions are in governing 
actors’ behaviour. Such considerations would fall short of an accurate 
assessment of whether a regulation indeed provides the necessary policy 
instruments for effective governance – a consideration that certainly is 
provided if we compare different policy outcomes. A legal provision addressing 
a certain area of energy policy does not necessarily translate into an effective 
provision. Also, the quantity of published legislation tells us little about whether 
the institutions are capable of effectively implementing the legislation and 
whether it successfully results in the predefined goals.  
 
 
2.1.2. Explaining path dependence, positive feedback processes and 
increasing returns 
 
As laid out in the theory chapter, a concept that is prominently featured in the 
HI literature is the notion of path dependence, involving positive feedback 
processes and increasing returns (Pierson 2004). This section will set out how 
these concepts will be operationalized based on the analytical dimensions of 
 50 
intended goals, policy output and policy outcome. It is a logical step to explain 
the relationship of these three dimensions (intended goals, policy output and 
outcome) with the concept of feedback processes at this point. 
 
Positive feedback processes are a well-suited analytical tool that helps to 
explain the phenomenon of stability in an institutional setting, and the reasons 
why institutions manage to remain on a rigid trajectory with an inherent 
resistance to change. Self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes can also 
be described as increasing returns processes (Arthur 1989, Pierson 2000, 
Pierson 2004). Path dependence is well captured by the notion of increasing 
returns, the phenomenon that the probability of further steps down a certain 
path increases with each step taken into the same direction (Pierson 2000). 
Collective action within an institution is prone to developing the qualities of 
positive feedback processes. Adaptive expectations are a reason for positive 
feedback mechanisms: 
“actors must constantly adjust their behaviour in the light of how they 
expect others to act. Whether you put energy into developing a new 
party, or join a potential coalition, or provide resources to an interest 
group may depend to a considerable degree on your confidence that a 
large number of other people will do the same” (ibid.: 258). 
In addition, collective action always involves high start-up costs (material and 
cultural), and creates a good amount of learning and coordination effects. 
 
This PhD thesis posits that the different dimensions of European energy policy 
and governance display all these features to various degrees. Indeed, high 
start-up costs for energy systems are an obvious example due to the cost-
intensive nature of energy production, transmission and regulatory oversight. 
These costs generate high expectations of both investors, who want to see 
their investments generating sure profits (grounded in the fact that certain 
generating technologies amortise just after a considerable amount of time has 
passed), and policy makers, who want to create a regulatory framework 
providing a secure and sustainable supply of energy and an environment that 
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attracts investors and maintains fluid markets. However, it is not just economic 
factors that generates adaptive expectations and positive feedback processes.  
 
Learning and coordination effects also create a momentum for positive 
feedback and path dependent processes. Learning effects arise within 
institutions as actors take advantage of the opportunity sets provided by the 
institutional framework. Once a certain path is established, the network 
externalities, the learning process of institutions, and “the historically derived 
subjective modelling of the issues reinforce the course” (North 1990:99). 
Based on the model by Arthur (1988), however, learning effects might be 
conditioned and constrained to a certain degree as the processes of learning 
in political institutions differ from learning effects applied in economics. Pierson 
(2000) clarifies that actors who engage in highly complex political 
environments are heavily biased in how they filter information. Information that 
tends to confirm and reinforce the prevailing institutional trajectory will be 
incorporated, whilst disconfirming information will get filtered out. Thus, social 
interpretations of complex political environments instigate feedback processes 
as they are frequently shared with other actors and, thus, create network 
effects and adaptive expectations. “The need to employ mental maps induces 
increasing returns” (Pierson 2000: 260). Based on these considerations, 
learning within institutions is guided by a rationale that is embedded within, 
and shaped by, the institutional design. 
 
In this PhD thesis, the concepts of path dependence and positive feedback 
mechanisms are deployed as important analytical tools to explain the 
institutional trajectory at a certain point in time; once an increasing returns 
process is established, the institution will be in equilibrium and quite resistant 
to change. However, based on the assumptions of HI, under such conditions, 
incremental steps and alterations can nevertheless be expected to change the 
institutional path. But how will this research project deploy the concept of path 
dependence? In the preceding paragraphs we established a framework on 
how to conceptualise an institution (the policy output), how to measure the DV 
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– the measured variation of the process of integration - based on the difference 
of policy outcomes over time; and the role of intended goals, understood as 
the goals that the institution collectively tries to accomplish. Positive feedback 
processes are dependent on, and closely related to, these three units. The 
continuum of the intended goals, policy output, policy outcome, and the 
inherent monitoring processes associated with the policy outcome constitute 
the basis for an explanation of how increasing returns, and associated 
incremental institutional change, can be perceived. 
 
Let’s recall the ‘cycle’ of an equilibrium institution punctuated by formative 
moments followed by path dependent processes in order to deploy a basis for 
the conceptualisation of increasing returns. First of all, a critical juncture (or 
trigger event) punctuates the institution in equilibrium and instigates a 
institutional disequilibrium. Critical moments can be created by both internal 
and external forces (Collier & Collier 2002). Whilst a clear definition of how this 
project operationalises a critical juncture will be provided in the subsequent 
methodology section, it is worth mentioning here that not only ‘big’ events 
constitute a critical juncture (and can have big consequences), small events 
that occur at the right time, can also establish long-lasting legacies (Pierson 
2000). However, as Capoccia & Kelemen (2007) note, some of the HI literature 
overemphasises that a set of random, small and sequenced events can 
instigate a process of increasing returns. They rightly point to a shortcoming 
of such general assertions: the neglect of power as a key dimension in politics. 
“Political science analyses of critical junctures (and synonyms) most 
often focus not on random small events but instead on decisions by 
influential actors—political leaders, policymakers, bureaucrats, 
judges—and examine how, during a phase of institutional fluidity, they 
steer outcomes toward a new equilibrium” (ibid.: 354). 
This means that actors are not merely ‘bystanders’ during formative moments, 
but actively influencing the decisions that are made to defend or enhance their 
own interests (Thelen & Steinmo 1992). 
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If we go back to the original goal to further conceptualise feedback processes 
dependent on the three analytical units: intended goals, policy output, and 
policy outcome. Firstly, a critical juncture (formative moment) impacts on an 
institution. Thus, and as a consequence of the critical juncture, powerful actors 
make certain choices that put the institution on a specific trajectory. During the 
formative moments, the decisions that are made can have long-lasting 
consequences (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, Pierson 2000, Pierson 2004, 
Thelen 1999, Peters et al. 2005). The institution is set on a specific path and 
increasing return processes start to unfold. The decisions that are made as a 
consequence of the formative moments are enshrined in the rules that are 
conceived to govern the institution – the policy output. Subsequently, actors 
translate the policy output into activity based on the institutional rules. Path 
dependent processes, as laid out in the previous paragraphs, entrench the 
institution and lend the institution stability, but make it also difficult and 
resistant to change. The ramifications of the policy output being transformed 
into action, as seen in the policy outcome, constitute the rationale for feedback 
processes. How can we explain this phenomenon? 
 
The fundamental implications of the policy outcome display the features of, 
and are the driving factors for, increasing returns, such as high start-up costs 
(material and cultural; costs that actors want to generate positive Return On 
Investment), learning and coordination effects (like monitoring and evaluation 
of policies), and adaptive expectations. All these factors contribute to feedback 
loops that affect the institution. Actors like the Commission, but also agencies 
and associations like ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators), ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity), ENTSO-G (European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Gas), and stakeholder consultations, assess the 
effectiveness of the policy output based on the policy outcome. This means 
that the institutional rules, and the behaviour of actors, are constantly re-
evaluated and monitored due to actors within the institutions, who assess the 
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viability and usefulness of specific policies and ensure that institutional rules 
are followed. 
 
However, these actors are also shaped by, and constrained through, the 
institutional layout and can only operate within their assigned parameters. HI 
proposes that institutional choices made in the past can persist at a later point 
in time and shape and restrain the possible policy options for actors (Pollack 
2008). Moreover, they are heavily influenced by learning effects and adaptive 
expectations, as they have a high interest in reinforcing the institutional 
trajectory (Pierson 2000). Based on this assessment, information about the 
policy outcome is reported back to the institution – the feedback process is 
complete. The feedback in turn triggers an adjustment of the definition of the 
intended goals and the specific policy means that are deemed appropriate to 
tackle specific issues. Subsequently, the new intended goals generate a new 
policy output (an amended set of rules – the specific policy choices). 
Consequently, the feedback cycle starts all over again. However, this time the 
institution does not face a critical moment, the ‘fuel’ for the institutional 
trajectory is provided by path dependence and feedback. These ‘new’ 
feedback processes, however, which ultimately manifest themselves in an 
adaption of the institutional framework, are only capable of instigating 
incremental steps and small changes of the institutional rules. Due to 
institutional constraints and path dependency, major alterations are not 
possible. The institution faces an equilibrium; path dependency provides the 
‘glue’ to hold the institution together and the cost of exit increases for the 
different actors the longer they remain within the institutional framework. 
 
 
2.2. The independent variables: their effects on the dependent 
variable 
 
As we have defined the analytical units of integration and feedback processes, 
we will now turn to a discussion of the relationship between the independent 
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and the dependent variables. The independent variables (IV) are deduced 
from the theoretical approach outlined in the beginning of chapter I. Two 
independent variables are defined, as they can be perceived as central units 
of analysis in HI: institutional inertia (lock ins & path dependence) and critical 
junctures. The IVs are informed by a continuum of both different levels of 
stickiness and whether a critical juncture happens or not. The two modes to 
operationalize stickiness are labelled as low and high institutional stickiness. 
Low institutional stickiness is reasoned through North's increasing returns 
rationale (North 1990), as discussed in the section on feedback processes and 
increasing returns. Increasing returns, characterised by path dependence 
processes, nevertheless allow for the possibility of incremental change, 
including learning effects, and coordination effects, driven by adaptive 
expectations. High institutional stickiness is operationalised on the basis of 
Scharpf’s joint decision trap (Scharpf 1988). Intergovernmentalism in 
combination with the unanimous voting rule creates substantial ‘lock ins’. Once 
these factors are suspended, and QMV is in place, change is possible. These 
two modes of institutional arrangements are then either punctuated by critical 
junctures, or they are not. However, after a critical juncture has occurred and 
the formative moments are over institutional inertia settles in again and 
constrains the possible choices visible during formative moments. The 
measurement of the degree to which an institution is sticky or not will be 
operationalised with the help of a proxy variable, as explained in detail below. 
 
 
2.2.1. Institutions and their specific functions 
 
In order to operationalise the ‘stickiness’ of institutions, this section will recall 
how the HI literature conceptualises institutions and discuss which functions 
they fulfil. Institutions are understood as actors and structures in which agency 
is embedded (Saurugger 2014). HI asks how institutions affect the behaviour 
of individuals (Hall & Taylor 1996). From a rational choice standpoint, 
institutions provide coordination functions, whereas without neglecting the 
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regulatory capabilities of institutions, HI focuses on how historical legacies and 
temporal processes produce, and are responsible for, specific outcomes 
(Thelen 1999). “In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with 
organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal 
organization” (Hall & Taylor 1996: 7). As discussed in the theory chapter, when 
it comes to the formation of actors’ preferences, HI accounts for both rationality 
(the calculus approach) and ideational values (the cultural approach). 
Institutions are based on rules that govern the actions of various actors, and 
thus, the policy output (the rules) is the core of an institution. 
 
From a calculus standpoint, institutions provide the necessary means to create 
certainty for actors about the present and future behaviour of other actors. 
Institutions generate stability, confidence in contractual agreements between 
actors, as they provide enforcement mechanisms and penalties for defection. 
The cultural approach, on the other hand, stresses that actors’ preferences 
and behaviour is not necessarily strategic (without neglecting the possibility for 
strategic action), but rather contingent on the actors’ worldview. From this 
perspective, institutions provide moral and cognitive templates for 
interpretation and action. The cultural approach suggests that institutions 
provide not only useful information for strategic action, as laid out in the 
calculus approach, but also shape and affect the self-image, identities and 
preferences of actors (Hall & Taylor 1996). The HI literature postulates that 
institutions do more than channel policy and structure political conflict, but 
rather the institutional context also defines and shapes objectives and both 
dimensions are inseparable (Thelen 1999).  
 
Building on these assumptions, this PhD thesis endorses the notion that 
institutions are not only capable of efficiently regulating and governing political 
processes, but in turn are also central to shaping and influencing the 
preferences of actors. Institutions can constrain and shape the political 
strategies of actors, but are also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of 
political strategies, political conflict and the choice of different actors. 
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Institutions include both formal organisations and informal rules that shape 
actors’ conduct (Peters et al. 2005). They are conceived to organise the polity 
and play a central role in governing how power and authority are exercised, 
constituted, controlled and legitimated. Institutions are central factors in 
constraining and enabling the range of possible action; they define the 
regulatory capacity of a political system. “Institutions simplify political life by 
ensuring that some things are taken as given” (March and Olsen 2008: 4).  
 
Institutions are hence an essential component of the political sphere as they 
help to define goals among actors and provide the necessary rules capable of 
integrating a specific policy area – the policy output. They play a remarkably 
important role in structuring, organising and governing political processes and, 
at the same time, enable and constrain the actors that are embedded within 
the institutional framework. Institutions are the ‘glue’ that ties a coalition of 
actors together, and they are the very fabric the political realm is composed of. 
Rules for governance can be formal or informal, however, they are the central 
point of reference and constitute the very core of the institution. Therefore, if 
we refer back to our three analytical units for the measurement of integration, 
institutional rules form the very basis of institutions and are closely associated 
with the policy output. 
 
 
2.2.2. Institutional stickiness & critical junctures 
 
Institutional stickiness is defined as one of the two independent variables 
influencing the dependent variable. The second IV is whether a critical juncture 
happens or not. ‘Stickiness’ means that the institutional setting is quite rigid 
and resistant to change. Even if specific decisions might be beneficial for a 
range of actors, institutional constraints diminish the range of possible 
alterations to the framework and hinder a substantial deviance from an existing 
path. To put it differently, stickiness is synonymous with resistance to change 
over time. The question is how and why are institutions sticky? This project 
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proposes that institutions can be sticky for two reasons. Firstly, they tend to be 
sticky due to the various factors that were discussed in this section explaining 
positive feedback processes: feedback is based on increasing returns, 
learning and coordination effects (for instance, the monitoring of policies 
translated into action), and adaptive expectations by all the involved actors. 
Secondly, institutions can become subject to a particular strong version of 
stickiness (or institutional inertia), which is caused by an institutional design 
that endorses veto players and which pre-empts any efforts by actors to 
change the institutional trajectory. This mode of high institutional stickiness is 
referred to as ‘lock-in’. But how do we recognise whether one or the other 
influences decisions made in an institution? The concept of institutional 
stickiness cannot be directly measured as we defined an institution as a set of 
rules, which is associated with the policy output. However, whether the policy 
output (or a policy) is ‘sticky’ or not, and moreover, to what degree stickiness 
occurs, cannot be directly analysed. Therefore, stickiness will be 
operationalised with the help of a proxy variable. 
 
The proxy variable utilised to measure stickiness is the voting rule endorsed in 
the institution: unanimous voting or qualified majority voting. The proxy 
variable can be understood to have two values. Firstly, based on Scharpf’s 
joint decision trap model (1988), if unanimous voting is the rule, the policy area 
will be almost impossible to change. This value is referred to as ‘high 
institutional stickiness’. Due to the requirement of a unanimous vote to 
instigate change, the institution remains on its path and is locked-in on a 
specific institutional trajectory. The second value of the proxy variable is 
termed ‘low institutional stickiness’. It can be observed when unanimous voting 
is suspended and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is the main voting rule – or 
when QMV is the voting rule from the beginning. In this case, the institution is 
capable of altering its regulatory framework to a certain degree. However, due 
to increasing returns and path dependent processes, merely incremental 
change is possible.  
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To provide a summary of the IV ‘institutional stickiness’: 
 
High Institutional Stickiness = Unanimity Voting (no change of the 
regulatory framework / Scharpf’s joint decision trap applies)  
 
Low Institutional Stickiness = when Qualified Majority Voting applies 
(change is possible to a certain degree due to increasing returns; however, 
merely incremental change) 
 
Thus, the level of (possible) integration during the phase of institutional 
equilibrium (the phase where secondary legislation is made = the 
provisions that define day to day energy policy) is determined by both 
the stickiness of the institution and the degree of integration of primary 
law. 
 
The second IV is whether a critical juncture happens or not. But what exactly 
is a critical juncture? As mentioned in the previous chapter, Capoccia and 
Kelemen (2007) suggest that the duration of the critical juncture must be brief 
relative to the path dependent process that it incites, and that during this critical 
moment the probability that the agent’s choice will affect the subsequent 
outcome is significantly higher than before and after the juncture. Agents face 
a much broader range of possible choices compared to the time during the 
path dependent institutional trajectory, and the impact these choices have on 
subsequent outcomes is therefore significantly heightened. Capoccia (2015) 
identifies the following explanatory approach:  
‘an event or a series of events, typically exogenous to the institution of 
interest, lead to a phase of political uncertainty in which different options 
for radical institutional change are viable; antecedent conditions define 
the range of institutional alternatives available to decision makers but 
do not determine the alternative chosen; one of these options is 
selected; and its selection generates a long-lasting institutional legacy 
(ibid.: 151).  
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However, as Capoccia further clarifies, the trigger events for critical junctures 
do not necessarily need to be based on exogenous events but might also 
originate in endogenously generated driving factors. For example, power 
holders might disrupt institutional equilibria to achieve political objectives 
(ibid.). The notion that formative moments can rely on both exogenous and 
endogenous events is especially relevant for the HI analysis. It leaves room 
for an explanation that institutional change can be either initiated by 
exogenous factors (as a rational choice approach would suggest), or 
endogenously, without foreclosing that ideas and ideational factors might also 
trigger institutional change. In the words of Steinmo (2008),  
“[b]ringing ideas into our understanding of institutional change, then, 
brings agents back into institutional analysis. One could argue that a 
key weakness of institutionalism in the past has been that actors could 
be simple hostages of the institutions that they inhabit. Integrating ideas 
into the analysis addresses this problem by making institutions both a 
constraining/incentivizing force and the object of political contestation” 
(ibid.: 133). 
 
Thus, the assertion that an analysis of institutional change based on a HI 
framework entails embracing both notions, is fully corroborated by Capoccia’s 
considerations about formative moments. Further explanation of how to 
approach critical junctures from a methodological perspective will be provided 





The relationship between the two IVs leads to variation in the DV. The DV can 
be understood to have three values based on the degree of integration: low 
integration, moderate integration, and high integration. A clear description of 
the scale of integration will be provided in due course. We have already 
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discussed how to operationalise integration in the ‘measuring integration’ 
section. Intended goals and the policy outcome together define the level of 
integration. To recall: the level of the process of integration is defined as the 
difference between policy outcomes over time. 
 
 
2.3.1. Impact of the two IVs on the DV & measuring integration 
 
Low integration 
Impact of the IVs: Low integration takes place when high institutional 
stickiness coincides with no critical junctures. The high institutional stickiness 
(the institutional ‘lock-in’) will create high countervailing pressures to change, 
and prevents the institution from changing at all in the absence of a catalytic 
event like a critical juncture. In this case, Scharpf’s joint decision trap fully 
applies (measured through the proxy variable) as the cause for the institutional 
lock in.  
Logic: As discussed in the previous section, integration is measured as the 
difference between policy outcomes. Based on this rationale, low integration 
is expected when goals are defined, however, they cannot be attained as the 
conceived policy outputs are not sufficiently capable of tackling specific issues 
and do not translate into effective legislation. Actors might show some 
willingness to address specific issues, but the institution simply does not 
provide the necessary framework to attain the goals. When comparing different 




Impact of the IVs: Moderate integration of primary law will happen when high 
institutional stickiness encounters a critical juncture. The high institutional 
inertia prevents the critical juncture from unfolding its full possible potential, 
which it would do if institutional stickiness would be lower, culminating in a 
moderate outcome. A second case of moderate integration takes place when 
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low institutional stickiness falls together with no critical juncture. North’s 
increasing returns model then fully applies; path dependent processes are 
revealed, allowing for incremental change.  
Logic: Moderate integration can be expected to occur when goals are clearly 
defined and, due to provision in primary law, the institution has the capacity to 
attain these goals to some degree. The difference between two policy 
outcomes over time might still be rather moderate, pointing towards 
shortcomings in the effectiveness of the policy output. However, when 
comparing different policy outcomes, the difference between them shows an 
increase of the effectiveness of the policy output over time - incremental policy 
change is possible, the ‘effectiveness curve’ of the policy output is much 
steeper than during time of low integration. 
 
High Integration 
Impact of the IVs: High integration of primary law will take place when low 
stickiness occurs together with a critical juncture. This can be explained 
through the rationale that when institutions are not locked in, they are open to 
incremental change, and critical junctures can have a very high impact on an 
institutional choice. Primary law will be amended (through non-incremental 
change). However, after the critical juncture, the institution will fall back into 
equilibrium and a process of moderate integration will be instigated based on 
path dependency. Low integration will be a value as long as certain parts of 
the decision-making process are still subject to unanimous voting (for instance, 
measure of fiscal nature in Article 194(3) TFEU concerning energy policy). 
Logic: High integration can be expected when specific goals are defined and 
the institution provides the necessary means to attain these goals to a high 
degree. Although certain actors (for instance Member States) might not share 
all their preferences with other actors, the institutional trajectory and 
institutional capacity that is provided, creates a fertile ground for policy-making 
that bears a large amount of effectiveness. Of course, negotiations to reach a 
specific agreement might still be cumbersome and hard to accomplish. The 
institution is capable of generating policy outputs that are able to effectively 
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regulate the behaviour of actors and attain collective goals (the policy 
outcomes). 
 
Based on these characteristics, whenever a critical juncture occurs, non-
incremental change of primary legislation can be expected. The change is non-
incremental, as the critical juncture compels rapid change in the institutional 
setting. In the absence of such forces, incremental change of secondary 
legislation can be expected. It is thus incremental, as the absence of a critical 
juncture makes it possible for the institution to change gradually, and no short 
bursts of ‘catalytic’ events (critical junctures) compel institutional amendments. 
In a nutshell, after a critical juncture punctures the institution, the institutional 
trajectory is altered and a higher level of integration can be expected.  
 
However, and as elucidated in the next section, endogenous or exogenous 
events can have an effect on the institution as well. These do not initiate far 
reaching changes in the institutional design and primary law but nevertheless 
have the capability to influence secondary legislation. They are not quite as 
strong as the ones that alter the institutional trajectory as a whole, but still 




2.3.2. The Four Hypotheses 
 
Institutional stickiness, the first IV, is associated with the policy output (the 
rules) and measured with help of the proxy variable of the voting system. A 
critical juncture, the second IV, is understood as an event (exogenous or 
endogenous) punctuating the institutional equilibrium. Finally, the level of the 
process of integration, the DV, is measured as the difference between policy 
outcomes (how the rules are eventually transformed into concrete action) 
addressing the same policy area at different points in time. 
 
Table 1. Hypotheses 
Independent  
Variables (IV)  
IV: High Institutional 
Stickiness:  
Scharpf's Joint Decision 
Trap  
IV: Low  
Institutional Stickiness:  
North's increasing returns 
rationale 





of Primary Legislation 
H4: High Integration  
Non-incremental change 
of Primary Legislation; 
followed by process of 
moderate integration of 
secondary law 
IV: No Critical  
Juncture  
H1: Process of Low 
Integration; Minor 
change of Secondary 
Legislation 
H3: Process of Moderate 
Integration 









The Independent variable (IV) depends on both the degree of institutional 
stickiness (low – high) and whether a critical juncture happened or not.  
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The Dependent variable (DV) is the measured variation of integration as 
explained in the section ‘measuring integration’. The DV is understood as the 
decisions that are reached and has three values: low integration, moderate 
integration, and high integration.  
 
Hypotheses: 
The hypotheses are falsifiable, therefore substantiating the positivist position. 
 
H1: If no critical juncture occurs in a setting of high institutional stickiness, low 
integration can be expected. ‘Small’ critical events will have no effect on the 
institution. 
H2: If a critical juncture occurs within a setting of high institutional stickiness, 
moderate integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form of a 
non-incremental change of primary legislation.  
H3: If no critical juncture occurs in a setting of low institutional stickiness, 
moderate integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form of 
incremental change of secondary legislation. However, small endogenous and 
exogenous events can have an impact on the institution in equilibrium, 
providing the possibility to alter the trajectory of a specific part of secondary 
law. 
H4: If a situation of critical juncture occurs within a setting of low institutional 
stickiness, high integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form 
of a non-incremental change of primary legislation. After the critical juncture 
occurred, the institution falls back into equilibrium and a process of moderate 
integration of secondary law can be expected. 
 
 
2.4. Data and methodology 
 
The study utilises a mixed methods approach which will be discussed in detail 
in the next section. The case selection, which is informed by the generated 
 66 
hypotheses, will be explained subsequently leading to elaborations on the 
methodology applied.  
 
Table 2. Hypotheses with case selection 
Independent  
Variables (IV)  
IV: High Institutional 
Stickiness:  
Scharpf's Joint Decision 
Trap  
IV: Low  
Institutional Stickiness:  
North's increasing returns 
rationale 
IV: Critical  
Juncture  
H2: Moderate Integration  
SEA Treaty  
Non-incremental change 
of Primary Legislation 
H4: High Integration  
Lisbon Treaty and 
beyond  
Non-incremental change 
of Primary Legislation 
IV: No Critical  
Juncture  
H1: Low Integration  
1950s - 80s 
H3: Moderate Integration  
Three Energy Packages  




This thesis analyses the policy evolution from the early 1950s – the creation 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) - to 2017, which includes 
the first proposals made by the Commission for a common energy policy up to 
the implementation of the most recent legislation. This timeframe will enable a 
comprehensive and holistic analysis of the policy area from its inception to the 
most recent significant developments, namely the implementation of the 
European Energy Union. The case studies used to test the hypotheses were 
chosen based upon a preliminary reading of policy developments, and an 
extensive examination of secondary literature addressing the various 
dimensions of energy policy. These insights provided an initial understanding 
of the policy field and concomitant developments within the sector. Moreover, 
the case selection was informed by the theoretical framework and its 




The delimitation from the 1950s to the 80s will inform the case for the first 
hypothesis. Energy issues were on the table of European leaders during this 
period, for instance, the proposals to enhance European integration on the 
basis of an integrated energy and transport policy were agreed on at the 
Messina conference (Lucas 1977) and, such as in 1973, when the oil crisis 
highlighted the European Community’s vulnerability to interruptions of a 
secure and reasonably priced supply of energy (George 1996). The 
implementation of the SEA, one of the chief objectives of which was 
subsequently to create a Single European Market (SEM), will serve as the 
case for hypothesis number two. The creation of the SEM subsequently led to 
the first proposals by the Commission to integrate the energy domain per se. 
Focusing on post SEA is most suitable for narrowing down the case for the 
third hypothesis as the first legal measures were then laid out to regulate gas 
and electricity grids: the three energy packages. The Lisbon Treaty was 
chosen as the case for the fourth hypothesis as it made the proposal for the 
European Energy Union possible. The endpoint of the study was chosen as 
the Commission announced that 2016 will be “the year of delivery” of the 
Energy Union, which denotes the highest degree of integration to this point 
(Commission 2015).  
 
Actors: 
Three types of actors need to be considered: intergovernmental European 
Institutions (the Council of the EU, the European Council), supranational 
European Institutions (the Commission, the European Parliament), actors 
operating in both domains (e.g. Coreper and working groups), and public and 
private interest groups. Variables interacting and influencing each other during 
the policy making process are arranged in a multi-level model, distinguishing 
between materialist variables (e.g. different actors, structure and agency, 
exogenous factors) and ideational variables (ideational factors, norms, best 
practice, soft rational choice theory). A central concern to be addressed is the 
degree to which we can ascribe agency to the different institutions, how we 
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theorise about institutions in general and where the agency to alter them 
comes from - when conceived as an endogenous process. In this vein, the 
thesis will contribute to the structure / agency debate and additionally inquire 
about the level of coherence within the different institutions. It is paramount to 
elaborate on the sources of agency in more detail.  
 
As discussed in the theory section, institutions are more than a set of formal 
(or informal) rules and more than the buildings in which the institutions are 
headquartered. We therefore theorise that institutions develop their own form 
of agency as they might alter policy development and the institutional trajectory 
in resonance with their own set of preferences. However, we have to 
emphasise that these institutions themselves are comprised of different actors 
with their own preferences, who are committed to individual perceptions of goal 
attainment. The Council of Ministers is a different institutional player than the 
Commission as different actors are involved in the institution. These actors 
display heterogenous interests as they derive their legitimacy / agency from 
diverse sources. Moreover, as the analysis will show, divergent preferences 
exist within the different institutional actors. For instance, the Commission is 
not a homogenous institutional player, with a coherent set of preferences, but 
rather an institutional actor that is constituted by different DGs with diverging 
preferences. As we will see in the empirical chapters, the Commission was not 
always internally aligned. For instance, the preferences of DG Competition and 
DG Energy diverged in some instances. 
 
The actors within this spectrum have their range and scope of influence and 
serve as indicators for different preferences. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament as the main 
decision-making bodies of the EU. They play an important role during the 
decision-making process and the legislative procedures. Public and private 
sector interest groups will also be incorporated in the analysis. Each of these 
actors are bestowed a particular leverage within the policy making process, 
depending on the institutional preconditions at a given time (such as voting / 
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veto power of Member States; unanimous vs. qualified majority voting) and 
norms and best practice. 
 
These actors, however, are systematically connected to each other and should 
not be looked at separately as a lopsided focus on one unit would impose an 
imperfect condition for a comprehensive analysis: the unfavourable condition 
of overemphasis (or underestimation) of its influence on policy making. These 
distinct units exert power within their scope and create a radius of influence, 
which is defined by legal requirements and their available capabilities, 
resources, interests and ideas. They propose, reinforce and bring policies into 
existence. However, as a consequence of their inherent connectedness, they 





I utilise different types of data that will be analysed using qualitative methods 
supported by descriptive quantitative data. An extensive document analysis of 
a qualitative nature is performed. Primary and secondary law published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union serves as the backbone of the analysis, 
as it defines the published formal institutional rules and represents the policy 
output as part of the policy cycle (together with intended goals and policy 
outcome). Official documents and dossiers from selected Member States were 
chosen for the analysis.  
 
Member States were selected upon preliminary research conducted with the 
help of primary and secondary literature, which gave an indication of their 
respective preferences regarding new developments in energy policy, and the 
extent to which their preferences were heterogeneous or not. At the beginning 
of the historical analysis, as only 6 Member States were part of the European 
project, preferences could be largely identified in official documentation and 
secondary literature; stances towards certain sectors of energy policy were 
 70 
quite stable over time and not as diverse as later in the timeline, when energy 
policy became broader in scope and more intertwined with other sectors. For 
instance, during the inception of the ECSC and later Euratom, France was very 
concerned with state security and bolstering its own economic standing in 
Europe to make the French economy more competitive in the future; 
preferences did not change much in the first few years. However, a limitation 
of relying on official documentation from this time is the fact that preferences 
within Member States could not be easily revealed. The historical record is 
rather thin in this respect and comprehensive secondary literature addressing 
considerations of the homo/heterogeneity of preferences is rather scarce. 
Accounts are not as manifold and detailed as they are in more contemporary 
contributions. Hence, in some instances, succinct accounts addressing 
preferences of/within different actors in the early stages of energy policy-
making were not always easy to come by. However, (annual) reports and the 
Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel / of the European 
Communities, published by the High Authority of the European Community for 
Coal and Steel / the European Commission, helped to build an understanding 
and overview of actor preferences. 
 
Later in the historical analysis, when more Member States were part of the 
European Communities / European Union, preferences are clustered into 
groups: for instance, a cluster of Member States in-favour/against a decision 
(or with a different opinion) is created to discuss the most powerful/dominant 
players in more detail. These actors are treated as spearheads for policy 
development and specific preferences.       
 
Official documentation from the institutions serve as primary sources in order 
to gain insight and explain major decisions, including: Conclusions of the 
Council, communications and proposals by the Commission, information about 
energy policy published by the High Authority and the Commission (for 
instance, the Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel; the 
Bulletin of the European Communities), publications by the European 
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Community Information Service and DG Energy (for instance, reports on 
specific energy developments; press releases published by the Commission / 
DG Energy and comprehensive information on their website addressing the 
development of energy policy), information and documents from the European 
Parliament’s website, and other relevant publications by European institutions. 
These documents were chosen to create a coherent narrative of historical 
events that serves as the empirical data which will subsequently be analysed 
from an HI perspective.  
 
Given the sheer volume of publications and information found, conscious and 
informed decisions had to be made to reduce the quantity of documents to be 
analysed. This was achieved through a preliminary study of each of the 
timeframes under consideration (for instance, energy policy from the early 
1960s to the early 1970s; the timespan before /after the first oil crisis; etc.), 
which gave an indication of the most significant events occurring during a 
specific period. Historical accounts and comprehensive volumes on the 
evolution of energy policy helped to acquire supplementary data2. 
Subsequently, these findings were taken to contextualise further information 
acquired from online archives, websites and secondary literature, in order to 
add empirical depth and richness to the analysis. A particularly challenging 
task was filtering out the most important legal provisions / documents / 
information about specific events that influenced the institutional trajectory. 
Here, hallmark decisions were mentioned (and re-iterated over months) in 
publications like the Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel 
/ of the European Communities. Comprehensive volumes by scholars or other 
secondary literature also pointed towards those legal documents that were 
valuable for deeper examination. This method made it possible to sift out the 
most important legal documents. However, a limitation of this approach is 
owed to the fact that a historical analysis may never be complete and, whilst 
 
2 see: Lucas (1977), Matlary (1997), George (1996), Schubert et al. (2016) 
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informed by the literature, subjective decisions on what to include must be 
made by the scholar.  
 
In a nutshell, the analysis was conducted through the sequence of historical 
events, moving from one point to the next. The criteria for the document 
selection was as follows: first, communications and proposals of the European 
Commission, European Council conclusions (and recommendations), White 
and Green Papers, and the Bulletin from the European Community for Coal 
and Steel / of the European Communities were taken as starting points to 
identify a certain set of intended goals, defined within the institutional context. 
The decision-making process was then analysed through an assessment of 
the preferences of the different actors leading to a specific policy output. 
Subsequently, the policy output (the legal provisions) was assessed, and 
whether it was effective or not (the policy outcome). The policy outcome in turn 
was mentioned in new policy proposals created by the Commission – as 
shortcomings became apparent once secondary previsions were transposed 
into domestic law - and were taken as starting points for a new set of intended 
goals. 
 
A conscious decision was made to pay less attention to new legislation 
regarding the coal sector in the analysis of the early stages of energy policy, 
as it was a fully integrated sector, which lost its dominance considerably after 
the inception of the ECSC. Indeed, early reports from the Commission 
highlighted the decline of the relevance / value of coal. Therefore, greater 
attention was paid to proposals addressing a common energy policy, 
provisions addressing oil and gas, and energy security, as these were areas 
that posed challenges in terms of deeper integration.  
 
The Pittsburgh Archive of European Integration (AEI) was consulted for older 
documents that could not be found on the Commission’s website (proposals, 
recommendations, decisions, general information, etc.); with a total of more 
than 77000 documents, it is a highly comprehensive archive of primary 
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sources. A structured search routine, guided by specific keywords/search 
words, resulted in the acquisition of relevant documents and publications. 
Moreover, Agence Europe was used to gain an understanding of relevant 
events affecting the energy sector and decision-making, which was likewise 
guided by a rigid search routine. Policy developments were cross-referenced 
in these documents, which helped to connect different developments, 
providing a more nuanced and comprehensive picture. As discussed in the 
section on Member States’ preferences, in some instances, it was difficult to 
conduct the historical analysis, as structured narratives/evidence regarding 
early energy policy(-making) was scarce and not easy to obtain. In these 
cases, some documents, although referenced in primary sources, were simply 
no longer available, not even in the Archive of European Integration. Moreover, 
it should be noted that not all documents could be analysed, as the historical 
record is simply exhaustive and not every piece of information could feasibly 
be examined.    
 
The data acquired from documents was supplemented by extensive data from 
a combination of exploratory and indicative interviews with experts and 
decision-makers in Brussels. The rationale behind incorporating interviews 
was to get a deeper understanding of preferences of institutions and Members 
States and identify potential areas of relevance - data that was not always 
readily identifiable from documents, as discussed earlier. Fifteen semi-
structured interviews were conducted in April 2018, with representatives of the 
Directorate General Energy (DG ENER – internal market, security, 
interinstitutional relations) at the European Commission, representatives of the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (Germany, Poland, Austria, Latvia), 
Members of the European Parliament, and think tanks. Questions were 
formulated based on the expertise and experience of the respective 
interviewee, in order to gain specific insight into particular policy events and 




In the case of Permanent Representatives, the content addressed the 
preferences of the respective Member States, where preceding research gave 
an indication about their individual stance, and which was used to confirm / 
reject such assumptions. Hence, representatives of Member States were 
chosen based on preferences, which were identified through preceding 
research, and which represent different positions in the Council. However, a 
couple of Member States, which were contacted did not respond to the 
interview requests and were therefore excluded from an interview-based 
assessment regarding their preferences. In these cases, preferences had to 
be determined through a document analysis.  
 
Interviews with Commission representatives were both indicative and 
exploratory. The interviewees were selected based on their positions within 
the institution and their respective area of expertise. This process proved 
highly successful as a number of the interviewees held senior positions within 
the Commission and the quality of data gathered was very high. These 
interviews with senior and experienced civil servants, proved invaluable in 
obtaining more detailed information about specific secondary legislation, since 
some of the interviewees were personally involved in drafting the content 
(proposals / final texts) of some of the legislation.  
 
Data gathered from the interviews was used as primary data for the analysis 
and directly quoted, whereas other parts provided indicative background 
information. In this regard, the interview content sometimes changed during 
the course of the interview as interviewees started to elaborate on themes that 
were not part of the semi-structured questions, but which were highly 
interesting for further document analysis. For instance, interviews with 
Commission officials revealed the importance of institutional actors like ACER 
and ENTSO-E/G and the development of network codes, which proved to be 
very important for path dependent processes due to their ability to generate 
formal and technical rules, and their obligation to monitor processes. This 
provided invaluable content and insight which I would not necessarily have 
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become aware of through a document analysis alone. Nevertheless, the 
interview data is largely used to further substantiate assumptions, as opposed 
to generate propositions of their own accord. The interviews provided an 
opportunity to examine policy development in conjuncture with legal policy 
provisions. Since interview data often reflects the specific stance of individuals 
it could lead to conclusions that could be criticised for their subjectivity. Thus, 
the main body of empirical data in this research project is gathered from 
primary and secondary legal provisions, and their interplay with envisioned 
goals and the policy outcome as part of the wider policy cycle.  
 
The method of process tracing will serve as the fundamental methodological 
backdrop. Process tracing in social science provides the opportunity to trace 
intervening causal mechanisms (the causal links and processes) between one 
or more independent variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent variable. 
Process-tracing is a thoroughly valuable tool for theory testing, not only as a 
wide variety of observations can be made within a case, but also due to the 
requirement that these observations reveal a particular sequence in which 
events unfold in order to serve as a valid explanation for the case and for a 
relationship between variables. Put differently, the lack of independence 
among the observations constitute the compelling rationale for drawing 
inferences (George & Bennett 2005: 206-207, Bennett 2008). Process-tracing 
as a research method is well-suited to be applied to a rational choice 
framework. The method provides tools aptly suited to empirically test 
processes of decision-making. In particular, scholars working with a rational 
choice approach use process-tracing to analyse detailed historical case 
studies, and develop comprehensive explanations of complex events (ibid.: 
208). 
 
Beach and Pedersen refer to three different variants of process tracing: theory-
testing process tracing, theory-building process tracing, and outcome process 
tracing. The differences between those three have important methodological 
implications for the proposed research design, for instance, how causal 
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mechanisms are understood and whether they can be used in a mixed-method 
design (2013: 3-9). If relevant theories on the phenomenon are well-
established in the literature (as well as potential alternative explanations), and 
the hypotheses are sufficiently detailed to generate testable predictions on the 
processes that should have taken place if the hypotheses are well-suited to 
offer an explanation of the case, then process-tracing can be conducted for 
theory testing (Bennett 2008). As this research project and the four generated 
hypotheses are based on, and derived from, a pre-existing theoretical 
framework, theory-testing process-tracing will be applied. In theory-testing 
process tracing, a causal mechanism is hypothesised to be present between 
both X (the cause) and Y (the outcome) in a case (or a populations of cases), 
and the context allows the mechanism to operate. The goal is to go beyond 
mere correlations and associations between X and Y showing whether the 
hypothesised causal mechanisms of X contributing to the outcome Y is evident 
(Beach & Pedersen 2013: 9-11). In theory-testing process-tracing we know 
both X and Y (see Figure 1) and the researcher has either conjectures about 
a plausible mechanism or uses logical reasoning to deduct a causal 
mechanism from existing theorisation. The theorised causal mechanism 
subsequently needs to be operationalised, conveying the theorised 
expectations into case-specific predictions about the observable indicators 
that should be present in the case for each part of the mechanism at work. 
Once the mechanisms are conceptualised and operationalised, the researcher 
proceeds to gather empirical evidence. The analysis is conducted stepwise, 
ensuring that each part of the mechanism is present. It is very important to 
note that the evidence for the different parts can be very different from each 
other, making evidence for them sometimes incomparable. They do not read 
like a narrative as, for instance, evidence in the form of events are different 
from evidence in form of pattern evidence (for instance, the number of 
documents produced by different institutional actors). Thus, ‘[w]hat is being 
traced is not a series of empirical events or narratives but instead the 
underlying theorised causal mechanisms itself, by observing whether the 








A challenging aspect of HI literature is the question of how to operationalise 
the two most important concepts: path dependency (including feedback loops 
and increasing returns) and critical junctures (Pierson 1996, 2000, 2004; 
Arthur 1989, North 1990). Both concepts are well explained from the 
theoretical standpoint, and at least the operationalisation of increasing returns 
is well explained in economic theory. However, in the institutionalist application 
the concepts pose a certain methodological challenge to the researcher, as it 
is often not entirely clear or thoroughly discussed how to measure these 
phenomena. Particular focus should be placed on identifying a comprehensive 
and methodologically distinct approach to identifying critical junctures. 
 
How can we identify critical junctures as they manifest themselves? Capoccia 
(2015) provides a list of boxes to be ticked before we can assume that an event 
 79 
truly qualifies as a critical juncture. Firstly, the unit of analysis must be defined 
(for instance, a political organisation, a public policy, a set of formal rules, a 
political regime). Then the following question has to be asked: a critical 
juncture in the development of what? In addition, a fallacy might occur here as 
sometimes researchers ascribe certain events of uncertainty and economic / 
political upheaval critical potential; however, we have to be careful with the 
selection as different kinds of shocks might influence some decision-making 
arenas and not others. Therefore, the researcher must carefully define the 
critical juncture as a contextualisation of the specific unit of interest. Secondly, 
once the unit of analysis is defined, potential ‘candidate’ critical junctures can 
be determined; this can be done with the help of existing literature. However, 
it is paramount that the critical potential of the juncture should be shown 
empirically and not assumed a priori. Thirdly, once potential moments of 
institutional change are identified, a test for structural effects causing the 
anticipated change should be conducted. Is the institutional outcome based on 
structural antecedents inducing the change or is agency the driving factor? Are 
the institutional outcomes based on political choices between available 
alternatives or are the choices assumed to be there but are based on structural 
preconditions? Fourthly, different candidate critical junctures should be 
assessed and the most critical ones identified. The structural test conducted 
beforehand will help to rule out some candidate critical junctures and a focus 
should be placed on those that clearly exhibit that agency and political 
dynamics played an important role in the development of a path dependent 
institution. Fifth, once the critical junctures are identified, the researcher should 
reconstruct historical events, identify the key decision makers and their 
respective interaction, and trace back which institutional alternatives would 
have been possible at the given time. Sixth, after institutional alternatives are 
defined, a counterfactual analysis can be conducted. It will help to show that a 
different institutional choice could have been made and, if such a different 
choice would have been made, the institutional arrangement would have 
created a durable institutional setting. Lastly, the researcher will present 
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evidence that the choices made during the critical juncture created and 
induced a long-lasting institutional legacy. 
 
The choice of Member States suitable for each of the hypotheses will vary for 
different decisions, the selection depends on the timeframe that is assessed. 
This rationale is based on the fact that certain Member States were simply not 
part of the EU when a certain decision was made, while at the same time they 
might have become strong advocates of other decisions at a later stage. On 
the other hand, certain Member States might have been in favour of a 
particular decision, but might have taken a more moderate stance towards 
integration in a subsequent case. In addition, the selection of Member States 
will also be dependent on the size of consumption of energy, whether or not 
they are energy producers themselves, their respective total market size, and 
how dependent they are on imports from Russia, which is by far the largest 
energy supplier. Especially the last variable is of interest due to the exerted 
pressures on the external dimension of energy policy during the last decade. 
This data will help to create proxy variables to show certain preferences of 
Member States towards a particular policy. 
 
As this work will employ a historical institutionalist approach incorporating 
rational choice (together with the sociological institutionalist strand), which 
argues that strategic actors strive to maximise their utility and interest based 
on a material basis, economic indicators will be incorporated into the analysis. 
These factors need to be taken into account as they determine and inform how 
actors behave due to certain economic settings. For example, the data will 
help to identify Member States’ preferences and their willingness to agree to 
proposed legislative measures - in the case of high gas prices imposed on 
weaker Member States - and the power of economically strong Member States 
to bargain and dilute proposals. In addition, macro-economic factors will be 
useful to determine critical junctures. 
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Prices of energy commodities, for services and infrastructure, provided by 
energy companies and dealt with in energy markets, are powerful factors 
impinging on preference formation of different actors from a rational choice 
perspective. They inform all actors, whether on the supranational, the 
intergovernmental or the private business level. In order to determine specific 
preferences of actors based on economic considerations, my research will ask 
questions regarding issues surrounding wholesale prices, issues of 
competition, and legal provisions for energy suppliers. These findings will 
serve as supplementary economic indicators and help to explain how material 
ends informed different actor’s preferences, such as the Commission’s or 
Member States’ rationale for policy behaviour and choices. 
 
The data will be collected from respective websites like Eurostat, with some of 
the datasets available from 2004 onwards. Moreover, economic pressure from 
the internal to the external dimension, will be assessed by economic indicators. 
For example, in the case of the three Energy Packages (which were 
implemented to integrate the internal market), regulatory capabilities exerted 
through the means of a mere market rationale, might not have been sufficient 
to regulate external relations with third country suppliers and solve issues 
regarding energy security. From a historical institutionalist perspective, 
external shocks (like gas crises) influence markets and prices and, thus, might 
create the need for deeper integration – from both a rational choice (the 
economic need to keep energy markets functioning), and a sociological 
perspective (to enhance solidarity between Member States and to sustain gas 
flows to protected customers). Economic indicators help to gauge the pressure 
exerted on the internal and external dimension due to the measures to 
complete the internal market. 
 
In addition, it is useful to render the import dependency of Member States 
visible, as there might be a significant variance between different states. It can 
be assumed that economic considerations highly influence the willingness of 
all proposed actors to support or reject proposals, at their own discretion. 
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Decisions and legal provision influence the margin of private business. The 
obligation to unbundle infrastructural assets from producers, laid out in the 
Third Energy Package, might have created incentives for investors to step into 
the energy sectors, which in turn might have influenced the stance of the 
industry towards certain legal provisions. This obligation, on the other hand, 
might have helped the Commission to take a more ambitious stance towards 
Member States that have been rather reluctant to support deeper integration. 
In this respect, economic factors are valuable and strong indicators for policy 
choices in the energy sector. 
 
This research contributes to the existing literature by analysing incremental 
steps towards a comprehensive energy policy, in this respect the project of the 
European Energy Union. It analyses the implications such developments also 
have had for Member States regarding existing relations with third countries. 
The research will give an explanation about the factors that contributed to the 
further development of the institutional matrix and identify critical junctures that 
instigated institutional change. In this respect, the factors contributing to 
deeper integration, the interplay between institutional development and policy 
development, are a central point of the investigation. My research will answer 
the question under what conditions does integration occur in the field of energy 
over time? The ultimate goal is to provide a theoretical model that can not only 
improve our understanding of integration in the energy domain, but can also 




Chapter III: When paths are defined: A Locked-in 
Institution 
 
Energy is of vital importance to the EU’s economy, warranting stability and 
prosperity for its Member States and citizens. Energy policy was enshrined as 
a cornerstone in the founding treaties of the EU, through the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Euratom Treaty. Although bestowed 
substantial importance by its founding fathers, little progress was made in 
energy policy after initial steps were instigated in the early years of the 
Community, and energy policy suffered from substantially limited and shallow 
integration in the first four decades of the European project.  
 
The next chapter will analyse the institutional developments in the time period 
between the late 1940s/early 1950s until the 1980s and test the first 
hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that if no critical juncture occurs in a 
setting of high institutional stickiness, low integration can be expected. This 
means that in an intergovernmental environment where unanimous decision-
making is the voting procedure and no critical juncture occurs, low integration 
can be expected as decision-making is substantially hampered even in the 
light of a changing environment. Institutions remain rigid, following their status-
quo institutional trajectory even if actors face a sub-optimal institutional 
utilitisation. 
 
H1: If no critical juncture occurs in a setting of high institutional 
stickiness, low integration can be expected. ‘Small’ critical events will 
have no effect on the institution. 
 
However, at this point it is imperative to emphasise that a distinction between 
different institutional arrangements and their voting procedure must be made. 
In this regard, the make-up and institutional design of the ECSC, based on the 
Treaty of Paris, bestows its executive certain powers to balance the 
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sovereignty of the member states. In the ECSC Treaty the so-called High 
Authority was given specific powers over the economies of the member states 
and was solely responsible for implementing the Treaty. The consent of the 
Council was only necessary when addressing important matters, sometimes 
requiring unanimity, however, qualified majority voting was established as the 
common practice (Lucas 1977, Noël 1993).  
 
In this early conception, the supranational body cannot be analysed through a 
testing of Scharpf’s joint decision trap, as unanimity was not a requirement 
when policies were introduced or amended. However, this changed in the 
treaties that followed. When the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the Euratom were formed, member states were reluctant to assign similar 
supranational powers to the executive as they did in the Treaty of Paris. In 
addition, it was deemed inappropriate by member states to give the “executive 
authority in fields where no clear agreement was yet foreseen or had yet been 
attempted” (Lucas 1977: 82). Under the EEC Treaty, specifically during the 
first two transitional stages – from 1958 to the end of 1965 - most Council 
decisions were subject to the procedure of unanimous voting (Noël 1993).   
 
This example has important implications for the following analysis. We can 
thus assume that the ECSC, with its comprehensive supranational decision-
making powers in the fields of the coal and steel industry, showed quite a high 
level of integration with substantial authority embodied by its executive branch. 
However, we must keep in mind that the ECSC can be treated as a forerunner 
to the subsequent projects of European integration, and that the architects of 
the EEC and Euratom envisioned institutions that encompass a much broader 
spectrum of economic development. Archer (1994) points out that “(f)rom the 
start it was clear that the ECSC might spawn other Community organizations 
and that there might be other ‘supranational’ institutions for other sectors of 
the economy” (ibid.: 85). The fact that these subsequent institutions were 




Along similar lines we have to distinguish between different forms of energy to 
offer a precise analysis of how the institutional development in the energy 
sector can be assessed with credible explanatory power. The most common 
way is to distinguish between the different forms of energy consumption and 
to differentiate between the markets of oil, gas, coal, and power (electricity) 
(Schubert et al. 2016). Thus, when we test for the first hypothesis, we must 
keep in mind that only the coal segment of the Community’s energy portfolio 
was solely regulated by the High Authority (which was endowed with 
considerable supranational powers) and that the other energy sources were 
located in the intergovernmental sphere, reflected by unanimous voting 
procedures. We can now proceed to the analysis, keeping this differentiation 
in mind to address possible criticism at an early stage and to make sure that 
the unit of analysis is clear, so that we can accurately test the aforementioned 
assumptions.  
 
The first empirical section of the chapter explains the initial developments, 
starting with the creation of the first supranational bodies in Europe. As Lucas 
(1977) poignantly observed in hindsight, “[i]t is odd that energy policy, which 
has apparently been so unsuccessful, has frequently been presented as a 
reason or pretext for European integration” (ibid.: 1). The HI framework offers 
a methodological approach to analyse events in a sequential order, not merely 
assessing policy development at a given point in time, but providing 
methodological tools so that causal linkages can be put into a wider historical 
context. However, it is paramount that the historical account does not slip into 
a story-telling exercise, but follows a stringent method. The first step will gather 
apposite empirical data dependent on the unit of analysis; for instance, 
whether certain institutional developments were addressed or energy sectors 
were scrutinised. The second step will trace explanatory factors and evaluate 
causal linkages based on the HI framework. 
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3.1. The European Coal and Steel Community 
 
The Second World War destroyed established energy networks and supply 
throughout Europe. Before the war, roughly 80 - 90% of primary energy came 
from coal (Matlary 1997, Lucas 1977) and the war diminished production and 
distribution to a large extent. The traditional coal producing countries like 
Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom faced various structural and 
endogenous restraints. Their distribution networks collapsed, indigenous 
mines were worked to the limit and equipment was not properly maintained. In 
addition, no investment was made to stimulate growth in the sector and 
unskilled labour was sent into the coal pits; in some instances even forced 
labour was deployed. Directly after the war, an ad hoc intergovernmental 
institution, the European Coal Organization (ECO) was created. Subsequently, 
its responsibilities were taken over by the Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) and in 1948 the Organization for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC) set up permanent committees for coal, electricity and oil. The Marshall 
Plan, which aided the reconstruction of Europe, made closer collaboration 
between European states a condition for economic support, and the OEEC 
was conceived to assist in this undertaking. In the United Kingdom, France 
and Western Germany, ambitious plans were designed in order to revive the 
troubled industry, which were thoroughly successful as the total quantity of 
imports (mostly from the U.S.) (Lucas 1977).  
 
By 1950, Germany had recovered quite substantially. However, a solution had 
to be found which reconciled Germany’s economic revival and France’s 
demand for security, famously expressed by Charles de Gaulle who stated that 
“[t]he current of German vitality is thus turned westwards. One day German 
aggressiveness might well face westwards too” (de Gaulle as cited in Archer 
1994: 73).  
 
A means to address this predicament was to instigate a process of integration 
and promoting plans for a united Europe, conceived by turning towards the 
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coal and steel industries, which offered an attractive target for integrationists’ 
strategic ambitions. The argument was threefold: first, these heavy industries 
were deemed necessary when fighting a war and hence posed a possible 
threat in the former Axis countries. Simply put, without steel and coal, no war. 
Second, and from an economic standpoint, the industries had important 
linkages in Western Europe. The steel industry in Saar was at that time linked 
to France but was supposed to be reintegrated into Germany. On the other 
hand, the French steel mills depended on the Ruhr for coking coal. The French 
steel industry was larger than its counterpart in Germany. However, the 
industry feared competition from reinvigorated Germany, as did the French 
coal producers from German mines. Third, there was a potential threat that a 
post-war depression would hit the coal and steel industries, similar to the one 
occurring in the aftermath of the First World War (Archer 1994). By utilising the 
coal and steel sectors as an ignition spark for integration, a potential remedy 
which simultaneously addressed multiple concerns was found, based on its 
utter significance for Europe’s economy. 
 
From an HI standpoint, the precarious economic situation as an exogenous 
factor prompted a critical juncture, which in turn shaped the initial demand for 
the genesis of an institutional framework. Moreover, it created an environment 
susceptible for powerful actors to steer the initial trajectory of the institution. 
During critical junctures, the scope and range of possible choices increase 
substantially. Critical junctures create demand for  
“institutional formation in moments of political openness and fluidity: the 
various types of political processes through which institutional choices 
are made: strategic interaction, coalition-building, norm-generating 
strategies aimed at influencing the perception of the legitimacy of 
institutional innovations by rule-takers, and choices made by powerful 
political leaders” (Capoccia 2015: 101). 
 
Such factors and processes can be identified as playing a role in influencing 
the creation of the ECSC. However, as defined in the literature, critical 
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moments can be created by both external (exogenous) and internal 
(endogenous) forces (Collier & Collier 2002). Ideational factors and normative 
considerations also affected the inception of the institutional matrix, as the 
reconciliation of Europe was seen as a means to generate solidarity, prosperity 
and peace amongst European states. The institutional vehicle for this 
operation was meant to be the ECSC. As the treaty states, the ECSC was 
conceived as an institutional means to resolve “historic rivalries (…) among 
peoples long divided by bloody conflicts” and to bring prosperity by “concrete 
actions which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common 
bases for economic development” (ECSC Treaty). From a political and 
economic view, the ECSC was instigated as an institutional measure to forge 
closer ties and strengthen solidarity between the two old historic foes, France 
and Germany, to annihilate the prospect of war, and to induce an impetus for 
integration and economic growth. By reducing competition over coal and steel, 
the backbone of industry at the time, and by providing accession to these 
markets for all participants, an “organized and vital Europe” could be created, 
“indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations” (ECSC Treaty). 
 
The plan for the ECSC, known as the Schuman Plan, was presented on 4 May 
1950 by the then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman.  
‘The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide 
for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as 
a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of 
those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of 
munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. 
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any 
war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, 
but materially impossible’ (The Schumann Declaration 1950). 
 
However, as Lucas (1977) and George (1996) point out, the plan was 
conceived in the French Economic Planning Commission (Commissariat du 
Plan) by Jean Monnet, and devised by the French Foreign Ministry. Monnet, 
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as an experienced civil servant and political economist who guided post-war 
reconstruction of the French economy, came to realise that in order to go 
beyond recovery towards sustainable economic growth and a higher quality of 
living for all citizens, the resources of a single nation were not sufficient and 
thus European states had to pool their resources (George 1996, Monnet 
1955). Milward (1984) emphasises that the Monnet Plan had important 
implications on both the international and domestic domain. One of the main 
aims was to make the French economy more competitive in the future, 
especially in respect of the German economy. But further implications were 
addressed in the Monnet plan. The ultimate goal was that France should 
become Europe’s largest steel producer, which was not an official policy, but 
a notion that was unofficially promoted. The projected increases in the output 
of the steel industries would only make economic sense if the French steel 
exports replaced former German steel exports. However, this would only be 
feasible by increasing the imports of coal and coke to the French market. The 
supply of coke and coal from Germany was immensely important. Thus, the 
Monnet plan fundamentally intertwined the French with the German economy, 
and offered a “programme for attempting to provide for future national security 
against Germany” (Milward 1984: 98).  
 
This suggests that in addition to the normative requirement to foster peace in 
Europe, rational decision-making was significant and an essential driving 
factor in the initial phase of the institutional inception. As explained by an HI 
framework, the initial phase of institutional creation is characterised by a 
situation in which the different actors have primacy regarding their institutional 
choices. The French government especially demonstrated strong rational 
behaviour, characterised by utility maximisation. They joined the institution in 
order to increase their economic benefit and to reinforce a dominant position 
on European markets. However, as we will see later in the analysis, structural 
factors restrained the available choices of actors over time, and initial policy-




Another important observation from an HI standpoint is the notion that 
Monnet’s plans for the creation of a common market were just a starting point. 
Strategic actions by actors corroborate the proposition of HI that actors base 
their initial policy choices on rational decisions, but subsequently become 
entrenched in the institutional matrix over time, which restricts and steers the 
range of choices (Pollack 1996, 2006, 2010). Regarding strategic economic 
planning, Monnet had high ambitions and wanted to create more than just a 
common market. As liberal free-market systems had caused some negative 
effects for the French economy in the past, his vision was to create an 
economic community that should adopt common economic policies and 
rational planning procedures (George 1996). As such, coal and steel were just 
the starting-point. The goal was to extend the planning procedures to all levels 
and policy areas of the European economy. Integration should accelerate over 
time, it was predicted, and the so-called spill-over effect - the momentum 
created by integrating one sector leading to further integration in another 
sector – was believed to “lead inevitably to full economic unity” (Haas 1958: 
283). However, European states would not have agreed to cede powers to 
supranational institutions all at once. The rationale to utilise coal and steel was 
reasoned through the immediate problems they created, as coal was in short 
supply and steel in excess. Thus, from a rational choice perspective, it made 
sense to harmonise these markets and undertake planning and production at 
a European level. Since steel and coal were such central components for all 
industries it was anticipated that rational planning of these two industries could 
only be done in a much larger economic context, “as part of a more general 
exercise in economic planning” (George 1996: 3). Monnet anticipated that 
economic spillover would be triggered by the creation of the ECSC, as the 
initial decision would lead to further integration and institutional development 
of other policy areas due to functional economic pressures. 
 
The ECSC was perceived as a brilliant concept. West Germany accepted the 
Schuman Plan to fuse French and German industries, however, the final 
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Treaty eventually broadened its scope to include the Benelux countries and 
Italy. The Treaty was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 and came into force on 
23 July 1952; it was limited to be valid for 50 years, and expired on 23 July 
2002 (Matlary 1997).  
 
Two important points can be observed regarding preference formation. Firstly, 
the formation of the ECSC was owed to the decision to rebuild Europe and 
European states’ economies, based on materialist considerations and rational 
decisions to promote prosperity and rapid recovery following the Second World 
War. According to this logic, preferences were exogenously given, and actors’ 
behaviour can be explained through their wish to maximise utility through 
deliberate goal attainment and rational choices. As explained in the theory 
section, once actors chose an institution, the institution falls into equilibrium. 
No actor within the institutional setting, and with a constitutional right to amend 
the institution, has an incentive to do so (Pollack 1996). Institutions are 
coordinating mechanisms, which maintain and sustain these equilibria (Thelen 
1999). The goal of the ECSC was to, 
“contribute to economic expansion, the development of employment 
and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating 
countries through the institution, in harmony with the general economy 
of the member States, of a common market” (Article 2 ECSC Treaty). 
 
Secondly, if we now go back to the formation of preferences that led to the 
creation of the ECSC, we can identify endogenous factors that triggered 
institutional development. In addition to materialist considerations and rational 
decisions based on exogenously given preferences, there was also a 
prevailing idea to tie European states together in order to create stability and 
peace in Europe, rooted in a logic of appropriateness (see March & Olsen 
1989). The idea to foster peace, trust and confidence between European 
States, and to end the long-lasting enmity between historical foes, has a very 
strong normative / ideational connotation, and therefore preference formation 
can also be understood through endogenous factors. From this standpoint, 
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economic considerations are a means to an end – namely, to further peace in 
Europe and to reinforce political institutions. It should be noted that this 
research is not claiming that normative factors are more important than 
economic factors for European integration (as, for instance, Manners (2002) 
claims when applying his framework of Normative Power Europe, in which the 
EU plays a unique role promoting universal values), but that both are 
contributing factors for institutional development. 
 
Both exogenous factors (for instance, the restructuring of Europe on a basis 
of economic interdependence; different oil crises; economic crises, etc.) and 
endogenous factors (for instance, ideas about how to govern and develop 
acceptable policy for all involved actors; how to overcome collective action 
problems; perceptions of how decisions should be reached) have an impact 
on an institution and enhance (or create) the institutional framework. Material 
considerations are an important factor for the creation of an institution. Ideas, 
on the other hand, are commonly seen as a part of the superstructure rather 
than the basis of political economy (in this respect the institutional framework). 
However, they are important constituting parts of institutions. “To neglect the 
role of ideas (…) is to miss an important component of the economic and 
political worlds” (Hall 1989: 361).  
 
Institutional change also needs ideas about how to alter an institution that is 
capable of effectively governing the institutional matrix. Rational Choice 
Theory can explain the conditions when institutions are in equilibrium. Actors 
have all the necessary information at their disposal, and, based on their 
interests and preferences, can make perfectly informed decisions within the 
institutional framework. The institution in turn, depending on a set of formal 
rules agreed between the actors, restricts and governs their actions in order to 
facilitate certainty and reduce transaction costs. Rational Choice 
Institutionalism sees "institutions as exogenous constraints, or as an 
exogenously given game form" (Shepsle 2005: 24). However, factors that 
instigate institutional change are not covered within such a framework. Hence, 
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Hall (1989) in a comparative study examined how Keynesian economic ideas, 
inspired by the economic depression of the 1930s, influenced institutional 
matrices in different countries, over the course of three decades after World 
War II, when many nations established the systems of macroeconomic 
management they use to this day. From this perspective, these new ideas 
created and altered prevalent institutions, and, as many countries still use 
institutions based on these ideas, instigated path dependent processes. 
Whether Keynes’ ideas offer valuable economic solutions that bring economic 
stability after a fundamental crisis like the Great Depression (a critical juncture 
par excellence!), or whether austerity measures could be the remedy to curb 
economic downturn (as propagated by his opponents), should not be the point 
of discussion here. Rather, the important insight acquired is the answer to the 
question about how and when new ideas can develop enough momentum to 
successfully instigate institutional change.  
 
The focus of the analysis, at this point, is the factors leading to the 
development of a specific institutional trajectory after a critical juncture, as 
opposed to an account of the institution in equilibrium. As stated by Hall (1989), 
“It is ideas, in the form of economic theories and the policies developed 
from them, that enable national leaders to chart a course through 
turbulent economic times, and ideas about what is efficient, expedient, 
and just that motivates the movement from one line of policy to another” 
(ibid.: 361). 
 
In this respect, structural accounts can tell us much about the constraints that 
policymakers face concerning decision-making. However, policy making is 
based on creation as well as constraint (ibid.). In his conclusion, Hall (ibid.) 
provides explanatory evidence of why and when new ideas successfully 
advanced institutional matrices after the occurrence of a crisis. First of all, the 
key to the success of new ideas was the judgment of policy makers whether 
the new ideas were capable of resolving the (economic) problems at hand – 
the (economic) viability of new ideas has a pivotal effect on how they were 
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received. Secondly, a significant factor was the administrative viability of these 
ideas and the existing capacities of the institutions (in his analysis the units of 
analysis were different states) to implement them. Lastly, the reception of new 
ideas was contingent on political viability, the alignment of the new ideas and 
the goals and interests of political actors and different associations. As the 
following evidence suggests, all three factors were influential with regard to the 
development of the ECSC, supporting the proposition that ideas had an 
important role to play. 
 
 
3.2. The institutional design of the ECSC 
 
The six founding Member States joined the ECSC “based on a common 
market, common objectives, and common institutions” (Article 1, ECSC 
Treaty). Article 4 addressed provisions to abandon import and export duties 
and quantitative restrictions on the movement of coal and steel; discriminating 
practices among producers, buyers and consumers concerning prices as well 
as measures which obstruct the buyer in the choice of the supplier; subsidies 
or state assistance, or special charges, in any form used by the state; and 
practices concerning market distortion / division of markets (Article 4, ECSC 
Treaty). In addition, it established a High Authority, which constituted the 
supranational executive, a Common Assembly, a Council of Ministers, and a 
Court of Justice (Article 7, ECSC Treaty).  
 
The High Authority was composed of independent experts from each of the 
Member States and could issue regulations addressing the market for coal and 
steel, which were legally binding for the Member States. In practice, Germany, 
France, and Italy sent two members to the High Authority whereas Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg could send one. As the Schuman Plan did 
not mention an institution that would represent the Member States, it was 
obvious that in order to guarantee support for the ECSC in general, and for the 
High Authority in particular, an institution had to be conceived representing the 
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interests of the Member States. The Council consisted of the governments of 
the six member states, was to be consulted by the High Authority, and had to 
agree to proposals of the High Authority by majority voting or on special 
occasions by unanimity (Glockner & Rittberger 2012). Majority voting was 
designed as a system of weighted votes, which meant that not only a majority 
of governments had to agree to a proposal, but also that a Member State, 
which accounted for 20 per cent of the total production of coal and steel in the 
community, had to be in favour of the vote (ibid.). As we can see, the coal 
sector was subject to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), and therefore path-
dependent processes could gradually evolve (as shown later in this chapter). 
The coal sector showed low institutional stickiness that made the gradual 
development of the institution possible. Actors perceived the ECSC as a 
suitable institutional vehicle to govern their coal industries. 
 
Jean Monnet was appointed to be the first President of the High Authority. 
After a preparatory period of almost two years, the High Authority became truly 
supranational. It exercised powers which were formerly under sovereign 
control and which were assigned to it by the Member States. One of these 
powers addressed the capability to fix prices. The High Authority exercised 
these powers immediately because the prices for coal were continuously rising 
following the end of the war, so maximum prices were set to avoid prices 
hardening. Price control was controversial from the beginning, because of 
potential market distortion. However, the High Authority made clear that if it 
did not control the prices, powerful cartels in the Ruhr basin and in the coal 
pits of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais coalfields would determine the price (Lucas 
1977). These powers were conferred upon the High Authority in Article 65 and 
66 of the Treaty constituting the ECSC (ECSC Treaty). The High Authority 
considered the problem of coal cartels as a priority issue, and two powerful 
agencies, the German GEORG and the French governmental agency ATIC, 
were targeted as infringers (High Authority 1955a). The French government 
appealed at the Court of Justice against the High Authority, however, in the 
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end both organisations were successfully changed (High Authority 1956a, 
Haas 1958, 76 & 77). 
 
The second important task of the High Authority was to assist the increase of 
the production of coal. The coal industry was still suffering from the war and 
cartels had set coal prices quite high, which made new investment in the sector 
unattractive. Due to the efforts of the High Authority and strong demand, the 
production of coal grew steadily until 1957. However, the total demand for 
energy increased faster than industry could provide coal; therefore, the 
difference was balanced with oil, which was seen as a supplementary fuel 
(Lucas 1977). Between 1955 and 1975 the High Authority predicted an 
increase in total energy requirements of no less than 50 per cent, and although 
gas played a role in the energy equation, that the heaviest demand would be 
for coal and oil (High Authority 1957a). The High Authority suggested the 
utilization of dual firing power stations for the generation of electricity (power 
plants that can use either coal or oil), to uphold energy security and to counter-
balance possible shortages of coal supply (ibid.). 1957 constituted a turning 
point in this equilibrium. Even though two mild winters and an economic 
recession diminished demand for energy, oil was still imported at the same 
rate. Before the war, oil had little importance in the Western European 
economies. During this period, attitudes of national governments towards the 
oil companies were formed (Lucas 1977). 
 
Overall, from an economic standpoint, the ECSC was an institutional 
endeavour with rather limited success and “its far reaching hopes and 
expectations could not be met” (Schubert et al. 2016: 94). The relatively mild 
winters of 1958/59 led to a decline in total coal consumption, causing a 
mounting level of coal stocks at pitheads. The High Authority decided against 
the declaration of a manifest crisis, which would have permitted import 
restrictions and the allocation of production quotas (European Community 
Information Service 1958). However, France and Germany responded to the 
surplus in a manner that was prohibited by the Treaty and against the will of 
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the High Authority: they put up restrictions on coal imports to protect their 
respective markets. The High Authority could not enforce the treaty due to a 
lack of powers. Moreover, it could not stop oil, as an exogenous factor 
influencing the institution, gradually gaining ground in the energy market 
(Schubert et al. 2016: 94). The Council of Ministers and the High Authority tried 
to address the problem that energy sources other than coal developed a bigger 
share of total consumption at a faster pace. Moreover, they came to realise 
that due to these developments a reliable forecast of the consumption of coal 
could not be carried out unless energy policy was brought into a wider context. 
Therefore, they aimed to harmonise the whole energy sector through a 
coordinated energy policy (Special Council of Ministers 1957). 
 
As the evidence suggests, policy-making was characterised by sub-optimal 
outcomes and a shallow performance of the institution. Nevertheless, as 
predicted by the applied HI framework, once an institutional path was pursued 
and accepted, the institution created incentives for the actors to stick with their 
initial choice and not abandon the institution (Pollack 2006), even in the light 
of an unproductive path (North 1990). Based on increasing returns, the ECSC 
deployed strong path dependent processes, adaptive expectations and 
coordination effects, as actors were stuck with their institutional choices 
regardless of the ECSC’s shortcomings concerning the governance of the coal 
sector. In this regard, the institution had a stake in evolving policies that 





Monnet’s choice to integrate the coal sector rested on two assumptions. The 
first was that coal would remain “a vital element in energy supplies for many 
decades to come” (High Authority 1957a: 1); an assumption that was prevalent 
in the 1950s. Especially electricity generation was meant to “give coal 
practically an unlimited market” (ibid.). The second assumption was that the 
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High Authority would take an interventionist approach to the production of coal. 
Monnet seemed to have hoped that the High Authority would create general 
economic plans for the whole Community, similar to his own efforts within the 
French Economic Planning Commission, directing the leading industrial 
sectors and providing a framework in which both private enterprises and the 
state-sector could harmonise their decisions on investment. This approach 
was addressed as indicative planning or dirigisme (‘guidance’ or ‘steering’) 
(George 1996).  
 
However, the High Authority of the ECSC, which formally had clear 
supranational powers, did not become dirigiste in its orientation. On the 
contrary, it confined its activity to promoting coal trade according to free market 
principles (Matlary 1997). Disappointed by the institutional development of the 
High Authority, Jean Monnet resigned from his post. In his resignation speech, 
he spoke of his conviction that the ECSC was the beginning of a process of 
integration that would trigger the creation of a truly federal union, the United 
States of Europe. He was convinced that the creation of the United States of 
Europe and a “European Common Market as big as the American market [was] 
crucial for the prosperity of Europe’s peoples, the well-being of our workers 
and the solution to our problems” (Monnet 1955). Charles De Gaulle, the 
French president between 1959-69, mocked Monnet as “the great American” 
(Talbott 2014). After his resignation in 1955 he founded the Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe, a position he held until 1975 (CARDOC 2010). 
As an independent organisation committed to federalism, it was comprised of 
leading political and trade union leaders, and promoted integration through the 
use of atomic energy, the realisation of the European internal market, and the 
alignment of social policies (High Authority 1955b).  
 
Monnet’s resignation from the High Authority was not driven by desperation, 
but was aimed “to help the ‘relance’ – the re-launching of Community Europe” 
(Archer 1994: 87). The idea to integrate the sectors of transport, oil and atomic 
energy, and to create a common market among the Member States of the 
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Community, were proposed and drawn up in the so-called Benelux 
Memorandum in 1955. In addition, the memorandum suggested that both the 
Atomic Energy Community and the Economic Community would need new 
supranational institutions (Archer 1994).  
 
The Memorandum formed the basis for the Messina conference (held from 1st 
– 3rd June 1955), where the foundation was laid to create the two Communities, 
a task that was delegated to a committee of the representatives of the six 
Member States, and headed by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri 
Spaak. The committee eventually came to be known as the Spaak Committee 
which subsequently worked on the technical details of the proposals - not 
without a great deal of internal wrangling, as one might assume (ibid.). 
However, on 29th of May 1956 the twin proposals set forth in the 
intergovernmental report were discussed at a conference in Venice. All nuclear 
industry related issues were addressed with the creation of Euratom, whereas 
for “all forms of conventional energy, oil, gas and electricity, the solution 
proposed [was] to place them under the High Authority of the ECC&S 
[(European Community for Coal and Steel)], at least until the time [came] when 
the question of European institutions would definitely be solved” (High 
Authority 1956b).  
 
As there was never a perception that nuclear energy was a sector that required 
a supranational institution, the motives leading to Euratom were purely 
political. Jean Monnet’s Action Committee, in particular, pursued an agenda 
utilising nuclear energy as a momentum for political ends. As Lucas states, 
“[w]hen the political motives required technical support, they fell back 
on a technical vision of the future which was an extreme view that did 
not enjoy the best of the arguments even at that time” (Lucas 1977: 28).  
 
Hence, endogenous momentum was deployed by the Action Committee for 
institutional change and to amend the predominant institutional trajectory. This 
evidence corroborates the claim that, when assessing the formation of 
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preferences of actors, “ideas render material considerations legible through 
processes of communication, coordination, and persuasion” (Fioretos et al. 
2016: 12). Similarly to the inception of the ECSC, after the initial endogenous 
spark concerning institutional formation / change, subsequent preference 
formation of Member States was rooted in rational decision-making and 
calculations regarding a trade-off between economic interests and security 
considerations, which we will now explore. 
 
Following a two-day session between the heads of state of Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, agreement was eventually 
reached in February 1957 in Paris (High Authority 1957b). The Treaties 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed in Rome on 25th March 
1957 (High Authority 1957c). What stands out is the omission of legal 
provisions addressing energy policy in the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. The decision not to incorporate the energy domain was 
significant for future policy development insofar as, from an HI standpoint, 
early decisions become more and more entrenched over time and shape and 
constrain the range of possible policy choices in the future. Although Euratom 
was mentioned throughout the document, not a single reference to other 
energy-related issues was made (EEC Treaty 1957). Hence, by excluding the 
sectors that were not covered by the ECSC and Euratom Treaty, hampered 
their further development from the offset. That said, the Treaty of the ECSC 
and Euratom created two institutions with considerable supranational powers 
in their respective policy field.  
 
Deubner (1979) drew a detailed picture of the negotiations leading to the 
Euratom Treaty and the final outcome. Prior to Messina, France was reluctant 
to accept the prospect of a general common market and instead proposed 
sectoral integration in specific economic policies. It was the first industrialised 
country after the war that strived to develop a nuclear programme on a large 
scale and endeavoured to produce nuclear weapons. France needed supplies 
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of uranium and technology and therefore proposed the creation of Euratom 
(Deubner 1979). Germany was not overly enthusiastic about Euratom but 
needed the support of France to bolster the project of the common market 
(Matlary 1997). As a consequence of their deteriorating international standing, 
aggravated by France’s involvement in the failure of the Suez Canal 
intervention of 1956, France eventually agreed to the common market and 
Euratom (ibid.). 
 
The crisis was instigated by ongoing tensions between Egypt and Israel on 
one side, and the UK and France on the other, and led to the closure of the 
Suez Canal, which was one of the major oil transit routes. The Suez Crisis 
raised serious concerns regarding a secure supply of oil, needed for the 
generation of electricity, thus creating the opportunity to frame Euratom as a 
means to solve Europe’s energy problems (Brutschin 2016). Moreover, the 
crisis can be seen as the first, however missed, opportunity of the High 
Authority of the ECSC to extend its competence and to gain influence in the 
gas, oil and electricity sector (Schubert et al. 2016). The lack of response to 
the crisis can be largely explained by the contractual arrangements at that 
time, with the majority of the Western oil companies securing good oil deals, 
and the relatively stable political situation in the producer countries (Brutschin 
2016). In addition, the importance of oil was not yet fully appreciated in the 
industrialised world. Thus, the role of Euratom was envisaged as a means to 
create a powerful nuclear industry capable of creating vast amounts of energy 
(Matlary 1997, Euratom Treaty 1957).  
 
As previously stated, the initial trigger concerning the formation of Euratom 
and the EEC was rooted in an idea about how to further enhance the 
institutional matrix and foster deeper integration, and not the outcome of 
actors’ choices based on exogenously given preferences and perfect 
information. The evidence corroborates the claim of Hall and Lamont (2013) 
that, “interaction between neoliberal ideas about states and markets and the 
material endowments of actors and groups” (ibid.: 12) is the important driving 
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factor for initiating change. Along these lines, political considerations (and not 
rational calculations) founded the basis for the idea to create Euratom as a 
means to invigorate the European project. Even more so, in the case of 
France, the institution was meant to reinforce the process of securitisation. 
Hence, preferences were endogenously constructed on the perception of state 
security. Notwithstanding the importance of rational calculations regarding 
costs and benefits during the subsequent bargaining process for both 
institutions, the starting point for institutional change can be best explained by 
assumptions resting on an ideational foundation and endogenous momentum 
created by agents inside the institution.  
 
Another important observation is the missed opportunity of the High 
Commission to integrate oil, gas and electricity (Schubert et al.: 2016) into the 
institutional framework and create policies for the respective sectors. This case 
serves as evidence for a short counterfactual analysis. The counterfactual 
analysis is a means to show that a different institutional choice could have 
been made and that this different institutional arrangement could have created 
a more effective institution (Capoccia 2015). As we will see, the biggest 
challenge for a comprehensive energy policy in the three decades following 
the crisis was the pervasive situation that no legislation could be passed 
without unanimous consent within the Council. Incorporated in the theoretical 
model as a proxy variable for institutional stickiness, the unanimity requirement 
created an adverse institutional environment foreclosing any real 
advancement in terms of secondary legislation. Hence, the Suez Crisis was 
an important and missed opportunity for the Communities to integrate the 
policy area much earlier than the actual historical record shows. 
 
Lucas (1977) points out that it would be an exaggeration to say that Euratom 
was a mere trade-off between the French and the other five Member States, 
who were (un-)enthusiastic about Euratom in varying degrees. However, it is 
fair to say that without the significant support of the French government, 
Euratom would never have been formed (ibid.). Although supportive of a civil 
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nuclear programme in general, the U.S. was highly critical of French 
aspirations, due to their own ambitions to control the world market and flood it 
with large quantities of cheap enriched uranium. The U.S. feared that it would 
lose its dominant economic and technological position. Moreover, they had 
geopolitical concerns as the leader of French nuclear efforts was a communist 
(Deubner 1979). The French aspired to the creation of a supply agency to buy 
uranium on the Western European market (from France; with high prices), a 
common European nuclear market, and for a joint enrichment plant in order to 
brake the U.S. monopoly (also in terms of reprocessing). In addition, France 
supported joint research and development efforts to “secure the place of their 
own lines of development inside Europe” (ibid.: 216). From a French 
standpoint, which was purely self-interested, the rationale behind Euratom was 
reasoned through the aspiration to get cheap access to the nuclear know how 
of other Member States, a secure supply of high quality uranium from the 
Belgian Congo, and a subsidy for its atomic research programme financed via 
the Community budget (George 1996). Moreover, France planned to build its 
own nuclear military capability (Schubert et al. 2016).  
 
The U.S. overtly opposed the attempts to create a European nuclear arsenal 
and demanded that European efforts to design a uranium isotope separation 
plant had to be abandoned – in exchange for US technology. Eventually, the 
U.S. signed an agreement with Euratom to build six nuclear power plants, 
helped financing it and delivered technological assistance, which in turn 
enraged the French President Charles de Gaulle (ibid.). Deubner (1977) 
denoted that Euratom was a “stillborn ‘integration’ scheme” (ibid.: 223). 
Although conceived as a monopoly supply agency, the final treaty had minimal 
relevance as an instrument of deeper European integration as Member States 
could buy uranium on the world market from the cheapest supplier (the US) 
and only formal authorisation had to be given by the agency (ibid.). The US 
sold cheap uranium rods to West Germany (George 1996). No obligation to 
construct a joint enrichment plant was in the treaty and therefore France 
constructed its own independent enrichment facility. No reprocessing plant 
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was authorised; jointly directed national and community research was very 
limited. In the end, even the proposed common market for atomic energy 
goods did not unfold its full potential due to national economic forces (Deubner 
1977). 
 
The Commission was slow to start work (in late 1959 due to the illness of its 
first president) and when it finally did, national rivalries became inherent 
(George 1996). Italy and West Germany soon developed their own nuclear 
research agenda following Euratom. France, with its biggest nuclear research 
programme in place, and who had anticipated taking the most advantage of 
Euratom subsidies, became less supportive of Euratom in general (Bache et 
al. 2014). Moreover, the Commission clashed with the French government 
over the right to inspect French plutonium facilities (which was not supported 
by the Council) and a proposal to create a joint programme with the U.S. 
regarding reactor development. Although the Commission won by majority in 
the Council regarding the reactor development, the French government 
insisted that budgetary concerns had to be decided by unanimity, thus, 
ultimately weakening the Commission’s position (ibid.). “Euratom moved 
perceptibly from the development of a powerful nuclear industry within the 
Community to the coordination and supplementing of national programmes – 
a move very much in keeping with French desires” (George 1996: 158). By the 
time the three executive institutions were merged in 1967, Euratom almost 
forfeited its institutional viability, with only the research centres, the Treaty and 
the personnel representing the institution. “These disembodied entities, 
without any real functional relationship, have nevertheless continued to affect 
community energy policy, much as chickens continue to run around after their 
heads have been cut off” (Lucas 1977: 44). 
 
If we now move on to an analysis of the development of a common energy 
policy concerning all forms of energy, we have to take endogenous and 
structural factors into account. Firstly, the endogenous factor we should be 
aware of are the intrinsic difficulties to implement a common policy posed by 
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the institutional design of the three institutions. Formal competences were only 
given to the institutions regulating coal policies and nuclear energy, leaving the 
three Commissions with no say regarding any other forms of energy. From an 
HI standpoint, the requirement to reach decisions by unanimity in policy 
domains not provided for by the Treaties created what Scharpf (1988) called 
“pathologies of substantive public policy” (ibid.: 267), which informs the 
reasoning for the proxy variable concerning high institutional stickiness. The 
theoretical model predicts that, when the institution shows high institutional 
stickiness, and the absence of a critical juncture, the institution will display a 
process of low integration over time. In this regard, the ECSC Treaty stated in 
Article 95 that, 
“(i)n all cases not provided for in this Treaty where it becomes apparent 
that a decision or recommendation of High Authority is necessary to 
attain, within the common market in coal and steel (…) the decision may 
be taken or the recommendation made with the unanimous assent of 
the Council and after the Consultative Committee has been consulted” 
(ECSC Treaty Article 95).  
As the evidence shows, apart from the coal and nuclear sector, the institution 
displayed high stickiness and an institution that was locked-in. 
 
The EEC treaty stipulated that powers already conferred on the institutions of 
the ECSC were untouched and no reference was made to the use of natural 
resources. Only Article 103 provided the Council with the formal powers to put 
forward a directive to overcome difficulties in the case of a shortage of supply 
of certain products, a loophole that was later exploited to implement the legal 
provision for the regulation on stock management (which will be explained 
later) (Haghighi 2007). The Euratom Treaty can be seen as a major obstacle 
to the development of a common energy policy – especially from a supply 
security standpoint - with respect to conventional energy sources in Europe. 
Nuclear energy was conceived as a panacea concerning the supply security, 
rendering concerns for other forms of energy obsolete and diminishing the 
dependence on third country suppliers. The major goal was to create a 
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powerful nuclear industry that should provide extensive energy resources 
(ibid.). However, as already discussed, Euratom did not unfold its expected 
supranational powers due to “the victory of national economic forces” 
(Deubner 1977: 223). In addition, another main obstacle to an aligned energy 
policy was the diverging preferences of the three executives. ECSC officials 
advocated for the protection of the European coal markets, EEC officials 
preferring a market-based approach based on cheap imported energy, and 
Euratom officials championed nuclear energy to render both coal and imported 
energy obsolete (George 1977). The internal differences and vested interests 
of the different executive powers posed a major stumbling block to the 
development of an energy policy addressing different sorts of energy. 
 
Secondly, the exogenous structural factor that coal lost its predominance 
as the major energy source quite rapidly was a development, which was not 
anticipated when the three communities were formed in the 1950s. In addition, 
due to the enthusiasm for nuclear power and the inherent ‘modernist’ and 
technical musings of how to deal with a growing energy demand, oil was 
completely ignored, although it was used as a supplementary source of 
energy. Only two forms of energy were assumed to be of real significance in 
the long term (George 1977). The first was the coal sector, which was to be 
maintained for reasons of political stability, due to commitments to the labour 
force and social stability in general (Lucas 1977). The second was nuclear 
energy, the future of energy, paving the way to a prosperous Europe and 
helping to “contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member 
States […] by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment 
and growth of nuclear industries” (Euratom Article I). Thus, control of other 
sources of energy, like oil and gas, remained in the hands of Member States 
who did not want to cede their advantageous relationship with producing 




3.4. Energy Policy in the 1960s and 1970s – a locked-in 
institution 
 
Gas did not play an indispensable role in the early / mid 1960s. The first 
pipelines from the Soviet Union to the European Communities were built from 
the late 1960s / early 1970s onwards (Högselius 2013) and concerns regarding 
the security of supply did not arise before the 1990s (Brutschin 2013). Hence, 
oil became the energy source on the rise. We therefore should turn our 
analysis to the factors leading to such developments, keeping in mind that 
matters regarding oil needed unanimous decision-making if addressed in a 
proposal. At first, the increase in oil imports into the Communities was 
reasoned through the inability of Western European coalmines to meet 
increasing demand for energy, and oil from overseas was considered a boon 
when security of energy supply posed a threat (Lubell 1961). However, after 
Europe faced overproduction of indigenous coal during the mild winters of 
1958/59, which happened to coincide with an economic crisis between 1957 
and 1959, long term commitments to import coal from the United States, 
concluded in previous years of shortage (sold at a higher price than during the 
recession), and the inflow of cheap oil, led to a decline of domestic coal 
production (Lucas 1977). As a result, the three big coal producing countries in 
Europe (West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) cut back on coal 
production, and the downturn was reflected in the pessimistic forecasts of both 
the OEEC and the ECSC. When compared, the Hartley Report of 1957 
(OEEC) and the Robinson Report of 1960 (ECSC) clearly show this trend (see 
Table 3). In just three years we see a downward revision of the indigenous 
production of coal of 75 million tons in 1965 and 90 million tons in 1975, 
respectively (Lubell 1961). 
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Table 3. Comparison of the Hartley Commission Report with the Hartley 
Commission Report (in millions of tce - tonnes of coal equivalent) 
 
 
Thus, it can be stated that the Commissions were aware of the predicament 
concerning the coal sector and amended their rather optimistic view of the mid 
1950s to a more accurate version in the early 1960s. The next graph shows 
that the consumption of coal stagnated on the energy markets between 1950 
and the mid-1960s (and deteriorated vis-à-vis oil), whereas total energy 
consumption increased quite rapidly. 
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Table 4 Oil consumption vs. consumption of hard coal  
     
Source: High Authority 1964a 
 
Energy markets were under exogenous structural pressure as oil advanced at 
the expense of coal and oil prices fell. The low oil prices were enabled by new 
oil discoveries in the US and the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, the 
discovery of the world’s largest oil field in Saudi Arabia (Ghawar field, 1948), 
and discoveries in Libya in 1956 and 1959 (Brutschin 2016). In 1960 coal sales 
were not higher than in previous years but sales of oil had increased by more 
than 25%. The High Authority warned of the consequences of these 
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developments as the livelihood of Community miners would be endangered, 
the reliance on energy supplies from outside of the Community evoked security 
concerns, and the investment represented by the coal industry would be 
threatened. Thus, assuming rationality, the three Executives, set up in the so-
called Inter-Executive Working Party, worked on measures for the coordination 
of energy policies in the Community countries (High Authority 1961). In total, 
three memoranda were issued, two addressing the coordination of energy 
policy (March 1960, January 1961) and one addressing imports of coal from 
third countries (October 1961) (High Authority 1964a). After having examined 
the proposals, the six ministers asked the Community Executives to go beyond 
the objectives put forward in the original proposals and to draft proposals for 
an “energy policy designed to culminate in the establishment of a Common 
Market for Energy” and emphasised that the “Executives need not confine 
themselves to the legal possibilities afforded by the existing treaties” (ibid.: 73).  
 
This evidence renders visible the Council’s initial willingness to tackle the 
imminent problems posed by the substantial structural changes in the energy 
sector, and to find effective and acceptable solutions to these new challenges. 
The invitation of the Council to go beyond existing legal provisions can be 
assessed as an awareness of, and reaction to, the pressing matters induced 
by energy markets and the growing awareness of the economic and 
socioeconomic effects these markets have on various other policy areas, 
depicting the intertwined nature of energy policy. The High Authority duly took 
on the task and prepared a draft resolution in June 1962. The purpose to create 
a common policy was reasoned through the growing share of imported 
hydrocarbons, to address the potential opportunities posed by the 
development of nuclear energy, and to tackle social issues. The goal was to 
create conditions to ensure a cheap, stable and secure supply of energy in 
terms of cost and available quantities, fair competition and freedom of choice 
for consumers (Haghighi 2007). The unexpected observation is that many of 
these ideas and propositions can be found in contemporary policy proposals 
regarding the Energy Union (which we will explore in chapter six).  
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However, in the end “it proved to be impossible to secure the Council’s 
unanimous acceptance of the draft resolution” (High Authority 1964a: 78) 
which was an already amended version of the original proposal made by 
Government representatives. The draft resolution merely represented the 
minimum commitments in relation to a common energy policy on which 
Member States might agree at that time. The three Executives considered it 
wholly inadequate because it did not address a common energy policy at all. 
The adverse outcome of the decision fuelled concerns within the High 
Authority, and the European Parliament “evinced deep disquiet” (ibid.: 79). 
This serves as strong evidence for corroborating the first hypothesis, that in 
the absence of a critical juncture, a locked-in institution, which is subjected to 
the highest degree of institutional stickiness, is trapped within its own 
institutional design. “[J]oint-decision systems […] are able to block their own 
further institutional evolution” (Scharpf 1988: 267). If decision-making is 
subjected to unanimous voting, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reach 
agreement on effective policy instruments addressing contentious issues. 
Even highly potent exogenous forces - oil flooding the market and coal losing 
its predominant position - that impacted the institution, and which had severe 
repercussions for the institutional performance, could not alter the path of the 
institutional trajectory. Under such conditions, there is no ‘gradualist’, stepwise 
way of transforming the institution towards greater policy potential (ibid.). The 
evidence suggests that, in order to equip the institution with the capacity to 
react to exogenous change, the policy area under concern must be addressed 
in primary law and QMV has to be the decision rule. This was the case for coal 
and nuclear power. Whether these policy provision showed effectiveness is 
not the exercise here, but rather, whether the institution was able to create 
policies in the first place. For those sectors in energy policy not provided for by 
the Treaties, policy evolution was severely hampered. Moreover, policy 
proposals gearing towards the creation of a common energy policy 
represented merely the smallest common denominator of Member States, as 
each Member State had the power to veto a given policy proposal if any of the 
 112 
provisions included were against a Member States’ own preferences. 
Therefore we see a process of low integration in the early 1960s. 
 
The inability to reach agreement not only hindered the creation of a common 
energy policy, but also prevented the Communities from tackling the extremely 
difficult and immediate problems with regards to coal. The coal producing 
countries introduced more and more measures that were national in nature 
(due to external pressures and serious social and regional complications) and, 
thus, less and less in line with the spirit of the ECSC Treaty. From a free market 
perspective, this state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and issues 
had to be resolved as soon as possible. The High Authority was “determined 
to leave no stone unturned to bring about a comprehensive solution” and 
stated that it was “essential that some definite prospect of an ultimate energy 
policy should emerge soon” (High Authority 1964a).  
 
A forecast made in 1964 predicted rapid growth of the Community economy 
(4.6 % per annum in GNP), and stated that the total energy consumption was 
also expected to increase substantially (about 4 % per year). Thus, further 
concerns regarding the share of coal in terms of total energy consumption 
were induced, even when the production of other energy sources was 
expanding. More and more of the energy requirements would have to be met 
by energy imports, mostly by the acquisition of crude oil. As these imports were 
assumed to grow also by a large amount over time, questions of stability and 
security of supply arose, both in terms of tonnage and prices (High Authority 
1964b). It was predicted that by 1970 barely one third of total energy 
requirements would be satisfied by coal, and even if production quantities were 
sustained, it would decrease to 33% in 1970 and 27% in 1975 (ibid.). 
 
By the middle of the 1960s, oil had superseded coal as the Communities’ most 
important primary fuel (Duffield & Birchfield 2011). Oil became very cheap and 
was available in large quantities. In response to this development, in 1960 the 
Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created to 
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counterbalance the oil surplus and extremely low oil prices, a development that 
was furthered by the Soviet Union’s entrance to the world oil market. Russian 
oil was much cheaper than its Middle Eastern counterpart. Therefore, in order 
to balance the bargaining power of exporter countries, the Head of the 
Directorate-General of Economic Affairs and Energy (ECSC) proposed that 
agreements between Member States should be made to coordinate energy 
policy at the European level. However, in the end this proposal never 
materialised (Brutschin 2016). As we can see in Table 5., things got even 
worse in 1970 than anticipated in the already pessimistic predictions of the mid 
1960s. By 1970, only 22% of primary energy consumption was covered by 
coal, whereas oil accounted for almost 60% and “the shares of a decade earlier 
had been almost exactly reversed” (Duffield & Birchfield 2011: 3).  
 
In addition, gas gained in importance with a share of almost 10% compared to 
nearly zero in 1950. Natural gas appeared on the energy markets in the mid 
1950s. Its performance had been particularly impressive as a consequence of 
increasing production in the Netherlands, and gas ousted coal from some of 
its traditional markets, thus, accelerating the decline of the consumption of 
coal. Nuclear energy did not satisfy initial expectations of its contribution to the 
energy mix; this was not accounted for by the technological advance itself, 
insofar as the nuclear technology reached a certain maturity. However, the fact 
was owed to the plentiful supply of cheap oil, rendering competitive prices of 
nuclear energy difficult (Commission of the European Communities 1972a). 
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Table 5. Total energy consumption broken down by fuel source in terms of 
TCE (tonne of coal equivalent) millions and % share 
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1972a  
 
The main obstacles to the solution of urgent energy issues persisted. The 
institutional design of the European Communities was never intended to 
capture the shift in the energy mix, creating institutional inertia, as “[t]he 
community institutions were never given any explicit jurisdiction over oil and, 
later, natural gas, not to mention any general competence in the area of energy 
policy” (Duffield & Birchfield 2011: 3). These omissions produced the inherent 
tendency for policy outcomes to be sub-optimal. From an HI standpoint, no 
institutional development could be initiated. The early decisions to exclude 
specific sectors of the energy domain from the institutional arrangement, 
conferring no competences to the Communities in these sectors, foreclosed 
the development of increasing returns and institutional alignment. Relatively 
small events and decisions early in the sequence, shaped and constrained 
decisions later down the sequence, and developed wide-ranging 
consequences for the institution’s ability to response to the changing context. 
Had the institution been exposed to low institutional stickiness (the second IV) 
based on QMV and path dependence, introducing a certain level of inertia, the 
matrix could have been gradually and incrementally changed. Under the 
proposed theoretical model of this thesis, a critical juncture was needed to jolt 
the institution out of the prevailing lock-in. 
 
However, that is not to say that the Commission did not fight hard to bring forth 
proposals addressing the energy dilemma. In 1968, the merged Commission, 
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on its own initiative, presented the memorandum “First guidelines for a 
Community energy policy” (European Commission 1968). During the 
preceding months, the divided responsibility of the three Executives were 
frequently cited as one of the causes for slow progress. Unfortunately, the 
preparation of the guidelines took up two years and much of the psychological 
momentum was lost along the way (Lucas 1977). Documents like guidelines 
and proposals for secondary legislation serve as evidence for the analytical 
unit of intended goals, as discussed in chapter two on research design. They 
outline the anticipated goals the institution tries to achieve. In this regard, they 
severe as a ‘blueprint’ for the policy output; the legislation the institution 
intends to deploy to govern energy policy. 
 
The Commission based the guidelines on two documents: on a Protocol of 
Agreement concluded between Member States in 1964 (Special Council of 
Ministers 1964) and a Council decision of 1967 regarding the policy for oil and 
natural gas. In the Protocol of Agreement, Member States asserted their aim 
to create a common energy policy in terms of a common commercial policy 
and the supply from third countries, address the management of state 
subsidies, and issues of competition based on different fuels. The guidelines 
emphasise the serious “obstacles to trade within the Community as regards 
energy products” (European Commission 1968: 5) and the need to 
counterbalance the excessive risks arising from the great dependence of the 
Member States on “imports and from insufficient diversification of the sources 
of supply” (ibid.: 6).  
 
The guidelines also contained specific proposals which fell into three 
categories: the establishment of a framework for action and a policy 
addressing measures in the case of the interruption of energy supplies, 
measures to create a common market, and the creation of a policy for 
obtaining cheap and secure supplies (European Commission 1968). The 
proposals, understood here as intended goals, were ambitious in their 
conceptualisation, as they addressed different levels of energy policy and a 
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common market. However, in the end the Council could only agree on a 
general set of principles (Duffield & Birchfield 2011). The lack of progress can 
be attributed to the design of the institution. It was not until November 1969 
that the Council met to discuss the guidelines – almost three years after the 
Executives had merged. Fundamental principles were agreed by the Member 
States, however, none of the proposals the Commission had sent to the 
Council – part of a “policy of little steps” (Lucas 1977: 50) - were approved at 
the end of 1971 (ibid.). Thus, the evidence once again suggests that only a 
minimum of the intended goals were addressed in the final policy output, 
corroborating the claim that institutional evolution was starkly obstructed by 
the institutional framework. 
 
The only proposal that materialised during this period was the Directive 
68/414/EEC, implementing an obligation for Member States to maintain 
minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, “at least 65 days 
average daily internal consumption in the preceding calendar year” (Council of 
the European Communities 1968: 586). Although measures to align different 
Member State’s energy policies to create rules for a common market / ensure 
the security of supply were on the table, in the early 1970s, the Communities 
saw again a resistance to instigate a common European energy policy. Policy 
measures and legal provisions materialised only with limited capacity to 
effectively regulate energy markets and provide supply security. In 1972, the 
directive from 1968 to mandatorily store a minimum of oil stocks was updated 
and increased from 65 to 90 days (Council of the European Communities 
1972). The increase in stocks was to be carried out as soon as possible, 
however, not later than 1 January 1975 (ibid.).  
 
A subsequent step was Directive 73/238/EEC to provide the competent 
authorities in the Communities with the necessary powers in an emergency 
situation caused by a supply disruption. The powers conferred entailed the 
following: to draw on emergency stocks; to impose specific or broad 
restrictions on consumption; to give priority to supplies of petroleum products 
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to certain groups of users; and to regulate prices in order to prevent abnormal 
price rises (Council of the European Communities 1973). In addition, the 
Commission made further proposals for more ‘little steps’ – without any 
progress being made. Even those measures that were agreed upon had their 
roots in initiatives instigated years before, and therefore just required a minimal 
amount of political will (Lucas 1977). Apart from the necessary commitments, 
no vision of further institutional endowment materialised - the institution was 
heavily locked-in. The implemented policy measures in the case of a supply 
disruption represented the absolute bare minimum of political will conferred to 
the institution. As Lucas (1977) explains,  
“[t]he lack of any interest in energy policy from the member states is 
certainly the most striking aspect of this period. […] (D)iscussion of 
energy was desultory and there was no determination to reach 
agreement. […] There was, in fact, agreement in principle on many of 
these proposals, but there was no determination to solve the secondary 
problems that they threw up. […] The reason for the lack of 
determination was not so much that the proposals would have harmed 
the interests of member states, but much more that no member state 
felt it had anything to gain from the proposals, and therefore no 
government made an effort to have them agreed” (ibid.: 51). 
 
In this case, as we can see, the notion of rationality considering Member 
State’s policy choices (their preferences) is very strong. Member States’ 
interest was to keep energy policy a sovereign issue with little involvement on 
the part of the Commission. Poor institutional performance can be attributed 
to the lack of political will and the institutional design. Member States perceived 
no economic benefit of a common energy policy based on rational choices, 
and a lack of leadership from the Commission was apparent due structural 
constraints. By 1972, and five years after the merger, energy policy was not 
further integrated and lacked effective policy tools. At this point we must recall 
that the formal competences of the EEC addressed only coal and nuclear 
energy, both diminishing in their importance (Matlary 1997), and hence, oil and 
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gas was subject to unanimous voting in the EEC. Therefore, the institutional 
trajectory was fundamentally rigid and secondary legislation was very hard to 
alter. New wide-ranging provisions, apart from the rather tenuous provisions 
on oil stocks and emergency measures, were almost impossible to trigger. 
Even though the shortcomings of energy policy were highly salient, policy 
makers and the different preferences of the Member States hindered the 
development of a common policy. Moreover, provisions concerning a common 
market / ensuring the security of supply were not addressed via primary 
legislation. Therefore, the institution could not be altered and national energy 
policies were conceived as the appropriate means to ensure the supply of 
energy. 
 
In 1972, the Commission published a communication called “Necessary 
progress in Community energy policy” (European Commission 1972c), which 
built on the “First guidelines for a Community energy policy” (European 
Commission 1968). Specific factors emphasised by the Commission in the 
document, were contributing to changes in the context of energy policy and on 
the world energy scene. They included: the changing attitude of exporting 
countries to a more assertive role regarding their price policy; thus, creating a 
seller’s market and resulting in changed costs (this means that oil producers 
were in a position to determine unilaterally questions of price and supply); a 
nascent debate on how to improve the quality of life, which found a first 
practical expression in a discourse about environmental protection; the 
upcoming enlargement of the Community, “which will have the effect of altering 
both the pattern of the energy sector and ideas on energy policy” (ibid.: 5). The 
memorandum furthermore clarified that the role of the public authorities on the 
Community energy markets should be strengthened. However, the term ‘public 
authorities’ was ambiguously formulated and could, depending on the 




Clearly, the proposal again set forth ambitious intended goals and a couple of 
specific measures to tackle issues associated with each individual sector (oil, 
natural gas, coal, electricity, and nuclear energy). However, despite attempts 
by the Communities to instigate renewed impetus for a comprehensive energy 
policy, they did not achieve the desired results and the lack of policy output 
prevailed. Much like its predecessor from 1968, the set of proposals did not 
generate more enthusiasm among Member States. France in particular was 
not keen to cede powers to the supranational institutions and tried to restrict 
the Commission’s role in developing any energy policy. A fact, that was 
exacerbated after the accession of the UK who supported France’s attitude in 
terms of limiting the powers of the Commission (McGowan 2011). 
 
In addition, the Commission published a communication in 1972 that was 
based on a comprehensive analysis of the demand side along with a predicted 
future supply situation of primary energy sources, to identify available policy 
options. In the 1960s, “[o}il was available in virtually unlimited quantities and 
at relatively low prices, and covered most of the new demand which arose” 
(European Commission 1972b). Gas gained some turf in the overall energy 
demand, the demand for coal decreased further, and nuclear energy was side-
lined due to much cheaper conventional energy. Almost like a pre-emption of 
the approaching oil crisis in 1973, the Commission warned that oil producers 
have become aware of the advantage they have on a sellers’ market, and that 
they were seeking to intervene more directly in the management of their 
resources. The Commission therefore proposed certain means to tackle long-
term energy security. The list of issues almost reads like a policy proposal for 
the 2014 Energy Union: a rational utilisation of energy to reduce the pressure 
on the market; the diversification of sources of supply to increase both short- 
and long-term security; and the creation of a stable energy market to ensure a 




3.4.1. The first oil shock 
 
The oil crisis of 1973/74 hit the European Communities hard and can be seen 
as the severest event that had affected the European Communities until then. 
It serves as valuable evidence for further investigation. From a HI perspective, 
exogenous events like the oil crisis, might punctuate the institutional trajectory 
in a way prompting the institution to change its path and initiate amendments 
to the institutional framework and its rules. This creates two main questions 
that warrant further investigation. Firstly, did the crisis initiate the institution to 
change its path and, hence, deploy enough momentum to be classified as a 
critical juncture? Secondly, if it did not fulfil this premise, what reasons can be 
identified for why the crisis did not provide the necessary momentum to change 
the institution, despite its severity for energy markets and the economy? The 
oil crisis of 1973/74 is thus a good case to assess under what conditions 
exogenous events instigate critical junctures. 
 
The crisis occurred due to the Egyptian and Syrian invasion of Israel, during 
which Israel managed to push back the invasion with the help of Europe and 
the US. As a response, the oil-producing countries, organised through the 
OPEC, instigated an oil embargo on 16 October 1973, which meant that they 
cut the production of crude oil and began to increase the price of oil. The 
embargo targeted the US, the Netherlands, and partially Denmark (European 
Community Information Service 1974). The Netherlands had allowed the US 
to use its territory and airlift military equipment to Israel. In addition, the 
Netherlands provided Israel with oil during the war (Schubert et al. 2016). The 
Dutch in return, looked for support from their fellow Member States without 
much success. The French and the British did not promote solidarity; 
especially the British endorsed a stance to not aggravate OPEC (McGowan 
2011) due to domestic interests. France and Britain joined the Arab blockade 
of the Netherlands. The Dutch invoked the Treaty of Rome, pointing to the fact 
that commodities had to move freely within the Community. However, France 
sided with the Arab oil producers, stating that they were free to choose whom 
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to sell to. Both the British and the French declared their approach to the Middle 
Eastern conflict was one of neutrality and, as a consequence, the Arab oil 
producers classified both as friendly countries. Europe was facing two serious 
problems: firstly, its stark dependence on Middle Eastern oil; and secondly, 
that there was neither the will nor the institutions for united action in the face 
of a crisis. The crisis showed “the unacceptably high cost of disunity” (Laqueur 
1974). The price of oil per barrel first almost doubled, then quadrupled, leading 
to a price increase from three to five USD, and over the course of 1974 to more 
than twelve USD (Schubert et al. 2016). 
 
Although the oil crisis might have created hope that it could reignite a debate 
on feasible policy options to create a comprehensive energy policy, this was 
unfortunately not the case. At the Copenhagen summit in December 1973, 
where measures to tackle the crisis were discussed, a common response by 
Member States was blocked due to disagreements between Germany and 
Britain over the funding of regional policy (ibid.). Intergovernmental bargaining 
was characterised by choices derived from Member States’ individual 
preferences to maximise utility and attain their respective goals. The 
Copenhagen Summit did not provide a solution to the grave situation the oil 
crisis evoked; rather it emphasised that Europe was facing a serious crisis, 
that it was split between different interests, and that it did not have the capacity 
to instigate common action (Laqueur 1974). Based on self-interested 
calculations and utilitarian considerations, Britain and France believed that if 
they adhered to the wishes of the oil producing countries, a steady and cheap 
supply of oil could be maintained and they would get better deals than the 
other European countries (ibid.). On 18 March 1974, OPEC decided in Vienna 
to lift the embargo and step up the production but left the price of oil unaltered. 
As EC Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf put it in early 1974, “(n)ever before have 
the clouds lowered so menacingly over Europe as now” (European Community 
Information Service 1974: 1). Consequently, the skyrocketing oil prices led to 
a decrease in economic growth by 1,5% and an increase in the general price 
level by 3%. To show the far-reaching implications of the energy crisis, the 
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following economic sectors suffered most from the slow-down of economic 
growth: chemicals and plastic industries, building and construction, textiles, 
cement, glass, ceramics, tourism, trade and other services, rubber and motor 
vehicle construction. In addition, the crisis also had an impact on employment, 
and on the payment balances and the monetary reserves (European 
Commission 1974). This highlights the interconnection of the energy sector 
with other policy areas and the whole economy of the Communities, which 
were also affected by the crisis. 
 
In the midst of the crisis, the Commission published a communication in June 
1974 named Towards a new energy policy strategy for the European 
Community. The communication was full of concern about energy security and 
hence,  
“[v]igorous action must be taken in order both to guarantee greater 
security of supply and to prevent violent' changes in the prices of energy 
materials, which always prejudice the effectiveness of investments 
undertaken and call into question the wisdom of the path economic 
development has followed” (European Commission 1974: 1).  
 
The Commission was not only concerned about the implications of the oil price 
increase for energy policy in general, but also about the repercussions it had 
for the adaptation of economic structures and the institutional matrix. As 
already mentioned, the crisis would bring about a deterioration in the balance 
of payments, and as an immediate consequence, the external debt of the 
Community would increase (ibid.). Intriguingly, as Buchan & Keay (2015) 
emphasise, the Commission also proposed an absolute institutional 
innovation: the creation of a Community agency, with its own legal personality 
and financial resources. This agency should have been the institutional body 
assigned with the planning of energy supplies and infrastructure. A daring and 
courageous undertaking, based on the severe economic conditions the 
European Community found itself in. As one might already assume, from the 
empirical evidence already examined, the proposal vanished without a trace. 
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Since then, the Commission has never dared to propose a European energy 
agency of this scope, not even in the context of the Energy Union. 
 
The evidence suggests that an institution must be endowed with the 
institutional capacity to react to exogenous factors / threats. In the absence of 
such institutional competences, and if a specific sector is not integrated into 
the institutional matrix, no effective responses can be triggered. As 
competences lie outside of the institutional remit, no mitigation measures can 
be deployed to preclude or reduce external threats. Member States reacted to 
the oil crisis with bilateral agreements, based on their respective set of 
preferences, with Arab suppliers, who awarded them contingent on Member 
States’ stance towards the Arab-Israeli question. Here, the notion of rationality 
is particularly strong; the locked-in institution was not able to resolve the 
problem and rational decision-making influenced intergovernmental 
bargaining. Despite high hopes associated with the oil stock obligation of 1968 
(the subsequent Council Directive from 1972 was not in force yet) and 
expectations of solidarity, the nine Member States opted for individual 
solutions (Schubert et al. 2016). OPEC’s strategy could be best summed up 
as one that sought to divide and rule – which worked perfectly in the EC 
(Matlary 1997). It was only after this that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
united most of the West European countries to establish a common front by 
creating an emergency oil-sharing mechanism, further delaying any common 
initiative within the Communities (ibid.). Not to mention that the involvement of 
the US – to form a consumer’s cartel as a response to the measures taken by 
the producer’s cartel -  complicated the OPEC crisis still further (George 1996). 
As a result, and in line with Gaullist foreign policy objectives, the French 
government did not follow the measures initiated by the US, and subsequently 
did not join the International Energy Agency (IEA) – the consumer’s cartel. The 
idea behind the IEA was not new. Kissinger suggested founding an ‘Energy 
NATO’, an international organisation within the framework of the Organisation 
of Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) (Schubert et al. 2016). 
However, “[t]his produced a split within the Community which made an energy 
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policy impossible to achieve” (George 1996.: 163). The attempts by the 
Commission to involve France in oil-sharing and research activities on 
alternative energy resources were hampered by France’s resistance to joining 
the IEA. France decided to do so in order to signpost some sort of 
‘Communitarian virtue’ – something that was not received well by other 
Member States (ibid.). 
 
In addition, Directive 73/238/EEC of July 1973, on measures to mitigate the 
effects of difficulties in the supply of crude oil and petroleum products, did not 
create a solution on a Community level. It conferred powers in the case of a 
supply shortage to “competent authorities” (Council of the European 
Communities 1973: 1) at a Member State level. Moreover, “Member States 
shall appoint the bodies to be responsible for implementing the measures to 
be taken in execution of the powers provided for” (ibid.: 2), thus, underlining 
that national programmes were preferred over European ones, during and 
after the crisis. It took another four years to confer minimum competences to 
the Commission, in case of a supply disruption. Based on the aforementioned 
directive, and the obligation to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or 
petroleum products (Directive 72/425/EEC), Council Decision 77/706/EEC 
allowed the Commission to “set a target for reducing consumption of petroleum 
products in the Community as a whole by up to 10 % of normal consumption” 
(Council of the European Communities 1977b:1), after consulting expert 
groups from the Member States. 
 
The Council would subsequently have to decide by qualified majority on the 
proposals concerning reduction targets by the Commission (ibid.) - a minor 
success, given the Community’s relentless efforts to comprehensively 
integrate energy policy for 20 years. However, the decision still endorsed a 
strong sovereign component as the expert groups, who should consult the 
Commission about the appropriate measures to be taken in the case of a 
supply shortage, were recruited from the different Member States. 
Interestingly, it took the Commission another one and a half years, until June 
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1979, to come up with detailed rules for the implementation of the Council 
Decision (European Commission 1979c), which happened to be during the 
second oil shock of 1979. This time, the oil crisis was caused by the Iranian 
Revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war. Once again, diminished oil 
supplies dramatically and increased the world price of crude oil (European 
Commission 1979a). 
 
As we can see, only insignificant progress was made to consolidate European 
energy policy; the institution was locked-in and unable to alter its institutional 
trajectory, which was agreed upon more than 20 years earlier. From an HI 
perspective, early decision can have a huge impact on later decisions as they 
entrench the predominant rules deeper into the institution. Again, we have to 
recall that, at this time, any oil related policy was subject to a unanimous vote 
in the Council. This supports the first hypothesis, that policy making was 
severely hampered by the voting system, and that the most rigid form of 
institutional inertia caused a total lock in of the institution. Energy policy at this 
time provides strong evidence to support the assertion that in the absence of 
qualified majority voting in an institution, institutional development is severely 
hampered. However, one important question remains unanswered. Why did 
the oil crisis, which represented a serious threat to the European Communities, 
not constitute a critical juncture / formative moment for energy policy making 
and was not a catalyst for the creation of primary law or the amendment of 
secondary law? Why did the crisis not instigate institutional change? 
 
An explanation that is based on the premise of self-interested utility 
maximisation of the different Member States regarding their preferences, may 
be able to provide a plausible answer. A later communication from the 
Commission points to causes for Member State’s action that are reasoned on 
the grounds of the self-interested behaviour, and that are, in this case, closely 
linked to the notion of ‘high politics’. The documents state that, 
“[i]t is because adequate and reasonably-priced energy supplies are so 
fundamental to the functioning of the economy and to the stability of 
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society that energy questions in time of actual or threatened difficulty 
become charged with the highest political significance both domestically 
and in the field of foreign relations” (European Commission 1979a).  
 
The evidence suggests that both exogenous and endogenous factors must be 
present to amend primary legislation and to count as a critical juncture, as was 
the case for the inception of the ECSC. In this case both factors were present. 
In the case of the oil crisis, exogenous factors were present, however, 
endogenous momentum was not given due to the diverging preferences of 
actors. Therefore, in times of an (energy) crisis, and when significant 
exogenous factors impact the institution, if the policy area concerned can be 
found in the intergovernmental sphere, institutional rules will not, or only 
minimally, be altered. To be able to amend secondary provisions, and to 
enhance the possibility to find a common solution to a problem on a 
supranational level, certain competences must be transferred to the institution 
in advance and enshrined in primary law as a prerequisite. Otherwise, the 
exogenous event will not have an impact on the supranational institution, but 
rather influence the regulatory framework of the different Member States on a 
national level. The crisis certainly did have a big impact on the institutions that 
governed energy policy on the national level; consequently, each Member 
State reacted differently. However, the impact of the exogenous threat did not 
change the institutional trajectory at the Community level. Oil was not 
governed by the EEC, hence, no institutional ‘matter’ or ‘substance’ in the form 
of secondary legal provisions could be altered. In order to influence the 
associated rules, and to change the path of the institution, the institution must 
be endowed with competences in the first place. When sectors fall outside the 
remit of the institution, and are not embraced by the institutional framework, 
actors will resort to unilateral measures on a national level. 
 
Suboptimal outcomes were the result of the energy crisis and laid bare the 
Community’s ineptitude to swiftly react to exigent events and effectively 
regulate specific areas of the polity which lay outside of the Union’s 
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competence. Moreover, crises like the energy crisis of 1973 constitute events 
that lead to a deep running uncertainty about, and distrust in, the capacity of 
the Community to tackle serious situations in order to maintain and ensure the 
well-being of its citizens. The approach to problem solving and decision-
making, as exemplified by the actions of Member States, is one that suggests 
that under severe conditions, and based on an intergovernmental rationale, a 
‘me first!’ attitude in the event of an exogenous shock serves as the common 
rationale for Member States – at least for those whose preferences are not 
aligned with the intended goals of the institution. Even if Member States are 
integrated in other policy areas and are embedded into the institutional matrix, 
if the sector is on an intergovernmental level and penetrated by an exogenous 
event, national solutions will dominate decision-making in the institution. 
 
 
3.4.2. The Institution after the crisis 
 
In 1974, the Commission once again proposed measures to create a 
Community energy policy (Council of the European Communities 1974a). The 
resolution stated that there was an urgent need for a Community energy policy, 
as acknowledged at the Copenhagen Summit, due to the shifting structural 
conditions on the world energy markets. It suggested the reduction of energy 
demand, improvement of energy security based on the development of nuclear 
power, further exploration of the Community’s own hydrocarbon and solid fuels 
resources, diversification of energy supplies, and measures to ensure 
research and development efforts. In addition, environmental protection 
should be considered in both the production and consumption of energy 
(Council of the European Communities 1974a). As required in the resolution, 
the Council met again in December 1974 to “work out and implement a 
common energy policy as quickly as possible” (Council of the European 
Communities 1974b).  
 
 128 
The meeting resulted in the Council resolution ‘concerning Community energy 
policy objectives for 1985’, providing a new set of intended goals. According 
to the forecasts, the Community’s level of dependence on imported energy 
would reach 50 % by 1985. As imported energy accounted for 63 % in 1973, 
the Council approved the objective to reach this goal and, if possible, even 
reduce it further to 40 % by 1985. The document specifically emphasised that 
the more ambitious goal of 40 % should take priority and that the Council 
request that the Community institutions constantly review the progress made 
to achieve this objective (ibid.). From an HI perspective, constant monitoring 
of the policy outcome contributes to feedback processes and increasing 
returns; assessing the effectiveness of the policy output is an indispensable 
part of the policy cycle – monitoring determines whether provisions are 
sufficiently applied by Member States, or whether stricter application is 
necessary to reach the predefined intended goals.  
 
The resolution stated that the Community’s growth rate in total energy 
consumption should be curbed by 15 % in 1985, compared with 1973; coal 
production should be maintained if economically feasible (180 Mtoe by 1985); 
the Community’s research and production of natural gas should be sped up, 
whereas 95-115 Mtoe should be secured from third countries; 160 GWe 
(Gigawatt electrical), and if possible, 200 GWe of electricity should be provided 
by nuclear energy (whereas electricity should cover 35 % of energy 
consumption by 1985); hydro-electric and geothermic power plants should 
raise their contributions to 45 Mtoe; oil consumption should be restricted as 
much as possible and where feasible, replaced by other energy sources; 
research and Community production of oil should be stepped up (to 180 Mtoe 
by 1985); and imports from third countries should be cut back from 640 Mtoe 
in 1973 to 540 Mtoe in 1985, which translated into reducing the share of 
imported oil in the total energy requirements from 61 % in 1973 to 38 % in 
1985 (Council of the European Communities 1974b). 
 
 129 
As one can see, the proposal set forth ambitious and clearly defined intended 
goals to tackle challenges in the aftermath of the Arab oil crisis. Shortly 
thereafter, in February 1975, the Council underpinned its willingness to support 
the development of a Community energy policy. The objectives as laid out in 
the resolution of December 1974 required the “implementation of appropriate 
measures at Community level as well as by each Member State” (Council of 
the European Communities 1975: 1). The Council therefore invited “the 
Commission to periodically recommend long-term guidelines on energy for the 
pursuit of these objectives, covering in particular any type of investment which 
such activities may involve. Such guidelines (were) to help Member States to 
take the appropriate decisions” (ibid.). The resolution also stated that for 
hydrocarbons, exchanges of information and concerted action between public 
authorities, and consultations between public authorities and industry, should 
be facilitated – and when necessary, the means to act should be provided. 
From an HI perspective, the exchange of information contributes to learning 
effects as it creates transparency and a more level playing field. Hence, it 
creates adaptive expectations and improves the conditions for policy 
alignment between the various stakeholders. Moreover, the Council agreed to 
review whether Community rules should be laid out in the event of supply 
difficulties, to ensure the balanced supply of the energy market “and the 
maintenance of its unity in observance of the provisions of the Treaty” (ibid.). 
However, as one can see, the wording is rather vague and leaves room for 
broad interpretation. As was the case with previous documentation (for 
instance, see European Commission 1972c), the term ‘public authorities’ could 
be interpreted in various ways and political actors on the national or 
supranational level could be meant. 
 
No big changes materialised as a result of these ambitious proposals. The 
main obstacle to a Community-wide energy policy was Britain, who joined the 
EEC in 1973 (together with Denmark and Ireland) and who was committed to 
keeping energy policy at a national level and vetoed deeper integration. The 
UK enjoyed a surplus of energy resources, producing more than it consumed, 
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which constituted a novelty amongst the other Member States. The UK had 
abundant resources of coal, oil and gas. When coal production declined 
between the late 1960s and 1970s, the country stepped up its oil and gas 
production. The discovery of large reserves off the British coast (in the North 
Sea), meant the UK could meet most of its energy demands for both oil and 
gas – although Britain continued to import crude oil and petroleum products 
(McGowan 2011). This development was exemplified in 1974 when the British 
Secretary of Energy stated that the UK had little to gain from any common 
European energy policy, thus, underling that Britain preferred a national 
approach over a Community policy, based on a self-interested set of 
preferences. 
 
From a HI standpoint, the slow development of a common approach to energy 
at this time can be explain as follows. Although the Commission relentlessly 
tried to instigate a Community approach to create a level playing field for all 
Member States, the development was hampered by the veto powers of 
Member States. Scharpf’s joint decision trap is hence fully corroborated based 
on the requirement to unanimously agree on secondary provisions. The high 
institutional stickiness (the institutional ‘lock-in’) creates high countervailing 
pressures to change, and prevents the institution from changing at all in the 
absence of a catalytic event like a critical juncture. Even though the Council 
agreed on a specific set of intended goals, as laid out in the Council resolution 
of December 1974 (Council of the European Communities 1974b), in the end, 
Member State’s resistance prevented the Community to develop a coherent 
stance.  
 
The UK, in particular, became a key veto player in energy policy reasoned 
through its predominant position as one of Europe’s main producers. In order 
to defend its interest to shield the North Sea oil and gas reserves from foreign 
influence, Britain protected its national champions like British Petroleum and 
sought that Community-wide policies do not weaken their position on the 
energy markets (Ciambra & Solorio: 2015). British energy policy was based on 
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a strong concern for supply security and “broader energy objectives” 
(McGowan 1996: 5). The government had direct influence on the energy sector 
which was based on the purchase of shares that would later become British 
Petroleum and the establishment of a corporation managing the electricity grid 
(ibid.). In the aftermath of the oil crisis, the UK used its (veto) powers to 
selectively leverage and hamper any further advancement of the EEC energy 
agenda. “In a context in which the Commission still lacked any resources and 
formal power in this policy field and France agreed to undermine the scope of 
a collective response by the Community, the United Kingdom effectively 
managed to phase out any sensible advance in energy policy from the formal 
agenda” (Ciambra & Solorio: 2015). The British government constantly 
intervened in energy markets and affairs to protect their own interests and 
preferences: to attain the goals of reconstruction and to develop new 
technologies and resources.  
 
An additional dampener for the development of a comprehensive energy policy 
was France’s protectionist stance towards a Community policy, much alike the 
UK’s. The reason for the reluctance to shift powers to the supranational level 
can be found in France’s development of energy policy that followed a similar 
historical development like the UK’s: France had a long tradition in participating 
in the oil sector, the energy sector in France was nationalised after the Second 
World War and public firms were subsequently utilised to attain energy policy 
objectives. Both the Ministry of Industry and Finance were responsible for 
energy policy, the former for strategic development of the sector and the latter 
for financing, investment and pricing (McGowan 1996).  
 
 
3.4.3. Assessing a locked-in institution 
 
As demonstrated, national interests dominated policy making in the 
Communities in the 1960s and 1970s. As has been shown, many proposals 
were ‘bogged down’ by some Member States’ aspirations to keep energy 
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policy in the national domain. Moreover, when the Community faced threats to 
their energy supply based on the oil crisis, no solidarity and unity was shown 
at the Community level; ideational factors did not play role in the institutional 
context which was characterised by the self-interested rationality of Member 
States. The institution was locked-in and policy development was reduced to 
an absolute minimum.  
 
The institutional lock-in – as a consequence of high institutional stickiness - is 
reasoned through Scharpf’s joint decision trap, and measured with the help of 
the proxy variable of the voting system. If unanimous voting was the decision 
rule, the policy area proved almost impossible to change and the process of 
further integration was impaired. The institution stayed rigidly on its path based 
on, and reasoned through, the requirement of a unanimous vote to instigate 
change – the institution was locked-in on a specific institutional trajectory which 
was decided on during the phase of inception. Even incremental change was 
reduced to a very low degree, and almost absent, as feedback mechanisms 
were hampered from the onset. To recall Scharpf’s argument, the “pathologies 
of substantive public policy” are based on two institutional conditions: “first, the 
fact that national governments are making European decisions and, second, 
that these decisions have to be unanimous” (Scharpf 1988: 267). In addition, 
and equally intriguing is the proposition that in an ongoing joint-decision 
system, in which unanimity applies, the ‘default condition’ of the institutional 
arrangement pre-empts institutional development if an agreement is not 
achieved. This means that in an event of non-agreement the continuation of 
existing policies entrenches actors and creates the adverse condition that they 
must stick to the institutional commitments even in the event of sub-optimal 
outcomes.  
 
From an HI perspective, key to institutional development are feedback 
mechanisms and increasing returns, which create incremental steps and 
change. Far-reaching changes are only instigated through critical junctures. 
However, the fundamental requirement for institutional development is 
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contingent on the prerequisite that actors need to share a common 
understanding of what functions the institutions should fulfil, enshrined in 
primary and secondary law. Moreover, decisions should be made without any 
of the actors having the option to veto during decision-making to unilaterally 
serve their own interests and hamper further advancement. Such assertions 
seem to be rather obvious, but when we look at the development of energy 
policy in the 1970s, the importance becomes clear. From the outset, proposals 
for legislation were on the table and intended goals were clearly defined all the 
time (e.g. High Authority 1964a; European Commission 1968; Council of the 
European Communities 1974b). Energy matters were a significant part of the 
political discourse in the Community as the decline of coal, the ascent of oil 
and gas, and the stark import dependence on third county suppliers lent 
substance to the necessity of a common approach (High Authority 1964b). 
Nevertheless, the biggest stumbling block was the fact that the Community 
had no competences in matters that surpassed policies that addressed coal 
and nuclear energy. “The community institutions were never given any explicit 
jurisdiction over oil and, later, natural gas, not to mention any general 
competence in the area of energy policy” (Duffield & Birchfield 2011: 3). The 
Community was trapped in a situation where high institutional stickiness made 
it impossible to alter the institution. 
 
For institutions to make incremental change possible, competences must be 
conferred to the institution; actors must demonstrate a degree of political will 
to attain the intended goals by shifting powers to the institution during a critical 
juncture, thus creating the necessary primary law for an institutional framework 
that triggers feedback mechanisms. For instance, the agreement in 1951 to 
shift powers to the ECSC to govern all matters concerning coal created 
processes of increasing returns due to a robust institutional framework 
enshrined in primary law, large set-up and fixed costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects and adaptive expectations (Arthur 1994: 112). 




In the absence of such basic institutional settings that provide the capacity to 
incrementally change the trajectory, deeper integration (or any integration) is 
obstructed even if actors show a willingness from time to time to improve the 
regulatory framework. Veto players can lock-in the institution. The factor that 
obstructs the development of a starting point for change through secondary 
legislation is that, under such conditions, no common denominator can be 
found due to actors’ divergent preferences on salient issues. Therefore, no 
path dependent mechanisms that allow for incremental change can be 
triggered. A point of departure must be agreed upon like the creation of the 
ECSC to govern coal and steel. If there is no such understanding, and if no 
competences are shifted to the supranational level, policy development is 
seriously hampered. Even if ‘pro-forma’ agreements exist among actors to 
solve institutional shortcomings, actors are too concerned to protect their own 
national interests. If a policy area can be found in the intergovernmental 
domain, and primary law does not provide the slightest capabilities to address 
policy making in the specific sector, the ‘default condition’, the status quo is 
almost endlessly perpetuated (with only some minor exceptions). In this case, 
adaptive expectations and coordination effects are not triggered and, due to 
the absence of increasing returns, different actors do not become ‘bound’ to 
the institution in a specific policy area.  
 
Hence, based on the empirical evidence, the first hypothesis is corroborated: 
if no critical juncture occurs in a setting of high institutional stickiness, low 
integration can be expected. ‘Small’ critical events had no effect on the 
institution. Even when actors showed a degree of willingness to push for 
deeper integration, the institutional design pre-empts the possibility to reach 
agreement. 
 
Therefore, based on a HI rationale, and further tested as a second hypothesis, 
this research project posits that a locked-in institution needs a critical juncture 
in order to instigate change in primary law. Due to the highest form of 
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institutional inertia, the institution was severely dysfunctional, not capable of 
correcting the institutional nuisances itself, and created suboptimal outcomes 
for all actors involved. As we recall, although the French and the British 
governments tried to escape the (socio-)economic ‘avalanche’ that the oil crisis 
initiated, in the end they eventually found themselves in the same boat with 
the other Member States - they had to bear the same high prices as other 
European countries. Along these lines, although France and Britain acted from 
a rational standpoint to absorb the price hike, in the end, the locked-in 




Chapter IV: A Critical Juncture 
 
This research project will now test the second hypothesis which assumes that 
a locked-in institution needs a critical juncture in order to be jolted-out of the 
dysfunctional institutional path.  
 
H2: If a critical juncture occurs within a setting of high institutional stickiness, 
moderate integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form of a 
non-incremental change of primary legislation.  
 
We will now turn to more evidence depicting a locked-in institution before 
assessing the events creating a critical juncture for the Communities. It took 
another two years before the Council resolution of December 1974 (Council of 
the European Communities 1974b), discussed in the previous chapter, 
materialised in concrete legislation. As the evidence suggests, energy policy-
making in the Community was a slow and cumbersome process and was met 
with much resistance from Member States, due to their preference to keep 
energy policy at an intergovernmental level. In May 1976, the Council passed 
legislation to set up a Community procedure for information exchange and 
consultation, regarding the prices of crude oil and the principal petroleum 
products (Council of the European Communities 1976a). This was followed by 
a regulation concerning the communication of information on the state of the 
Community's energy supplies (Council of the European Communities 1976b). 
The regulation was implemented to ensure that the energy supply situation in 
the Community was made more transparent, to enable the adjustment of 
supply structures to changing market conditions, and to diminish the impact of 
possible supply challenges or disruptions. In addition, in February 1977 the 
Council passed a decision to regulate exports between Member States in the 
event of difficulties in the supply of crude oil and petroleum products. This 
measure was conceived to ensure that “the burden of deficits in supplies of oil 
and petroleum products must be fairly distributed among the Member States” 
(Council of the European Communities 1977a).  
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Britain remained a major obstacle to any attempts for deeper integration of 
energy policy in the Community. In October 1977, the UK refused to accept 
proposals for emergency measures to be taken in the event of a supply crisis, 
unless it was granted veto powers, to shield British national interests, if 
deemed necessary (George 1996). Another proposal by the Commission to 
reduce refinery capacity, which had substantially increased during the oil-
boom, was also opposed on the grounds that Britain wanted no interference 
by the Community in its refinery capacity, in regard to North Sea oil production. 
A third proposal, made in October 1978, to fund joint exploration of oil within 
the Community, was also put to a halt, although Britain would have benefitted 
economically. From a rational choice perspective, since the other Member 
States did not consent to financing the increase in British resources without 
getting any returns on their investment, the proposal also did not result in any 
legal provisions (ibid.). 
 
In addition to the impediment of Member States to find common ground, the 
Community also faced the challenge of attaining previously agreed targets. In 
1974, the Community set targets for a common energy policy to be achieved 
by 1985 and the Member States’ heads of government, who met in Paris on 9 
- 10 December 1974, called upon the Community institutions to implement this 
policy “as quickly as possible” (Council of the European Communities 1974b: 
1). However, in 1977 the Commission conceded that these aims could not be 
reached: nuclear power was still lagging and oil remained the dominant energy 
source. Moreover, although oil imports had reduced as a consequence of the 
oil crisis, they rose to the levels just before the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The 
Commission emphasised the need for solidarity, as a normative impetus 
among Member States, in order to effectively tackle energy problems. The 
Commission stated that,  
“[t]he necessities of our balance-of-payments and the loss of growth 
leave us no choice. We need: development of our own sources of 
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energy, energy saving measures, solidarity of all members of the 
Community” (European Community Information Service 1977).  
 
In June 1979, the Commission published a communication on the energy 
objectives of the Community for 1990. The Commission invited the Council to 
consider the new Community objectives with a “view to their early adoption” 
(European Commission 1979e: 5). The Commission emphasised that there 
were substantial differences between Member States’ practical applications of 
the 1985 objectives (see Council of the European Communities 1974b). 
Energy saving programmes were different in scope and intensity. In most 
cases, the degree to which coal and nuclear energy was used to bring down 
oil dependency, in regard to electricity generation, was likely to be insufficient; 
and pricing policies did not ensure that consumer prices reflected long-term 
supply costs (European Commission 1979d). Again, following similar 
objectives to 1974, the Commission called for more intensive energy saving, 
more use of coal and nuclear energy, and an increase in the production of 
hydrocarbons (ibid.). In order to achieve the targets of limiting oil consumption 
in the Community, specific actions should be set to limit 1985 oil imports to 
their 1978 levels. In addition, the Commission invited the Council to urgently 
consider specific measures to achieve medium and long term energy policy 
goals, and review the development and implementation of “effective and 
convergent energy policies within the Community” (European Commission 
1979e: 5). The Commission stressed the critical need for a comprehensive 
approach to the energy situation. Interestingly, the Commission also instigated 
the distribution of public information on energy problems. Moreover,  
“[t]here will be a permanent system for monitoring and ensuring the 
convergence of the Member States' policies in respect of these 
objectives. The Community could take appropriate steps to back up and 
supplement these efforts and to ensure greater coherence” (European 
Commission 1979d: 1a). 
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The Commission’s undertaking to disperse information to the public and create 
a permanent monitoring system points to evidence that the Commission tried 
to instigate learning and positive feedback processes, based on adaptive 
expectations. As discussed in the theory section, Pierson (2000) clarifies that 
actors who engage in highly complex political environments are heavily biased 
regards how they filter information. Information that tends to confirm and 
reinforce the prevailing institutional trajectory will be incorporated, 
disconfirming information will get filtered out. Thus, social interpretations of 
complex political environments instigate network effects and adaptive 
expectations, as they are frequently shared with other actors and, thus, induce 
increasing returns. However, this research project proposes that the efforts of 
the Commission to instigate adaptive expectations and feedback processes - 
adaptive expectations are one of the reasons for positive feedback 
mechanisms (Pierson 2000: 258) - did not lead to the desired outcome. Due 
to the locked-in institutional framework, which substantially hampered all 
efforts to create processes of increasing returns, no learning effects (acquired 
knowledge leads to higher returns), coordination effects (benefits increase with 
the number of actors), or adaptive expectations (prospects about joint usage 
among actors reinforces a choice) were triggered.  
 
It is proposed that path dependent processes, conceived as a form of 
institutional stickiness that is substantially lower than in the context of a locked-
in institution, are heavily dependent on a framework that allows actors to reach 
decisions based on Qualified Majority Voting. An institution that displays low 
stickiness is nevertheless able to incrementally change its institutional 
trajectory, due to its capacity to be progressively altered - based on its voting 
system. Actors reach decisions more easily and veto players (as in the case 
of Britain and France) do not have a chance to block agreements. As all 
decisions concerning oil policies – which can be understood as the most 
important part of the energy mix at this time - were made by unanimous voting, 
no such path dependent processes could evolve. Table 6 shows that gross 
consumption of both oil and natural gas - where the Community did not hold 
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any competences either – accounted for almost three quarter of the total 
energy mix. Hence, the importance of hydrocarbons, and the locked-in 
institution that pre-empted undertakings in this domain, meant that the 
institutional trajectory was highly rigid and the institution itself was unable to 
initiate any processes of increasing returns. 
 
Table 6. Shares of different fuels in the energy mix (1978 estimates) 
 
Source: European Commission 1979d 
 
 
4.0.1. The second oil shock 
 
During the second oil crisis in 1979, triggered by the Iranian revolution and 
continued due to the Iran / Iraq war, the European Council discussed the global 
energy situation, which remained very serious. The difficulties arose in the first 
half of that year, due to the unforeseen interruption of oil supplies from Iran, 
coupled with a harsh winter and high energy demand. The need for a common 
approach was pressing, much as during and after the first oil embargo as a 
result of the Yom Kippur War. The Commission warned that, 
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“[a]s recent events have shown, the Western public is extremely 
sensitive to the effects of even minor and temporary energy shortages. 
More fundamentally, the standards of public services and the level of 
business activity and hence employment can decline or remain at an 
unacceptably low level if the energy situation is such as to jeopardise 
world trade and economic growth. In these circumstances social 
tensions can appear or be exacerbated, and political and social norms 
can be challenged” (European Commission 1979a: 2). 
 
In the first half of 1979, supplies to the Community were 3% short 
(nevertheless 6% higher than in 1978) – although net-imports of crude oil 
increased by 4% and domestic crude oil production by 40%. The shortfall was 
not evenly distributed between Member States. Oil prices rose to 18-23,5 
dollars per barrel, which led to an average increase of 57% in the price of 
imported crude oil (ibid.). As energy prices increased, the security of supply 
and production were in jeopardy, and the structure of the world oil market 
changed fundamentally. The European Council emphasised the need to 
create greater stability in producing and consuming countries: “In the light of 
these needs the Community for its part must now develop a more effective 
energy policy” (European Commission 1979b:9).  
 
Once again, the Community was urged to develop indigenous energy 
resources, in particular coal, nuclear and hydrocarbons, and to promote 
research and development with particular regard to renewable energy 
sources. However, no effective policies were implemented; the institution was 
in a deadlock and incapable of making decisions. On 9 June 1980, a Council 
Resolution concerning Community energy policy objectives for 1990 and 
convergence of the policies of the Member States was passed. Another 
important step leading to a comprehensive energy policy one would have 
hoped. However, the result was rather a drop in the ocean. The document, in 
total merely one and a half pages long, set out some basic guidelines: efforts 
to save energy and reduce oil consumption; a request for Member States to 
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submit their respective energy programmes annually up to 1990; and 
requesting the Commission to asses these programmes. In addition, the 
resolution indicated in one short paragraph that 70 - 75% of primary energy 
requirements for the production of electricity should be provided by means of 
solid fuels and nuclear energy (Council of the European Communities 1980). 
As Table 7 shows, the figure on nuclear energy was quite optimistic when 
comparing the estimate for 1978 with 1990. Given the knowledge within the 
Community about the actual share of nuclear energy in the energy mix - 25,5 
million of tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) - and the slow advancement of nuclear 
power since the creation of Euratom, due to the associated high costs and 
demanding technological requirements, it is safe to say that the projected 
figure for 1990 exaggerated the capabilities of nuclear power generation at that 
time. 
 
Table 7 Sources of electricity production, 1978-1990 
 
Source: European Commission 1979d 
 
On 12 - 13 June 1980, the European Council met in Venice to discuss 
international political questions regarding the situation in the Middle East. The 
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meeting was primarily concerned with the serious international situation and 
economic problems resulting from the energy crisis. A couple of months 
earlier, at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg, the Community had 
slid into a severe deadlock over Britain’s contribution to the Community 
budget, although an agreement on energy would have been of “utmost 
importance” (European Commission 1980c: 10). The European Council 
meeting was considered a disappointment as not much progress was made 
regarding the pressing energy problem. As many observers have remarked, 
at the meeting in Venice, the European Council was forced to return to its 
original role of providing political stimulus and general guidelines, and leave 
the solution of economic and technical problems to the Council. A solution to 
the issue of Britain’s contribution to the Community budget was found by the 
Council on 29 - 30 May 1980 (European Commission 1980a).  
 
As one can see, energy policy was firmly in the grip of the Member States. The 
gap in their respective approaches to energy policy widened, and the institution 
continued to be locked-in. The Community faced the second oil crisis within 
six years, which can be understood as the second severe exogenous shock to 
the institution in a decade. Although the crisis represented another serious 
threat to the security of supply, the economy and the wellbeing of European 
citizens, Member States could not align their preferences to overcome their 
internal differences. One would have hoped that the European Council 
meeting would have generated endogenous momentum to eventually deploy 
institutional change. However, these hopes were shattered by the gridlock 
between the Member States.  
 
Roy Jenkins, the president of the Commission urged for a thorough overhaul 
of Member States’ approach towards the Community’s energy policy, stating, 
“[t]he Commission firmly believes in the necessity of Community action 
other than dispersed action by the Member States. National responses 
to successive oil crises since 1973 have actually widened differences in 
the Community. I fear this will continue unless we can agree on a 
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common framework of policy comprising energy prices and necessary 
additional investment. It is therefore important that the Council of 
Energy Ministers gives a thorough examination to all the elements in 
the Commission's proposal' of 20 March and concludes its work before 
the end of this year (European Commission 1980a: 12).  
 
A year after the first recommendations were made by the Commission in 1979, 
no common solution had been found to tackle energy problems caused by the 
suspension of oil imports from Iran and Iraq, let alone the implementation of a 
comprehensive European energy policy for the Communities. By late 1980, 
the Council was in the process of reviewing a communication by the 
Commission, sent on 10 November 1980, addressing a more flexible approach 
regarding the supply of oil. The provision would have been within the 
regulatory framework of Directive 73/238/EEC – the measures to mitigate the 
effects of difficulties in the supply of crude oil and petroleum products (Council 
of the European Communities 1973) - which was already in force, in order to 
prepare the EEC for the following months. It set out a range of possible policy 
instruments, for instance: measures to discourage oil companies from making 
purchases at excessive prices; a reduction of demand; a stock management 
policy; efforts to increase the Communities own production; coordinated oil 
sharing at Community level; and price policies (European Commission 1980b).  
 
None of the ambitious proposals striving for a common and coherent energy 
policy materialised into concrete legislation, apart from the sectors in which the 
Community already had competence. By 1982, the Community only managed 
to publish new secondary provisions concerning nuclear energy, coal, energy 
savings, provisions concerning petroleum products were kept to a minimum 
and only addressed registration procedures and the exchange of information 
for imports3. These can be understood as minor and rather tenuous 
 
3 For instance, see: Council Resolution of 18 February 1980 on fast breeder reactors; Medium-
term guidelines for technical coal research; Council Decision of 28 April 1981 adopting a 
programme of research and development for the European Atomic Energy Community; 
Council Recommendation of 28 July 1982 concerning the encouragement of investment in the 
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developments, given the envisioned scope and depth of a coherent and 
comprehensive European approach formulated in the numerous proposals in 
the decades before. Above all, it is baffling that despite both crises in 1973 and 
1979, which had such severe repercussions for the Communities on a (socio-
)economic level, did not provide an impetus for significant institutional change; 
one would expect that such severe exogenous shocks would have acted as a 
catalyst. Again, the question to be answered is: why did both shocks not 
punctuate the trajectory of the Communities and instigate fundamental change 
in policy regarding hydrocarbons or measures to reconcile the policy field as a 
whole? 
 
As outlined in the section on the first oil embargo, the exogenous shock 
initiated by the oil shortage did not affect the institution, and the corresponding 
legislation on energy policy, as the institutional rules under concern were not 
part of the overarching institutional framework; rules concerning oil and gas 
were still subject to unanimous voting in the Council and severely defended by 
Member States’ interest in keeping these sectors under sovereign control. The 
evidence suggests that, even if Member States shared some common 
understanding of how a Community energy policy could look, the design of the 
institution forestalled any alterations. The obstacle to reaching agreement over 
the scope and depth of a common energy policy, in the form of high institutional 
stickiness, measured through the proxy variable of the voting system, made it 
impossible to alter the institution. 
 
As previously stated, the evidence suggests that institutions can only react to 
exogenous events when competences, which might enable the mitigation of 
the external shock, are transferred from the Member States to the institutional 
level. As there were no rules in place, and only minimum agreement about the 
set of rules governing the institution, both exogenous events did not impact the 
 
rational use of energy; Council Regulation (EEC) No 481/81 of 24 February 1981 introducing 
registration for crude oil and petroleum product imports in the Community; and Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 301/82 of 9 February 1982 regards the communication to the 
Commission of information concerning crude oil or petroleum product imports. 
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institution. One could argue that, due to the economic severity of the crises 
and the repercussions for production and the whole economy of the 
Community, momentum could have been created that could have spilled over 
into the energy sector (see Haas 1958). However, this argument does not hold 
as Member States regarded oil a sovereign issue, something they would not 
want to be regulated by the institution. This suggests that if a specific sector of 
the institution is solely defined by a minimum set of rules, and if those rules 
and associated decision-making is in the hands of Member States, exogenous 
events cannot contribute to the alteration of secondary legislation. 
 
Moreover, agency is needed to shift powers to an institution, and this shift must 
be cemented into the institutional design via primary legislation. Actors must 
make a conscious decision to confer powers to the institution from the outset. 
These powers must be woven into the institutional fabric in the form of primary 
law. Regarding energy policy, this is very much the case when we look at the 
coal and nuclear policies of the Community (ECSC and Euratom). A decision 
was made upfront to bestow the Community with powers regarding coal 
policies and nuclear energy, thus, in these areas the institution was not as rigid 
as one that is locked-in. Once powers had been conferred to the supranational 
level, structural forces began to unfold and actors become entrenched in the 
institution. This was the moment when path dependent processes unfolded 
their full potential. 
 
Based on this logic, one can assume that under such circumstances, and when 
exogenous events occur, they have a much larger impact on the institution and 
can alter the institutional trajectory in form of amendments to secondary law. 
Chapter V and VI will substantiate these claims with empirical evidence, as the 
EU was later bestowed with competences that could address energy policy in 
a more comprehensive way (for instance, through the internal market 
programme). Hence, the energy crises did punctuate the trajectory of coal and 
nuclear policies (for both sectors, many secondary provisions were 
implemented). However, the big problem was that those sectors were not as 
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important for the development of a common energy policy as the actors had 
hoped. As shown in Table 6 (p. 132), solid fuels accounted for 21% of total 
consumption and nuclear energy for only 3% [sic!]. Although policies regarding 
these sectors were altered, the impact was rather marginal and did not bring 
about a substantial change for energy policy. 
 
In addition, as a consequence of a decade that saw two energy crises, the 
Community faced a problem regarding its identity and the ability to effectively 
govern the polity as a whole. Gaston Thorn, the president of the Commission 
expressed his concerns about the state of the Community. Not only did the 
crisis pose a serious threat to energy security and the economy, but the 
Community gradually slid into a crisis that affected the entire institution. He 
claimed that, 
“[t]he Member States are faced with a dire economic and social 
situation. So far we have failed to overcome the crisis and pull ourselves 
out of it. Nationalist attitudes are resurfacing and threatening 
Community solidarity. The achievements of the Community and the 
European ideal are in danger. The prevailing climate is one of doubt, 
disparagement and confusion. If we do not halt the downward slide 
soon, we shall lose control, and the whole European edifice will be 
swept away” (European Commission 1981a: 8). 
 
No single proposal materialised into concrete legislation as a result of the crisis 
apart from the sectors in which the Community had competence. Despite the 
rather meagre output of the Community in the aftermath of the crisis, the 
Commission tried to instigate endogenous momentum. The Community was 
the world’s largest oil importer, embedded in an international context that was 
very unstable and, hence, the Community needed to shield itself from further 
risks associated with possible supply price increases, to safeguard the 
European economy. The Community economy had been badly hit by the oil 
crisis in 1979, which caused the oil prices to double (European Commission 
1981c). The Commission took the view that to diminish the Community’s 
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vulnerability, steps needed to be taken on the demand side (via energy savings 
and the rational use of energy) and on the supply side (via the diversification 
of sources of supply). The success of these measures was to a great extent 
dependent on what was done externally (European Commission 1981b). The 
internal and the external dimension in energy policy are highly interwoven as 
imports affect the security of supply and the functioning of the internal energy 
market.  
 
In 1981 the Commission published a communication on the ‘Development of 
an Energy Strategy for Europe’. The communication emphasised that, 
although the two Council Resolutions of 1974 and 1980 had provided some 
basis for common objectives, such as the reduction in oil dependence and a 
broader diversification of energy supply, the implementation of an overall 
strategy, comprising of action by the Community, the Member States, 
producers and the consumers, had not occurred. In the document, the 
Commission highlighted the inadequacy and inconsistency of action 
undertaken by the actors concerned (European Commission 1981c). In order 
to achieve the intended goals, the communication stressed the need to ensure 
that more rapid progress was made towards improved consistency and 
coherence between Member States in regard to their respective energy 
policies. Interestingly, the Commission took a completely new approach, 
addressing energy matters in the Community. The communication laid out that 
concerted efforts did not necessarily need to translate into the centralisation of 
energy policy instruments, nor did it require uniformity in the diversification of 
supply – depending on the national circumstances (ibid.). The Commission 
enticed Member States with a proposal that left room for individual approaches 
on a national level, making Community-wide energy policy more attractive. 
Nevertheless, it was important for the Commission to underline the need for 
efforts to go beyond a mere expression of Member States’ will to do so – as 
we saw in the 1970s. Each Member State’s policy approach should reflect the 
willingness to pursue common objectives. 
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4.1. The Single European Act 
 
Between 1981 and 1985 the Commission made a couple of proposals that 
addressed a common approach to energy policy. In 1983 oil prices fell, helping 
to recover the economic situation of the global markets and to ease the supply 
situation regarding hydrocarbons. The Council managed to adopt a regulation 
on the method of formulating natural gas prices and tariffs in the Community, 
which followed a similar recommendation adopted on 27 October 1981 on the 
fixing of electricity prices and tariffs (European Commission 1983a). Apart from 
these rare successes, the Council did not manage to make further progress in 
bringing together the different levels of energy policy and reconciling the 
preferences of Member States. Consequently, energy ministers met on 21 
April 1983 and requested the Commission prepare a progress report on the 
energy strategy for the attainment of the Community’s 1990s objectives and 
conceded that these undertakings were “a matter of the greatest importance” 
(ibid.: 45).  
 
On 7 June, the Commission sent a communication to the Council, which was 
based on former proposals and objectives adopted on earlier occasions. It 
evaluated the progress made in realising the Community’s energy objectives 
for 1990s (Council of the European Communities 1980), and outlined the 
changes needed to achieve these goals. The Commission’s conclusion was 
that the policies adopted were not sufficient to attain the intended goals, mainly 
due to the lower oil prices in 1983, which had slowed the initial momentum of 
the energy strategy (European Commission 1983b). In fact, the Commission 
referred back to the meeting on 21 April and underlined that, while the Council 
had agreed concerning certain risks (for instance, issues associated with 
security of supply), the lack of progress regarding measures to create a 
comprehensive, Community-wide energy policy, reflected the doubts of some 
Member States about the value of Community action, as opposed to national 
measures (European Commission 1983c). The conclusion of the analysis 
confirmed the need to: provide incentives for investments in the efficient use 
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of energy; establish coherent pricing systems; increase efforts in research, 
development and demonstration projects; promote the use of solid fuels; 
extend nuclear programmes; increase the security of supplies of natural gas; 
and ensure a satisfactory level of compulsory stocks of crude oil and oil 
products. 
 
Proposals like the aforementioned Community strategy of 1981 and 1983 were 
made throughout the 1980s. One can observe that the content and the issues 
that were addressed in the first 30 years of energy policy, could also be part 
of proposals for the Energy Union: energy security, solidarity and trust; a fully 
integrated European energy market; energy efficiency contributing to 
moderation of energy demand; and a focus on research, innovation and 
competitiveness (European Commission 2015a) were all issues within the 
energy domain that the Commission tried to improve in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Hence, the challenges and issues that contemporary proposals try to tackle 
were not new, but rather were components of the energy domain from the 
outset and can be conceptualised as recurring main motifs in energy policy. 
The reluctance of Member States to shift competences to the Community was 
the predominant and compelling force that locked the institution in, much as 
Scharpf’s (1988) joint-decision trap proposes. In the early to mid 1980s, the 
Commission sent some proposals to the Council that could have initiated fresh 
endogenous momentum, “which the Council politely welcomed and 
subsequently ignored. Real progress was rare and difficult to identify” 
(Schubert et al. 2016). 
 
Intriguingly, in line with HI assertions, the Commission was aware of different 
factors that would contribute to processes of increasing returns, especially in 
regards to network effects and adaptive learning. In the proposal of 1983 they 
listed factors that would enhance the Community dimension of the energy 
domain, especially in sectors where it was more economic and more effective 
to do so. Analysed from a HI perspective, such measures would have helped 
to set a stable institutional path leading towards deeper integration, based on 
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incremental steps. For instance, taking advantage of economies of scale, such 
as pooling scientific and financial resources in research and development, 
would have pre-empt the duplication of often heavy expenditures associated 
with R & D. In addition, economies of scale would have improved the 
Community’s financial instruments to borrow under the most favourable market 
conditions (European Commission 1983c). Learning effects would have been 
addressed through efforts to pool knowledge and experience, both of energy 
technologies and systems, and of policy measures in specific sectors. As 
suggested by an HI framework, learning effects among different actors once 
initiated, improve the efficiency of the institutional framework and, as 
contractual agreements with other institutions are made, coordination between 
actors increase and expectations about future events lead to stability in the 
system (North 1990: 95). Community programmes, as envisioned by the 
Commission, should have provided a framework for a fast and efficient 
dissemination of knowledge and outcomes of programmes to develop energy 
technologies and techniques. Such community programmes should also have 
drawn on experience and best practice regarding energy policies in different 
Member States and been available for the Community as a whole. Hence, all 
Community members would have gained from undertakings regarding the 
pooling of knowledge and benefitted from the experience of others and the 
evaluation of already implemented policies. 
 
Another important step was the vision to expand the scope of the internal 
market in energy products. Community programmes should encourage energy 
price transparency, eliminate distorting factors and promote a more uniform 
approach toward energy taxation. Additionally, norms and standards should 
be harmonised regarding energy-consuming equipment and pollution control 
(European Commission 1983c). From an HI standpoint, the assertion to 
address norms and standards in energy policy pointed to the Commission’s 
endeavour to create ideational momentum regarding the envisioned 
institutional trajectory. How can such behaviour be explained? Institutions 
provide moral and cognitive templates, allowing for individual construction of 
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possible action (Hall & Taylor 1996). The actors are deeply embedded in these 
institutions, which transport norms, values, symbols and scripts, and these 
ideational factors create filters for interpretation and define possible action. 
Actors gauge not only the situations but also assess themselves and their 
actions within a given context. Institutions provide strategically useful 
information about possible choices and they shape the identities, self-images 
and preferences of actors (ibid.). On the one hand, the Commission is the 
‘consciousness’ (also in a normative sense) and policy vanguard of the 
institution who constantly strives to formulate policy in-line with the overarching 
Community interest. On the other hand, the Commission acts like a broker 
between the interest of Member States (or between competing sectoral 
interests), and builds consensus between the different actors (Padgett 1992). 
The interest to decrease pollution levels and to implement environmental 
policies in order to address issues of sustainability is evidence for the 
Commission’s role as a normative policy vanguard. Promoting sustainability in 
various policy areas is an overarching goal of the Community that certainly 
deploys a strong ideational notion, and the Commission tried to embed such 
normative components into the institutional matrix. 
 
In addition, the Commission endorsed a more integrated infrastructure that 
would enhance the flexibility of the energy supply. From a HI perspective, the 
development of infrastructure starkly contributes to processes of path 
dependence as the creation of infrastructure not only enhances capabilities in 
terms of trading energy products in the Communities, but also physically binds 
the actors to each other. Hence, as actors become part of an interconnected 
energy grid, adaptive expectations unfold: firstly, because actors find 
themselves part of a bigger network; secondly, due to their interest to 
maximise benefits according to their investment and to maintain such 
undertakings. Moreover, energy markets associated with infrastructure, unlike 
markets that are not bound to physical grids and networks, help create regimes 
based on institutional rules that need to be quite stable: since energy products 
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are a vital part of Member States’ economies and due to their significance 
concerning social welfare.  
 
Once these infrastructure projects are created, and long-term contracts 
between different actors are made, path dependent processes are initiated; 
not only because these contracts are concluded on a long-term basis, but also 
because coordination and network effects unfold. The more actors become 
part of the system, the more the system increases in terms of its value; 
coordination effects evolve as procedural and operational standards must be 
aligned to guarantee the smooth operation of the network and associated 
markets. Moreover, the Commission suggested that in order to protect 
Member States’ economies against future energy supply and price crises, the 
Community should improve collective contingency arrangements. All Member 
States, even those with significant indigenous energy resources, would be 
affected by the economic disruption triggered through future energy crises, no 
matter how comprehensive national arrangements were (European 
Commission 1983c).  
 
These ambitious ideas are evidence for the Commission’s attempt to create a 
solid institutional path, to consolidate the capabilities of the Community and to 
reinforce the institutional framework. However, such efforts petered out due to 
the lack of a supporting institutional framework, enshrined in primary law. The 
proposals encompassed policy instruments that the applied theoretical 
framework identifies as factors contributing to path dependent processes. In 
addition, and as a reaction to exogenous factors, the Commission tried to 
overcome institutional shortcomings with regard to the correction of (socio-) 
economic problems, triggered by the energy crises with the implementation of 
secondary provisions based on new ideas and approaches.  
 
Steinmo (2008) understands ideas as “creative solutions to collective action 
problems” (ibid.: 131). As explored, the Community faced collective actions 
problems after both energy crises in 1973 and 1979 due to diverging 
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preferences of the different Member States and, as a consequence of the joint-
decision trap, the institution was severely locked-in. The Commission 
attempted to overcome the inability of the institution to deal with, and react to, 
imminent problems with ambitious policy proposals and innovative ideas. This 
implies that institutional change happens when powerful actors have the ability 
and the political will to change the institution in favour of new ideas (ibid.). 
However, as the evidence suggests, although Member States agreed to 
important intended goals with regard to the formulation of a comprehensive 
energy policy on a Community level, in reality, the Community fell short of any 




4.2. Assessing a critical juncture 
 
In addition to the lack of institutional capacity to form a coherent and 
Community-wide energy policy, the Community faced a severe institutional 
crisis. When analysing the driving factors that contributed to the critical 
juncture that will be discussed in the following section, both exogenous and 
endogenous factors must be examined and accounted for. Critical junctures 
altering primary law are understood as those events that affect the institution 
as a whole. Such critical junctures are an institutional ‘big bang’, so to speak, 
and provide enough momentum to generate a force that punctuates the 
institutional trajectory in its entirety. Based on this understanding, it is posited 
that the creation of the ECSC, the EEC and EURATOM, and at this point in 
the historical analysis, the Single European Act (SEA), represent critical 
junctures for the entire institution. These critical junctures created (and altered) 
primary legislation. 
 
The driving factors influencing the SEA can be reasoned through both 
exogenous and endogenous factors. A rational choice explanation suggests 
that preferences are exogenously given. Following this logic, economic 
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underperformance in terms of market competition, or an institutional crisis 
triggered by oil shocks would explain how certain preferences were formed. 
However, the empirical evidence examined so far suggests that when 
analysing critical junctures for primary legislation, not only exogenous but also 
endogenous factors played a role. Therefore, when we analyse the 
mechanisms that led to the implementation of the SEA, we must also 
incorporate an analysis of endogenous factors as possible determinants of 
institutional change. This can be reasoned through the following proposition: 
during a critical juncture, actors’ preferences are exogenously given but also 
have an endogenous origin (Dietrich & List 2012). We will now look at the 
factors contributing to the critical juncture that instigated the SEA. 
 
 
4.2.1. Preferences based on exogenous factors 
 
In the case of the SEA, economic underperformance of the Community was 
evident before its adoption, corroborating the premise that exogenous factors 
can be identified as a possible cause for the institution to fall into 
disequilibrium. The growth rate of trade between the Member States declined 
proportionally to an increase of trade with the rest of the world. More 
importantly, Member States began to lose their share of the Community market 
concerning many industrial products. To exacerbate things further, American 
and Japanese manufacturing became dominant forces on the global markets 
and Member States were unable to respond to the increase in competition 
(Milward 2000). As Europe was incapable of keeping pace with its Japanese 
and American counterparts, Japanese and American manufacturing took a 
growing share of markets in the Community. The loss of market shares of 
Member States was an entirely unhealthy development for the EEC. In high 
technology sectors where economies of scale are supposed to be greatest, 
and which were supposed to be reinforced by the common market, European 
manufacturing was falling behind (Milward 2000). As a result of these 
developments, non-tariff barriers in the form of state subsidies and the creation 
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of national monopolies were introduced, distorting intra-West-European trade. 
As a matter of fact, the Community was less integrated by 1981 than it had 
been in 1973, which diminished its international competitiveness (ibid.). 
 
By the early 1980s, extreme pessimism took hold in the Community; the often-
cited ‘Eurosclerosis’ was evidence of an economic downturn that affected the 
institution. The impetus for change came from growing concerns about 
competition from Japan and the US, but also from the Community itself 
(Matlary 1997). Hence, exogenous factors in the form of increased economic 
competition from outside of the Community had a considerable impact upon 
the institutional trajectory of the EEC. When considering GDP, the economy in 
Europe was growing much slower in the 1970s and early 1980s than in the 
1950s and 1960s4. The recession was also visible in the labour market, with 
the unemployment rate continuously increasing from 5.5% in 1978 to 11.5% in 
1985, whereas in the US after 1982 it fell to about 7%. The labour market 
situation starkly contributed to Eurosclerosis (Giersch 1985). 
 
In the mid 1980s considerable frustration spread through the Community and 
political elites, especially in France and Germany, were unsatisfied with the 
way the Community had developed, or in other words, with the lack of 
institutional development. Efforts to complete the internal market were soon 
instigated as an economic necessity. Economic elites were responsible for the 
design of new economic measures and political elites for the implementation. 
An unprecedented and new acceptance concerning deregulation in order to 
create functioning markets formed the basis for such undertakings. This new 
trend was palpable on the national level (with the exceptions of in Tory Britain 
and Francois Mitterrand’s socialist France) which in turn created economic 
momentum on the Community level. The underlying rationale was that a more 
 
4 Annual GDP growth had fallen from 4.8% in 1973 to 2.1% in 1983, and between 1981 and 
1985 the EEC showed an annual growth rate of 1.1%, which was only half the rate of the US 
economy and only a quarter of the Japanese. 
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efficient and better integrated market would create growth and minimise costs 
(Matlary 1997). 
“There was a shared understanding of the economic problems as well 
as an ideological vision of the political cure” (ibid.: 19). 
 
 
4.2.2. Preferences based on endogenous factors 
 
Before analysing the dynamics that forced the institution onto a new 
institutional path, let’s explore the endogenous institutional factors which, in 
conjuncture with the exogenous factors, evoked the critical juncture that 
caused the institution to fall into disequilibrium. As already explained, a very 
important factor that contributed to the critical juncture was the perceived Euro-
fatigue towards the EEC and the repercussions such developments had 
leading to a stalemate of the institution, the so-called ‘Eurosclerosis’ – a term 
coined in the eponymous paper by the German economist Giersch (1985). 
This ‘Eurosclerosis’ represented the immanent “institutional malaise” 
(Moravcsik 1991 :33) the EEC had to endure in the 1970s and 80s, and 
presented itself as an endogenous force that had a remarkable influence on 
the EEC and its ideological direction. What were the reasons for such a 
development?  
 
To fully understand the dynamics that lead to the impasse, the Empty Chair 
Crisis and its remedy, the Luxembourg Compromise, must be considered as 
these two events set the stage for institutional inertia in the wider historical 
context. France initiated an institutional crisis in 1965 by not attending Council 
meetings due to internal disagreement in the Council over the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), by claiming that it would be against France’s 
interests. The deadlock was eventually resolved by the Luxembourg 
Compromise (the requirement to reach unanimity if national interests were at 
stake), which in practice meant that even small decisions required unanimity 
in the Council, hence, locking-in the institution even in policy areas were QMV 
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was the voting procedure. Although decisions by QMV gradually increased 
between 1966 and 1984, the Community was cautious not to invoke any 
similar preconditions that would led to the paralysis of the EEC and the 
traumatic experience of the Empty Chair Crisis (Good 1988). Although the 
Community expanded decisions that could be taken by QMV, in practice the 
Council was caught in a joint decision trap and the “unanimity requirement 
hindered the ability of the Council to make decisions efficiently throughout the 
1970s” (ibid.: 307).  
 
In addition to this structural impasse, the Community also suffered from an 
ideational crisis based on the perception of its own political identity, a 
institutional impasse, based on endogenous factors. The vision “to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (EEC 
Treaty preamble) and to give the Communities a political dimension / to create 
a closer political union was an aim already conveyed in the EEC Treaty. 
However, the framework of the EEC did not provide any institutional means to 
foster a political union. The European Parliament, especially after its members 
were directly elected from 1979 onwards, expressed its frustration concerning 
the slow development of the EEC into a political institution (Murphy 1989). 
Pressure for reform grew within Community institutions between 1980 and 
1985. Particularly the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, 
and the Commission, led by President Jacques Delors and internal market 
Commissioner Lord Arthur Cockfield, urged for a reform of the institutional 
design (Moravcsik 1991). Weiler (1983) states that “[i]n the late 1970's and 
early 1980's, crisis became a way of life and the Community has seen a 
plethora of reports and proposals for tackling the problem” (ibid.: 129), 
“advancing the concept of a political European union” (Murphy 1989: 339-340). 
In fact, not only supranational institutions advocated for a union. As early as 
1972, government leaders also saw the creation of a European Union as a 
beneficial goal and “set themselves the major objective of transforming, before 
the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for the Treaties 
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already signed, the whole complex of the relations of Member States into a 
European Union” (European Commission 1973: 16). 
 
Among the proposals for unification (see Weiler 1983; Murphy 1989 for further 
information), the three most important attempts were the Genscher-Colombo 
Draft European Act, the Solemn Declaration which both are sometimes 
regarded as the precursors of the SEA (Moravcsik 1991), and the Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union (Dinan 2012), which created endogenous 
momentum for institutional development.  
 
In order to tackle the institutional malaise and economic recession, the 
Genscher-Colombo Plan (the Draft European Act), advocated by German 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Italian counterpart Emilio 
Colombo in 1981, endorsed a strategy towards European unification. In 
essence, the rationale behind the proposed act was based on three symptoms: 
a pervasive shortcoming of effectiveness regarding the Community decisional 
process; a potential for enlargement of the scope and impact of traditional 
Community policies; and a decline in the ideology and spirit of European 
integration (Weiler 1983). Both Genscher and Colombo frequently referred to 
the necessity for “relaunching of the European Ideal the need « to strengthen 
the political will of Europe », and this with, the objective of « spurring on the 
creation of the [European] Union », « boosting the idea of a European Union” 
(Genscher and Colombo as cited in Weiler 1983: 138-139). The Draft 
European Act was not only based on the rationale to tackle economic 
recession (Moravcsik 1991), but the initiative also strongly referred to setting 
up a renewed vision of the European Communities together with the 
proposition to instigate the relaunch of the European Union idea in order to 
solve the endogenous, institutional malaise (ibid.). Moreover, the act would 
have made the European Council the controlling political organ within a unified 
Europe (Murphy 1989). However, due to disagreement between Member 
States, the Genscher-Colombo initiative did not show the envisioned progress 
towards European unity. This was specially the case for France, whose 
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interest in Europe was limited to sporadic proposals in order to facilitate a 
socialist Europe, and Britain, for whom negotiations over the budget were the 
most important issue (Moravcsik 1991).  
 
In response to the Draft European Act, the European Council issued the 
Solemn Declaration on European Union (or Stuttgart Declaration) in June 
1983, which accepted the goal for a political union, but imposed no obligations 
on Member States to work towards that goal and envisioned a political union 
based on the existing EEC Treaty (Murphy 1989). It covered a wide range of 
institutional and policy issues, amongst them the completion of the internal 
market, and procedural and institutional reform (Dinan 2012). The declaration 
was promoted by national leaders at their summit in Stuttgart in June 1983, 
but subsequent British, Danish, French, Greek, and Irish objections reaffirming 
the Luxembourg Compromise brought a halt to any further developments. In 
addition, the Stuttgart Declaration was attacked by French Prime Minister 
Pierre Mauroy, hence, reinforcing the veto right (Moravcsik 1991). 
Nevertheless, the Solemn Declaration did have an impact on further 
institutional development as it convinced the European Parliament of the futility 
of trying to achieve a political union through intergovernmental negotiations 
(Murphy 1989). 
 
In response to the Solemn Declaration, the Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union, adopted in 1984, was an outcome of the first directly elected 
European Parliament - an important institutional factor that provided further 
momentum for European unification. Under the patronage of veteran Italian 
Euro-federalist Altiero Spinelli, a founding father of the EC, and endorsed 
through the so-called ‘Crocodile Group’ (named after the Strasbourg 
restaurant where they first met), the European Parliament produced an 
ambitious proposal for unification. The Draft Treaty sought to substitute the 
existing treaty establishing the European Communities with a single European 
Union. As laid out in the document, the EU would maintain its basic institutional 
structure and legal competence. However, the decision-making procedure 
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would be strengthened and some of the Union’s competences would be 
enhanced in the economic, social, and political domain. The purpose of the 
decision-making reform was to improve the efficiency of reaching agreements, 
and to tackle a perceived democratic deficit at the European level of 
governance (Dinan 2012).  
 
The Draft Treaty was a bold attempt for unification proposing a federalist type 
of union among Member States of the EEC and would have dramatically 
increased the powers of the European Parliament at the expense of the 
European Council. The Draft Treaty would have impinged on the sovereignty 
of Member States more than the EEC Treaty, by conferring a common 
citizenship on citizens of signatory states and providing protection for certain 
fundamental human rights. Moreover, the Draft Treaty would have bestowed 
legal personality upon the Union (European Commission 1984). It goes without 
saying that the Draft Treaty was controversial among Member States (Murphy 
1989), due to its far-reaching alterations to the institutional design. 
Nevertheless, it was still endorsed by national legislatures from Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and West Germany. Given that there 
were 10 Member States at the time, this serves as evidence that these Member 
States perceived an urgent demand for profound institutional change. 
However, it would appear that the Draft Treaty was too ambitious in its scope 
(it was never ratified by all Member States). It nevertheless prompted further 
stimulus towards European unity. 
 
As a response to the Draft Treaty of the European Parliament, the European 
Council set up an ad hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs at the 
Fontainebleau meeting with the goal in mind to increase European unity. The 
efforts of the Committee subsequently led to the so-called Dooge Report in 
March 1985 (Good 1988). The Report emphasised that, although its promising 
start after the Second World War as an unprecedented legal entity, based on 
the principles of pluralist democracy and the respect of human rights, the 
Community was in a severe endogenous crisis and suffered from serious 
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deficiencies (European Commission 1985c). Member States had become 
entangled in differences and, hence, could not benefit from the financial and 
economic advantages a common market and economic and monetary union 
would provide. In addition, and unlike the United States and Japan, Europe 
had not managed to achieve a growth rate sufficient to reduce the disturbing 
figure of almost 14 million Europeans in unemployment. The Dooge Report 
urged the Community to recover faith in itself on a new common venture: the 
formulation of a genuine political entity among European States – a European 
Union. To draw up a simple catalogue of different measures to be taken was 
not enough for such an undertaking, as such exercises have been made in the 
past without achieving any progress. Rather, common political will of Member 
States was needed to make a qualitative leap in order to foster European unity. 
The evidence suggests, that endogenous momentum for institutional change 
was strong in the Dooge Report. As prominently endorsed in the report, it 
stated that ambitions to create a European Union demanded not only 
cooperation based on economic reasons, but also required Member States to 
cooperate in fields other than economic ones (as the Community already did 
to a certain degree). Hence, the Committee proposed that an 
intergovernmental conference should be convened to negotiate a draft 
European Union Treaty based on the acquis communautaire, the Dooge 
Report, the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union, and in spirit and 
method of the Draft Treaty voted by the European Parliament (ibid.) - which is 
somewhat surprising given that the Draft Treaty was endorsed by the 
European Parliament (Murphy 1989). 
 
 
4.2.3. The solution for an institution in crisis: the SEA 
 
At the meeting in Brussels in March 1985, the European Council laid emphasis 
on the completion of the internal market and called upon the Commission to 
draw up a detailed programme with a specific timetable (European Council 
1985a). Before the adoption of the SEA, the Commission put its utmost 
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attention on the Single European Market (SEM) programme as a successful 
realisation would “fundamentally alter the face of Europe” (European 
Commission 1985a: 18). Within seven years, the market programme would 
then remove the Community’s physical, technical and tax frontiers to create a 
genuine common market (ibid.). A White Paper, designed to spell out the 
programme and the timetable, and based on European Council 
recommendations, set out the “action to achieve a single large market by 1992 
thereby creating a more favourable environment for stimulating enterprise, 
competition and trade” (European Commission 1985b: 3). Remarkably, as a 
reflection and consequence of past energy policy failures, the Commission did 
not include energy in the initial agenda for the SEM. Energy was indirectly 
affected by more general market provisions (McGowan 1989). However, the 
White Paper emphasised that the four major sectors, energy, transport, water 
and telecommunications, were not covered by Directives at that time and, 
hence, the document suggested that by 1988 energy should be included in the 
internal market programme as well (European Commission 1985b).  
 
On a different note, contributing to the willingness of Member States to agree 
to complete the internal market was also a wide-ranging change in economic 
ideologies in different Member States, which led to experimentation regarding 
the privatisation of certain sectors and the deregulation of the economy in 
general. As Hall & Lamont (2013) contend, new (neoliberal-)ideas played an 
important role steering institutional change and in the governance of markets. 
The new liberal sentiment was triggered by the aforementioned issues 
regarding Member States’ competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan and the United 
States, the return of stark unemployment, and often very high inflation rates. 
Although these novel economic approaches were applied at different times in 
the different Member States, in the end, they nevertheless shared a common 
objective on a European level: to return to the growth rates of before 1974. As 
a consequence of this new Community spirit, and together with the shared 
willingness to end the institutional malaise on a Community level, the 
European Council decided at the Milan conference in June 1985 to complete 
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the single market (Milward 2000) and to overhaul the institutional design 
(European Council 1985b). In the run-up to the summit proposals began to 
multiply, and Jacques Delors, then Commission president, began to link 
internal market liberalisation to Qualified Majority Voting, “stressing that the 
first was unattainable without the second and that neither was possible without 
an intergovernmental conference to amend the Treaty of Rome” (Moravcsik 
1991). 
 
Recommendations by the Dooge Report and the White Paper were intensively 
discussed at the summit. The White Paper was unanimously accepted by all 
the Member States (ibid.). With such significant endogenous momentum and 
fresh Community spirit based on new ideas about how to govern the institution, 
the European Council held a wide-ranging discussion on the improvement of 
the Council’s decision-making procedure, the enlargement of the European 
Parliament’s role, the Commission’s administrative powers – with a view to 
their early adoption - and the strengthening of political cooperation in the 
context of a transition of the EEC to a European union. The European Council 
emphasised the need to improve the operation of the Community to reach its 
intended goals, especially with regard to the completion of the internal market 
and measures to advance a technological Europe (European Council 1985b). 
In accordance with Article 236 of the EEC Treaty, the Council convened an 
intergovernmental conference as suggested by the Dooge Report in order to 
deliberate on the amendments to be made to the treaties of the European 
Community (Good 1988). From there, things moved fast.  
 
As stated by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), from an HI perspective, the 
duration of the critical juncture must be briefer than the path dependent 
process it incites. However, it is also important to mention that this proposition 
concerns the actual decision-making process (which must be short) and not 
the timespan and events that contribute to evoking the institution to fall into 
dis-equilibrium (which usually takes a longer period of time). A draft of the SEA 
was written during the first month of the intergovernmental conference, and 
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the remaining issues were resolved in five meetings between the heads of 
state and foreign ministers between October and December 1985 (Moravcsik 
1991). The SEA was signed on 17th February (Luxembourg) and 28th February 
(The Hague) 1986 (European Commission 1986), came into force on 1st July 
1987 and set the overarching goal to complete the Single European Market 
(SEM) in the Community by 1992 (Single European Act 1987).  
As laid out in the Treaty, “[t]he internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty” (ibid.: 7). 
 
 
4.3. The SEA and its effects on energy policy 
 
The Single European Act Treaty can be understood as a critical juncture since 
it marked a turning point for the institutional trajectory and the further 
development of a common energy policy. It opened the door for the creation 
of an internal market for energy and paved the way for an increasingly efficient 
and effective decision-making process. The most important change in the SEA 
was the transition from unanimous voting to Qualified Majority Voting on 
matters concerning the internal market, in order to facilitate the adoption of 
approximately 300 directives necessary for its facilitation (Matlary 1997). Due 
to the changes brought about by the SEA, the Community was able to reach 
decisions and to adopt measures much quicker and more effectively than 
before, and energy policy was no exception. As the evidence has shown, many 
proposals collapsed owing to the requirement that their implementation was 
dependent on unanimous voting in the Council (ibid.). Hence, the Single 
European Act and the associated rule of Qualified Majority Voting in the 
Council represented a significant change to the Community’s framework, and 
provided the institution with the capacity to free itself from the pathological 
lock-in that had plagued it during the preceding years. As Matlary (1997) puts 
it, 
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“[t]he adoption of the SEA was a major step in the process of formal 
integration. It transferred decision-making power to the institutions of 
the EC, primarily the Council of Ministers because the member states 
had relinquished their right to veto decisions. Furthermore, the 
European Parliament (EP) was now able to play a more active role in 
amending proposals from the Commission. Thus, the changes made in 
the SEA allowed the Commission greater independence and also 
accorded a large role to the EP. The Commission and the EP now had 
a mutual advantage in forming an alliance, as in combination they could 
see a proposal through the Council of Ministers unless the latter 
rejected it unanimously” (ibid.: 20).  
 
Energy policy-making in the Community had previously relied on the political 
will of national governments to cooperate, and the Commission was allocated 
a subordinate and goal-setting role, as a ‘henchman’ of the Member States 
(Tonini 2015). The Commission’s policy endeavours were not central to 
Member States’ own policies, and much less so regarding the development of 
a common energy market. Policy making was characterised by the self-
interested behaviour of Member States; rational decision-making and utility 
maximisation dominated the energy sector; the institutional design foreclosed 
any advancement and change of its regulatory capacity. At best, energy policy 
was “largely indicative, consisting of information gathering, target setting and 
enabling activities” (McGowan 1989: 549). However, under the new market-
based approach introduced by the SEA, the Commission was able to 
strengthen its powers vis a vie intergovernmental institutions and be more 
proactive with regard to policy making. The Commission’s new role was closely 
associated with the revivification of the Community as the SEA strengthened 
supranational authority in several policy areas (Tonini 2015). The institution 
reinforced its capacity and actors became more embedded in the institutional 
framework. As mentioned before, deriving its authority from the SEA and the 
blueprint in the 1985’s White Paper, the SEM programme did not include 
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energy. However, positive steps were taken from 1987 onwards (Padgett 
1992) – as also suggested in the White Paper.  
 
From a HI standpoint, the treaty change in the form of the SEA serves as 
valuable evidence for a critical juncture that affected the whole institution and 
changed the institutional trajectory. This change in primary law, in turn, opened 
the door for (smaller) exogenous and endogenous events to affect the 
institutional, since the institution now had the capacity to react to such events. 
Moreover, the SEA introduced the potential for incremental change in 
secondary law through increasing returns, as will be seen in the forthcoming 
chapters. 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that exogenous factors  only 
have an impact upon an institution (or a specific policy area), if relevant 
competences have already been ceded to the institution. This represents a key 
finding of this research project. If actors are reluctant to shift powers to the 
institution, or if there are no rules implemented that govern a specific sector in 
the first place - especially if the sector is associated with security concerns, 
high politics and the survival of the state (as in the case of energy policy) - the 
exogenous event will not have the capacity to alter the institutional path. As 
shown in Chapter III, if the institution is only made up of a minimum set of rules 
in a specific sector (or if there are none at all), and those rules and the 
associated decision-making is in the hands of Member States, exogenous 
events cannot unfold their full potential and, thus, cannot have an impact on 
secondary legislation. Institutional developments following the 1973 and 1979 
oil crises support this claim.  
 
As discussed in the theory chapter, primary law is the core of the institution; 
the institutional matrix is comprised of the rules that lay down the framework 
to regulate the behaviour of all the actors that are embraced by the institution. 
As the evidence suggests, the SEA can be seen as the outcome of a critical 
juncture for the institution, as it fundamentally altered the institutional trajectory 
 168 
and the performance of the EEC due to the amendments made in primary law. 
The institutional lock-in was overcome when qualified majority voting became 
the voting procedure (Matlary 1997) and the institution changed to one that 
was capable of developing processes of increasing returns in the energy 
sector. As the second hypothesis proposes, due to the critical juncture 
punctuating the institution, primary legislation was amended: moderate 
integration of primary law happened as high institutional stickiness 
encountered a critical juncture. The high institutional inertia prevented the 
critical juncture from unfolding its full possible potential, which it would have 
done if institutional stickiness would have been lower, culminating in a 
moderate outcome for energy policy. Although deeper integration was evident 
- the institutional framework was comprehensively overhauled - energy policy 




Chapter V: Path Dependence and Incremental Change 
 
We will now turn towards an assessment of the policy development during a 
time characterised by a process of path dependence. The thesis will test the 
third hypothesis based on the fact that QMV was in place for secondary 
legislation concerning energy markets. 
 
H3: If no critical juncture occurs in a setting of low institutional stickiness, 
moderate integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form of 
incremental change of secondary legislation. However, small endogenous and 
exogenous events can have an impact on the institution in equilibrium, 
providing the possibility to alter the trajectory of a specific part of secondary 
law. 
 
Shortly after the Single European Act was adopted, and after the 1986 oil price 
collapse and the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Council adopted conclusions 
concerning new Community energy policy objectives for 1995 and 
convergence of the Member States’ policies. The Council emphasised once 
again that the secure availability of energy on a stable economic basis 
remained a requirement for the attainment of social and economic goals. 
Therefore, if necessary, progress to restructure the energy economy should 
be reinforced at the Community level, and the coordination and harmonisation 
of national energy policies should be realised through a framework established 
by Community objectives (Council of the European Communities 1986). The 
Council underlined that such concerted action would demonstrate to 
consumers, producers and investors that the EEC was determined to improve 
their energy supply conditions (ibid.). However, as laid out in the document, 
the Council emphasised that such undertakings had to be in accordance with 
national policies, in the light of Member States’ specific possibilities and 
constraints. These objectives were meant to be “indicative guidelines (…) 
without taking the form of rigid planning instruments” (ibid.: 1). 
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Propositions like these were not new, as many of the foregone conclusions 
endorsed similar action concerning Community-wide objectives5. However, 
this time the far-reaching alterations in primary legislation made it possible to 
actively pursue common goals and spark the development of an internal 
energy market. At the Council meeting on 2 June 1987, the prospects for a 
common energy market were discussed, against the backdrop of the policy 
objectives for 1995, in which the examination of national policies formed a 
major element. There was an exchange of views on the issue of the completion 
of the internal market. The Commission was asked to draw up an inventory of 
existing obstacles to the attainment of an internal market and, subsequently, 
submit proposals to the Council regarding the elimination these obstacles by 
the end of 1992 (Council of the European Communities 1988: 61). This request 
by the Council was the initial spark that ignited the overarching project of 
energy market liberalisation, based on the major Treaty revision of the SEA. 
The Commission duly took on the task and presented an inventory of the 




5.1. The Single European Market and the Internal Energy 
Market 
 
The report The Internal Energy Market can be considered as the first important 
step towards energy market liberalisation. Most poignantly, the Commission 
started the communication with the insight that “considerable barriers to trade 
in energy products within the Community” still existed, and that “[i]f this state 
of affairs does not alter and if a common energy market is not achieved in the 
near future, the degree of integration achieved in this sector may well be 
jeopardized” (European Commission 1988: 2). These opening words were 
taken from a communication that was sent by the Commission to the Council 
 
5 For instance, see Council of the European Communities 1974a, Council of the European 
Communities 1975, and Council of the European Communities 1980. 
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in 1968. It is quite interesting that the Commission decided to start the 
communication with lines that were, by that time, twenty years old; it suggests 
it was the Commission’s intention to emphatically remind the Council that little 
progress had been made to integrate energy markets since 1968. 
 
Regarding the findings of the Commission, all Member States were asked to 
submit their comments, together with a hundred or so organisations and 
enterprises. All energy sources were considered and producers and 
consumers submitted their contributions. Hence, the document was extensive 
in scope and addressed many different facets of energy policy. The scope and 
depth is owed to the fact that the energy market is not a homogenous sector, 
but one that is extremely diverse in terms of traded products and end-uses. In 
addition, there is a considerable amount of diversity regarding energy market 
operators, ranging from small to medium sized enterprises up to multinationals 
and political traditions. Taxation habits and energy resources also diverge from 
one Member State to another. It is hence the very nature of energy products 
and the conditions under which they are produced and consumed which 
constitutes the variation between Member States (European Commission 
1988). The rationale for the creation of the single market was based on the 
Community’s need to become more competitive in the global context. A better 
integrated internal energy market would reduce energy costs, which would 
benefit the individual consumer but also various industries. Industries would 
become more viable and increase their competitiveness, and the economic 
growth would in turn have a positive effect on employment. The internal energy 
market would improve the cost structure and rationalise energy production, 
transmission and distribution activities. Furthermore, the security of supply 
would be significantly enhanced and better interconnections would increase 
both the solidarity between Member States as well as have a positive impact 
on the flexibility of the industry. An increase in trading between the Member 
States at a lower price point was expected. The Commission emphasised that 
the “establishment of a more integrated energy market is of vital importance to 
the future of our Community” (ibid.: 6). The communication estimated that the 
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omission of an integrated energy market, the “cost of non-Europe” (ibid.: 6) as 
it was termed, would cost the community around 0.5% of the Community’s 
GDP. 
 
Hence, the Commission proposed a fourfold, comprehensive plan for action. 
Firstly, and based on the 1985 White Paper, the harmonisation of legally 
binding rules, technical norms and the opening up of public procurement was 
addressed. Secondly, the application of Community Law concerning the free 
movement of goods, state monopolies, rules of competition, and state aid to 
eliminate obstacles laid out in the Treaties should be enforced. Thirdly, 
provisions addressing the protection of the environment and health and safety 
standards would need to be harmonised. Lastly, in order to positively influence 
the development of energy trade, the differences between Member States in 
respect of energy costs, prices and tariffs needed to be harmonised and 
energy infrastructure for both electricity and gas improved (Padgett 1992). On 
a more general level, the Commission instigated a twin-track approach to 
energy policy making (the predominant approach ever since), which was 
based on the alignment of provisions regulating the energy market and using 
its competition powers against states and market participants that infringed on 
those rules. The SEA unblocked the legislative path and the Commission 
began to take advantage of its competition powers by launching a series of 
anti-trust cases, which brought an end to the legal monopolies certain states 




5.1.1. Preferences informing policy making after the SEA 
 
In general, Member States were unable to oppose new policy initiatives (as we 
will see later with the so-called First Energy Package), although most of them 
showed a great resistance towards them (Eikeland 2011b). From a HI 
standpoint, such developments are of great interest as they provide strong 
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evidence that actors had become highly entrenched in an institution and were 
subjected to the phenomenon of unintended consequences. As a matter of 
fact, now that the SEA had resolved the adverse situation of the Luxembourg 
Compromise, where unanimity was the quasi voting rule, and with renewed 
momentum regarding the European project and the commitment to the 
completion of the internal market, Member States did not have the powers to 
oppose new policy initiatives in energy policy as they had done in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. As Member States agreed to the SEM programme in the first 
place, they were not able to resist and escape the gravitational pull the 
amendments in primary law evoked. The new institutional design strongly 
bound them to the concessions they gave two years earlier, and deprived them 
of veto powers, in the wake of the renewed market-based approach triggered 
by the SEA. Of course, Member States were divided in terms of their 
preferences. As we will see later in this chapter, the institution constrained the 
available options for Member States more and more over time, and 
consequently, they agreed to policy proposals further down a sequence they 
would not have agreed to at an early stage. In sum, from a HI perspective, 
unintended consequences gradually evolved.  
 
The empirical evidence also shows that most Member States were sceptical 
of the envisioned goals and the policy proposals published by the Commission, 
for different reasons (Schubert et al 2016). Germany and the Netherlands 
hoped for a broader European approach, Denmark opposed the idea to 
harmonise markets, due its commitment to nuclear-free electricity generation, 
which would be levered out by a common market, since the control over 
electricity production would be removed in an open market. Spain was afraid 
to lose income from transit charges on electricity transfer between France and 
Portugal. Greece worried about domestic coal production and its 
competiveness in a free market. The energy industry in general was concerned 
regarding new gas and electricity transit proposals, with France and the UK 
being the only exceptions. The underlying rationale was that the UK already 
liberalised its domestic energy market in the preceding years, and France 
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envisaged selling its overproduced nuclear-generated electricity (Schubert et 
al 2016). Nevertheless, from an HI standpoint, since market principles played 
such a great role in the new overarching institutional framework, Member 
States had to subjugate their individual national preferences and streamline 
them with other Member States to enhance policy making on the EU level, 
based on rational decision-making and the institutional constraints. If they did 
not, the “cost of non-Europe” (European Commission 1988: 6) looming in case 
of non-realisation of the Internal Energy Market (IEM) was too high, and all the 
positive effects market liberalisation would bring for different EU industries and 
consumers would have been lost. Member States could not challenge and 
contest the validity of market integration within the institutional setting, as 
market integration was the predominant norm, the backbone of European 
integration, and the dominant economic policy doctrine, at the time (Eising 
2002). 
 
The Commission’s proposals reflected the dominant policy approach in the 
institutional setup of the EU, with market rationale at its core. However, to fully 
understand the make-up of the institution, the influence of institutional norms 
on the institutional matrix also must be taken into account as ideational 
components have significance within the system. In addition to the cost-benefit 
analysis of Member States concerning the IEM (confirming that the decision-
making of Member States was rooted in the calculus approach, with the 
institution acting as an arbiter between actors), Eising (2002) shows how 
endogenous institutional norms also influenced the institutional trajectory in 
terms of decision-making procedures in energy policy. Such considerations 
greatly enrich HI’s assumptions about institutions and how preferences are 
endogenously created within the institutional setup. Norms shape actors’ 
orientations and their perceptions about the institution and, hence, ‘what 
constitutes the EU’s legitimate claim to make binding decisions’ (ibid.: 103). 
For instance, the inclusion and participation of different EU bodies, societal 
actors, and the consensus principle within the Council bridge the gap between 
the different actors and stakeholders, and their respective preferences. Even 
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though Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was increasingly common following 
the Single European Act (and later the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice 
Treaties), the decision-making process was based on a consensus principle 
that tried to find acceptable solutions for all Member States (ibid.). Certainly, 
QMV created the conditions to reach decisions much more easily but the 
peculiarity of the mutual interests to reach a decision via consensus shows 
that decision-making is also influenced by normative factor. 
 
To recall Scharpf’s joint decision trap: the “pathologies of substantive public 
policy” are based on the condition that “decisions have to be unanimous” 
(Scharpf 1988: 267). In this sense, as long as unanimous voting rules apply 
(as opposed to qualified majority voting), policy choices tend to be rigid and 
unresponsive to change and “have an inherent (non-accidental) tendency to 
be sub-optimal” (Scharpf 1988: 267). After the SEA, QMV became an 
important feature of the Community in many of its activities. In practise though, 
most decisions were (and still are) reached by consensus. However, reaching 
consensus in a policy area under the shadow of a vote is altogether different 
than to reach consensus under the shadow of a veto (Weiler 1991). From an 
institutional standpoint, institutions deploy structural preconditions that shape 
and influence both the behaviour of actors and the structural factors that 
determine how decisions about policy choices are reached. Furthermore, and 
specifically important from a HI point of view, institutions and institutional 
choices made in the past constrain actors later in time (Pollak 2008). Hence, 
institutions play a remarkably important role in structuring, organising and 
governing different levels of political processes through formal and informal 
rules.  
 
The awareness that informal rules unfold potential to influence the institution 
is corroborated in the case of the introduction of QMV together with the 
normative implication of finding a consensus between Member States, 
concerning their respective preferences (and hence their policy choices). The 
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structural design of the institution facilitates and upholds such behaviour. As 
Weiler (1991) elaborates,  
“[t]he possibility of breaking deadlocks by voting drives the negotiators 
to break the deadlock without actually resorting to the vote. And (…) the 
power of the Commission as an intermediary among the negotiating 
members of Council has been considerably strengthened” (ibid.: 2461). 
 
Based on this logic, the mere prospect of a QMV vote constrains and shapes 
the policy options for Member States in the sense that they are more inclined 
to make compromises due to the prevalent institutional setup. The costs of 
being outvoted on important issues is simply too high. It is thus far better to 
find a compromise on contested topics rather than to unitarily resort to a hard-
line stance, which in turn enhances the risk that the actor’s preferences are 
not considered at all. Under unanimous voting, the option for Member States 
to instigate a deadlock is ultimately feasible, as veto players, dependent on 
their unilateral preferences, can stop any decision-making process all 
together. Hence, the norm to resort to consensus not only constitutes a form 
of comprehensive protection against any unwanted repercussions, for 
instance, being outvoted on very important issues like the Internal Energy 
Market. It also ensures that Member States search for an outcome that is 
acceptable for all Member States from a normative standpoint, so that 
decisions are perceived as adequate, appropriate and fair (see March & Olsen 
1989 ‘logic of appropriateness’). This in turn also ensures that Member States 
comply with negotiated rules, and the Council hence makes strong efforts to 
produce outcomes that every Member State can accept (Eising 2002). 
 
The Commission elaborated on different decision-making procedures for the 
gas and electricity sectors, which traditionally had been dominated by vertically 
integrated national oil companies (NOCs), to liberalise these markets and 
provide fair competition for all market participants. The first suggestion was the 
application of competition rules (at that time it was Article 85 and 86 of the EEC 
Treaty) as a means to dismantle dominant market players and utilities. The 
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second, was to instigate infringement procedures on the basis of Article 169 
EEC. Thirdly, the gas and electricity sector would need to be governed by 
specific Directives. These directives could either be unilaterally formulated by 
the Commission according to Article 90 (3) EEC-Treaty; or fourthly, in 
accordance with Article 100a EEC, which was a consensus-based decision-
making procedure, and which would allow other EU bodies to decide on the 
space and scope regarding policy measures to liberalise energy markets 
(Eikeland 2011b). As energy was widely regarded as a public good, a large 
part of the Commission (including the energy policy department), the Council 
and the European Parliament preferred a stepwise, consensus-based 
approach to decision-making that allowed for incremental change (Eising 
2002). The Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP), on the other 
hand, strived for a faster breakup of the NOCs by using competition rules and 
Article 90 (now Article 86 of EC Treaty). Under this provision, they could initiate 
legal action unilaterally. DG COMP started infringement procedures against 
some of the Member States, in order to maintain a high degree of pressure, 
and to swiftly achieve a single market in energy (Eikeland 2011b.). However, 
as already stated, most of the Commission directorates refused to support the 
aggressive approach of DG COMP and instead proposed a stepwise 
procedure for policy making. 
 
In the end, following a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling, the abrasive 
competition policy route envisioned by DG Comp was waived for the more 
inclusive approach of a co-decision procedure that required both the EP and 
the Council to agree to a new directive and to consult energy utilities, so that 
all voices would be considered. The consensus-oriented approach ensured 
that all the actors retained a high degree of control over the outcome and a 
more appropriate regulatory environment than a purely legal strategy would 
provide (Eising 2002). Most importantly, the consensus norm was not only 
confined to the choice of the decision –making procedure, but also applied to 
decision-making in the Council. The co-decision procedure allowed for QMV 
in the Council. However, due to the heterogeneity of national energy structures 
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and the economic relevance of energy, the Member States were not willing to 
outvote each other on salient issues. Even big antagonists like Germany and 
France agreed not to isolate one another during the Council negotiations but 
instead agreed to search for a consensual solution acceptable for all Member 
States (ibid.). As the evidence suggests, endogenous normative factors also 
played a significant role in the institutional design, supporting the claim that 
institutions not only provide formal rules but also provide moral and cognitive 
templates, allowing for individual construction of possible action (Hall & Taylor 
1996). Actors are deeply embedded in institutions, which transport norms and 




5.1.2. The First Energy Package 
 
As an outcome of these considerations, the recommendations as promoted in 
The Internal Energy Market (European Commission 1988) led to the first 
legislative package that was adopted at the beginning of the 1990s (Andoura 
et al 2010). As already stated, the electricity and gas sectors were viewed as 
particularly challenging as most of the time they were nationally dominant, 
vertically integrated utilities. Hence, breaking up these structures was seen as 
pivotal to create free and fair competition and a level playing field for all actors 
involved (Eikeland 2011b). The Directives were the first step towards the 
liberalisation of energy markets, but were not broad in scope. One Directive 
concentrated on the transparency of gas and electricity prices (Directive 
90/377/EEC), two addressed the transit of electricity and gas through the main 
transmission grids (Directive 90/547/EEC and Directive 91/296/EEC), and a 
fourth addressed the liberalisation of certain activities (prospection, exploration 
and production) related to hydrocarbon products (Directive 94/22/EC) 
(Andoura et al 2010).  
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The launch of the market programme coincided with a drop in the price of oil 
in 1986, which remained  low for the next couple of years. It subsequently rose, 
however, only to fall again in the late 1990s. The price drop in turn created a 
favourable economic environment, bolstering the market programme, 
alleviating economic issues associated with the structural reforms, and 
creating more winners than losers in all sectors. Exogenous factors helped to 
give energy policy and the single market programme greater momentum. As a 
consequence of the eased supply conditions, EC Member States did not focus 
on energy security as they had done in previous years. This made it much 
easier for Member States to accept any market liberalising policy measures 
without constantly worrying about the impact of these policies on their 
respective security situation and national energy policy more general (Buchan 
& Keay 2015). Moreover, due to the exogenous factor of the oil price collapse, 
which impinged on governance in Europe, energy companies tried to reduce 
their costs to remain competitive, whilst low-cost sources of energy flooded the 
market, especially from the Middle East. The inefficiencies of state-owned 
industries, and the unwillingness of governments to continue to support the big 
NOCs, made it easier for the liberalisation of energy markets (Stern 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, the SEM initiative gave rise to an intense debate within the 
European gas and electricity sectors on the merits of marked liberalisation and 
liberalising the access to networks, with the dominant domestic players in 
continental Europe fiercely opposing any changes in the status quo. The 
prevalent view of the gas and electricity industries was that the involvement of 
Brussels was neither necessary nor welcome. Some views were based on the 
fear of losing substantial profit, others were simply a reflection of fear of 
change (Stern 1998). To take full advantage of energy markets, the 
Commission sought to invigorate them through two different processes: by 
increasing competition and liberalising energy markets. The former was driven 
by changes in the supply/demand balance and by aspirations of new entrants 
to the gas sector; the latter was driven by national and European Union 
commitments to open markets, greater efficiency and consumer choice (Stern 
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1998). The passage of the first directives concerning price transparency and 
the gas and electricity transit directives paved the way for subsequent 
secondary legislation, as information about price levels and energy 
infrastructure in different Member States allowed for a more systematic 
analysis of the possible benefits of market liberalisation (Brutschin 2016). Path 
dependent processes gradually evolved, and monitoring, learning and 
coordination effects began to unfold.  
 
Based on these successes, the Commission strived for bolder moves towards 
serious liberalisation, which was still considered a stumbling block. The 
Commission created a consultative committee for the gas and electricity 
sectors, which reported their findings in 1991. It soon became evident that the 
electricity sector conceded that market liberalisation would bring efficiencies 
and advantages to the system, whereas the gas sector “regarded the 
introduction of liberalisation as the equivalent of the end of civilisation. As far 
as the Commission was concerned, the gas gatekeepers were the ultimate 
liberalization refuseniks” (Stern 1998: 91). In this regard, the proponents of 
market liberalisation in the gas sector consisted of the UK (where markets 
were already liberalised), Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal, whereas France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg were sceptical (Brutschin 2016). In the electricity 
sector, similar preconditions were prevalent, with the UK and the Scandinavian 
countries supporting liberalisation, as these already opened their energy 
markets through national legislation, and France and Germany acting in 
tandem to prevent Brussels from reshaping the structure of their energy 
industries (Buchan 2009).  
 
In February 1992, the Commission published a draft directive concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and natural gas (European 
Commission 1992), creating new sets of intended goals. The issue of non-
discriminatory access to pipeline networks by market participants that do not 
own the physical infrastructure for transmission – the so-called third party 
access (TPA) – was conceived as the key to enhance competition in energy 
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markets and on the agenda of the European Community since 1988 (ibid.). 
TPA was conceived as the ultimate solution for dismantling natural monopolies 
and deployed as the spearhead principle of energy liberalisation. “Almost all 
of the other proposals emanating from Brussels are simply designed to make 
TPA happen” (Buchan 2009: 21). The second important pillar to facilitate 
market liberalisation was the separation of the management and accounting 
of production, transmission and distribution activities. The so-called 
unbundling was proposed as a means to ensure the transparency of 
operations of vertically integrated companies (European Commission 1992). 
In basic terms, unbundling creates a conflict of interest within vertically 
integrated firms. Unbundling is necessary because by allowing access to the 
network, the distribution/transmission branch of the company creates 
competition for the supply arm which will affect the overall return of the 
company (Talus 2013).  
 
The separation of energy supply and generation from the operation of 
transmission networks was a means to ensure that the transmission and 
distribution functions were managed in a neutral way, and that discrimination 
against competitors is avoided. However, ownership structures should not be 
affected by such undertakings. The Commission proposed a gradual 
development of the energy markets that was based on a step by step approach 
in order to give the electricity and gas industries sufficient time to the new 
requirements of the markets (European Commission 1992). However, with the 
intense opposition from industry, it soon became clear that the draft directive 
could not succeed. For instance, the European Union of the Natural Gas 
Industry (EUROGAS) criticised that spreading TPA over several steps might 
be a political compromise but would not change the measure from an 
economic point of view. The introduction of TPA would compromise the system 
of long-term contracts and would diminish the ability of the gas industry to 
participate in the development of this form of energy, which was recognized as 
essential for the entire economy and for the protection of the environment. 
EUROGAS contended that TPA might bring a temporary cost advantage to 
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some large gas users but at the expense of other consumers and of market 
penetration. Moreover, the legislation proposed would lead to more significant 
regulation and a stricter regulatory regime. According to EUROGAS, 
experience in the United States, for example, showed that TPA leads to 
creeping regulation, generating much litigation instead of liberalisation 
(Agence Europe 1992).  
The issue of unbundling could have been resolved However, the serious 
stumbling block was the question about granting TPA to third parties. The 
important conclusion that was drawn during the negotiation process was the 
realisation that the gas and electricity industries would need to be separated 
in terms of liberalisation proposals (Stern 1998). 
 
As one might assume, the Gas and Electricity Directive were watered down 
from the initial proposal of the Commission (Eikeland 2011b). However, the 
value of the gas directive, for instance, lay not so much in the specific legal 
provisions, but rather in the fact that it “establishe[d] both the principle of 
access to networks, and the assurance that the opponents of competition and 
liberalization [could] not indefinitely procrastinate in the opening up of their 
markets” (Stern 1998: xvii). An important insight, especially from an HI 
standpoint, is that as soon as first steps towards liberalisation were taken - and 
although some Member States still had objections towards further 
liberalisation - path dependent processes and incremental change were 
instigated. Hence, slow and incremental policy change occurred, however, as 
Stern puts it regarding the first gas directive, “(t)hose who expect anything 
more concrete to emerge from the Directive will almost certainly be 
disappointed” (Stern 1998: xvii). He clarified, however, that most importantly, 
energy liberalisation had to be addressed henceforth and could not be 
discounted as had been the case previously (ibid.). Based on this logic, both 
directives must be valued not so much for their respective impact on energy 
policy (although they introduced measures for liberalisation); but rather, 
because they established a gravitational pull towards the institution and further 
policy development hereinafter. Moreover, even if the directives were less 
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ambitious than the Commission had hoped, it allowed those Member States 
who were in favour of liberalisation of their energy markets to proceed without 
being slowed down by the more critical states (Andoura et al 2010). 
 
The first Directive 96/92/EC (EP/Council 1996) which addressed the internal 
electricity market, required integrated companies to keep separate accounts 
for their generation, transmission and distribution activities (‘unbundled 
accounts’). With regard to the access to transmission systems, Member 
States6 were given the choice between three different institutional approaches: 
they could either opt for negotiated access (negotiated between the incumbent 
and the new entrant), a single buyer option, or regulated Third Party Access. 
Negotiated Third Party Access (NTPA) meant that all electricity producers and 
suppliers and all eligible customers could sign supply contracts with each 
other. The modalities and terms of grid access – in particular the transmission 
price – should be negotiated between the parties to the contract and the 
network operator. The negotiation with the grid operator was the defining 
feature of this model of access to the network. Due to the contingency of the 
negotiation process, which had to be done for every single case, negotiations 
lead to different prices for transmission (Bier 1999). The single buyer option 
(SB), on the other hand, required Member States to designate a so-called 
‘single buyer’ who set a non-discriminatory tariff for the use of the transmission 
and distribution system. A single buyer was defined as “any legal person who, 
within the system where he was established, was responsible for the unified 
management of the transmission system and / or for centralized electricity 
purchasing and selling” (EP/Council 1996: 23). The single buyer was obliged 
to supply all customers with electricity within the territory concerned. Eligible 
customers, however, were free to conclude supply contracts with producers 
and supply undertakings inside and outside the territory covered by the 
system. The single buyer was then obliged to buy the contracted quantities 
 
6 Of the 14 Member States (excluding Luxembourg), six were monopolies (Belgium, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal), four were effectively duopolies (Germany, Spain, 
Denmark and the UK), and four had competitive structures of sorts (Austria, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) (Thomas 2005). 
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from producers either inside or outside the territory covered by the system – 
at a price which was equal to the sale price offered by the single buyer to 
eligible customers, minus the price of the published tariff (ibid.). The regulated 
Third Party Access (RTPA), which was the third option Member States could 
opt for, gave eligible customers the right of access based on published tariffs 
for the use of transmission and distribution systems (ibid.). 10 Member States 
opted for the RTPA system, two for the single buyer, and two for the NTPA 
system. Since the SB and the RTPA system featured the same regulatory 
approach (where a uniform transmission tariff was set by the regulator), 
leading to the same net payment flows, it became clear that the RTPA and the 
SB were virtually identical (Bier 1999). 
 
Although the directive set out the basic regulatory regime for organising market 
liberalisation, only very little guidance was given on how to issue tariffs (they 
had to be transparent and non-discriminatory) and what methodology should 
be used to calculate these (Stern 1999). Directive 96/92/EC only referred to a 
‘competent authority’ that should be set up to resolve disputes between parties 
concerning contracts, negotiations, and refusal of access, or refusal to 
purchase. In addition, the directive set deadlines for opening the retail market 
for large users and distributers: by February 1999, 26% of the market had to 
be open; by February 2000, about 28% of the market had to be opened; and 
by February 2003, about 33% of the market had to be open. Member States 
were given some leeway about how this was interpreted and consumers could 
include retail supply companies (Thomas 2005).  
 
As for the gas sector, Member States were divided in terms of their preferences 
regarding appropriate instruments for the liberalisation of the gas sector, and 
with incumbent firms strongly opposed to TPA, it took two years before 
Member States could agree on a regulatory regime for liberalising gas 
markets. Around the same time as the final decision were made on the 
Electricity Directive, the Irish Presidency circulated a draft proposal for a Gas 
Directive endorsing a new set of intended goals. As endorsed by the Council 
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conclusions, there was a convergence of views by Member States on the 
public service and unbundling aspects of liberalisation of gas markets. 
However, major divergences persisted over the approach to access to 
networks and long-term ‘take-or-pay’ contracts. France, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg were especially critical of liberalising gas markets. France, for 
instance, contended that,  
“it is imperative for the states to be allowed to impose strong public 
service obligations on gas undertakings, notably in relation to secure 
supplies, environmental protection and equalization of prices 
(guaranteeing equal treatment for all consumers)” (Agence Europe 
1996). 
Hence, the proposal was met with stark opposition by some Member States. 
 
On the other hand, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands 
warned against the danger of seeing public service obligations preventing the 
development of real competition on energy markets (ibid.). France, Belgium, 
Spain, and Greece, who were especially dependent on gas supplies from 
outside of the EU, opposed liberalisation on the grounds of long term contracts 
with third countries - so-called take-or-pay (TOP) contracts (ibid.). TOP 
contracts are very common in the energy sector and are a provision written 
into a contract, to either buy a predefined quantity of (a) energy product(s), or 
paying a specific amount to compensate for the loss. Customers have to buy 
an agreed amount of energy over a specific timespan, but can opt to pay 
compensation if they decide that, due to the volatility of the market, the 
commodity is not needed to the extent that was anticipated. Overhead costs 
for suppliers are very high in the energy sector; therefore, long-term TOP 
contracts ensure that energy suppliers have an economic incentive to expend 
capital upfront to finance upstream and downstream activities and to reduce 
uncertainty and reduce the risk of losing money. TOP contracts, hence, 
guarantee a steady income for investors even if (a) certain product(s) are not 
sold on the market. Due to such long-term commitments, France, Belgium, 
Spain, and Greece contended that, under the regime of a new Gas Directive, 
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Member States should have the possibility to comply with the TOP contracts 
agreed with third country suppliers. On the other hand, the UK and the 
Netherlands (the two largest gas producers), partly supported by Germany, 
were against any form of provisions in gas contracts that could be a hindrance 
to free competition (Agence Europe 1996). 
 
After lengthy negotiations, Directive 98/30/EC (EP/Council 1998) concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas was adopted in June 1998, 
reflecting a new policy output. The Directive was essentially the same as the 
Electricity Directive concerning the unbundling of accounts, Third Party 
Access, and transmission and distribution. An important difference between 
the Gas and Electricity Directive addressed the tendering procedure for new 
production facilities – which was an important part of the Electricity Directive. 
The difference was owed to the fact that the location of production facilities in 
the gas sector are determined by physical resource location, which does not 
apply to the electricity sector (Thomas 2005). Moreover, Member States could 
only make a choice between a system of ‘negotiated access’ and ‘regulated 
access’, the ‘single buyer’ option does not appear in the Gas Directive 
(Thomas 2005; Stern 1998). Deadlines for the implementation of the Directive 
were quite relaxed, Member States should open 20% of their market 
immediately, 28% five years later (in 2003), and 38% in 2018, 20 years after 
the Directive entered into force (EP/Council 1998).  
 
Addressing the measurement of the dependent variable through the policy 
outcome, both the Electricity and Gas Directives were rather modest regarding 
their respective impact on the energy sector and their capacity to liberalise 
energy markets. As explained in the methodology section, the policy outcome 
is understood as the degree to which the policy output proves to be effective 
in attaining a set of predefined goals. In this regard, the two Directives as part 
of the First Energy Package, showed a moderate level of effectiveness, as 
discussed further down. Nevertheless, compared with the situation of the 
1970s and 1980s, the regulatory framework improved from a low level of 
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effectiveness to a moderate level of effectiveness: the level of the process of 
integration is measured as the difference between different levels of policy 
outcomes (effectiveness of the policy output) at different points in time. Thus, 
a process of moderate integration can be identified.  
 
Regarding the First Energy package, the Directives were criticised for leaving 
integrated companies too many ways to get around the provisions that tried to 
break up monopolies and grant competitors non-discriminatory access to 
transmission/distribution networks. Integrated energy companies merely 
needed to make an accounting separation of their network activities and their 
respective retail / production / import activities. In addition, if Member States 
opted for the negotiated TPA, integrated companies could refuse TPA to 
competitors on grounds of system security and provided companies with 
ample scope to avoid opening their networks (Thomas 2005).  
 
As the First Energy Package included merely ‘management unbundling’ (the 
separation of accounts), the legal provisions were only of limited practical 
value. This mandatory building of ‘glass walls’ or ‘Chinese walls’ resulted at 
best in a kind of quasi-independence (Talus 2013). Both energy market 
directives can only be considered as a first policy instrument fostering a 
regulatory regime capable of increasing EU-wide competition; however, even 
given the well-known shortcomings of the First Energy package, they 
represented an important start on the road to deeper integration of European 
energy policy as a part of the subsequent policy cycle. Hence, the “first internal 
energy market directives were the first constructive and significant steps 
towards restructuring the EU’s energy industries and creating an internal 
energy market since the Treaty of Rome established the rules on the internal 
markets and free trade law of the EU” (ibid.: 237). Energy markets did not 
materialise to the extent envisaged, which should not be necessarily 
considered a failure of the system. Rather, energy markets needed time to 
develop as energy is a far too strategic and politicised commodity to be 




5.1.3. The Second Energy Package 
 
The Commission took the First Energy Package as a starting point for the 
promotion of further movement towards opening the markets. Most countries 
adopted the more liberal options within the framework of the First Energy 
Package and opened their respective markets more than the Directives would 
have required (Thomas 2005; Andoura et al. 2010). In January 2001, then 
Commissioner for energy, Loyola de Palacio, stated that the results of the First 
Gas and Electricity Directives were encouraging but only the start for further 
market opening and the adoption of new accompanying measures. According 
to de Palacio, due to the First Energy Package, two thirds of demand, and 
three quarters of gas demand had been opened up to competition, and the 
price for industrial consumers had fallen by 25% since 1995 (Agence Europe 
2001a). Hence, endogenous momentum for further policy development had 
been created. On 13 March 2001, the Commission adopted a proposal to 
amend the Gas and Electricity Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC and to speed 
up the liberalisation process. The proposals sought to strengthen the 
provisions that were laid out in the First Energy Package and were a logical 
step further towards the liberalisation of the energy markets – based on the 
step by step approach as envisioned in the first proposal of 1992 (European 
Commission 1992: 8).  
 
New ambitious intended goals were set. First of all, Member States had to 
ensure that an independent national regulator was created to guarantee non-
discriminatory access to the network. These authorities should be wholly 
independent from the gas/electricity industries. They should have the 
competence to fix or approve terms and conditions for connection and access 
to national networks, including transmission and distribution tariffs for both 
sectors; define the rules for the regime to allocate interconnection capacity for 
both sectors; fix or approve tariffs, or changes in tariffs at national level, to 
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reflect costs or revenues related to cross border transmission of electricity; and 
terms, conditions, and tariffs for access to liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
facilitates. Regarding unbundling, the proposal stipulated that the 
independence of the transmission system operators (TSOs) was of utmost 
importance and the provisions on unbundling must be strengthened. 
Additionally, in order to ensure non-discriminatory access to distribution 
networks, unbundling requirements for the distribution system operators 
(DSOs) concerning both the gas and the electricity sectors should be 
introduced. The proposal endorsed that both TSOs and DSOs should be 
independent in terms of its legal form, organisation and decision-making from 
other activities not relating to transmission/distribution. Regarding Third Party 
Access (TPA), Member States should ensure the implementation of non-
discriminatory access to the transmission and distribution system based on 
published tariffs that should be set by a national regulatory authority. Member 
States should ensure that all customers are free to purchase gas/electricity 
from the supplier of their choice and have the rights for TPA from 1 January 
2005 at the latest (European Commission 2001).  
 
As one might expect, the responses of the different Member States were 
heterogeneous. Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Spain, Finland, Germany, Austria, and Sweden were in favour of accelerating 
energy liberalisation; Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and France; on 
the other hand, wanted liberalisation not to occur “to the detriment of the 
general interest” (Agence Europe 2001b: 1) – especially France did not want 
to set any precise dates for market liberalisation. 
 
The Second Energy Package strived for a stronger regulatory framework that 
accommodated the emergence of a further degree of competition and, hence, 
set a path facilitating the opening of energy markets based on a robust set of 
intended goals. As corroborated by HI’s assumption about the development of 
the institutional trajectory, once initial institutional choices were made (here, in 
the form of the First Energy Package) and if the institution is in a state of 
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equilibrium, path dependent processes begin to unfold and put the institution 
on a stable institutional path. These path dependent processes are based on 
positive feedback mechanisms and a continuous policy cycle, adaptive 
expectations, and learning processes which reinforce the institutional path. 
Hence, from an institutionalist perspective, the First Energy Package laid a 
solid foundation for further institutional development in energy policy and 
created the preconditions for step-wise, incremental change. The important 
insight is, however, that changes to the institutional matrix did not occur in 
sudden bursts of completely new and unprecedented legal provisions, where 
far-reaching alterations to the institutional setup were introduced, but rather, 
and based on preceding steps, only incremental change can be observed. 
Although novel provisions were introduced, they nevertheless were 
subordinate to the intended goals of the legal provisions (in this case, market 
liberalisation). The Second Energy Package did not deviate from this rule. 
Following the regulatory foundations laid out in the First Energy Package, 
alterations were made based on these preceding legal provisions and existing 
policy instruments.  
 
The second important observation that can be made is that, although most of 
the Member States were initially against energy liberalisation (see the section 
on the early 1990s), due to path dependent processes, Member States were 
entrenched in, and embraced by, institutional (formal) rules they collectively 
agreed upon and from which they could not deviate. Firstly, due to the SEA 
and the commitment to the completion of the SEM, and secondly, as a 
consequence of such a commitment, the assent to the First Energy Package 
determined the parameters of further policy choices. Whereas Member States, 
before the enactment of the SEA, had the opportunity to shape energy policy 
depending on their (unilateral) preferences, the SEA and the change of the 
voting rule towards QMV deprived them from the prospect to hamper deeper 
integration. Furthermore, commitments to the co-decisions procedure, the 
(informal) consensus rule in the Council, and most importantly, the (formal) 
commitments to market liberalisation (which translated into deeper market 
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integration) restricted and steered their policy options and made a total 
stalemate in form of a locked-in institution impossible. Initially, with the 
exception of the UK, which already had liberalised its domestic markets, most 
Member States were against the liberalisation of their respective energy 
markets and the dismantling of their vertically integrated energy companies in 
the late 1980s / early 1990s. Such sentiment was reasoned through notions of 
the security of energy supply and the perception of energy as a public good, 
and a strategic and politicised commodity. However, due to the SEA and the 
step-wise introduction of secondary law, Member states committed 
themselves to the continuation and further development of these specific rules, 
as the institution steered and constrained their potential policy options. The 
institution was on its way, only moving slowly and changing incrementally, but 
it was nevertheless on a stable institutional path. Under such premises, 
change is always based on small alterations, not big ones. Big alterations only 
happen together with critical junctures. Based on such an understanding of 
institutions and energy policy as a constituent part of the regulatory framework 
of the EU, the Second Energy Package was a further step up from the initial 
policy decision of the First Gas and Electricity Directives. 
 
Eventually, on 26 June 2003, both the Electricity and Gas Directive 
2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC (EP/Council 2003a; EP/Council 2003b) were 
adopted providing a new policy output. The Second Energy Package marked 
an important improvement from the previous regime (Talus 2003). In a 
nutshell, both Directives required the legal and functional unbundling for both 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs), and larger Distribution System 
Operators (DSOs) from any other parts and activities of a vertically integrated 
undertaking (for instance, supply, generation, and production activities). The 
Directives state that both the TSO and the DSO “shall be independent at least 
in terms of its legal form, organisation and decision-making from other 
activities” (EP/Council 2003a: 45 & 46) not related to transmission / 
distribution. However, the legal separation should not create an obligation to 
separate the ownership of assets of the transmission / distribution system from 
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the vertically integrated undertaking (ibid.). Nevertheless, the requirement to 
set up a separated legal entity was an advancement in terms of the institutional 
rules compared to the First Energy Package, which merely stipulated the 
separation of accounts. It was believed that by creating a separate legal entity, 
the employers, including the management, would increasingly be able to act 
independently from the parent company (Talus 2003). Empirical evidence 
suggests that incremental progress was made in terms of unbundling 
(although not providing the ultimate solution to enhancing competition as we 
will see in the upcoming chapter). 
 
In terms of the Third Party Access (TPA) to the transmission and distribution 
systems, both Directives abandoned the possibility for negotiated TPA (it just 
remained as a component for storage in the Gas Directive) and, instead, 
regulated TPA was the only option. TPA was based on published tariffs and 
applicable to all eligible customers without discrimination, between different 
system users. The single buyer option of the First Electricity Directive was 
completely discarded. Member States had to ensure that the tariffs regarding 
access to transmission systems, or the methodologies underlying their 
calculations, had to be approved by a regulatory authority. The regulatory 
authority had to be wholly independent from the interests of the gas / electricity 
industries and should “at least be responsible for ensuring non-discrimination, 
effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market” (EP/Council 
2003b: 70). The authority was obliged to conduct important monitoring 
processes (as part of the policy cycle) to guarantee and safeguard further 
liberalisation of the energy market and to design the methodologies used to 
calculate transmission and distribution tariffs. Whereas in the First Energy 
Package a ‘competent authority’ was merely responsible for dispute 
settlement, it was given more latitude to assess and influence the 
implementation of the Electricity and Gas Directive. 
 
From an HI standpoint such developments can be explained through the 
institutions’ occupation to constantly monitor and evaluate the implementation 
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of the policy output, and to have all the necessary information about the 
performance of the institution available. If necessary, monitoring mechanisms 
are also important to help readjust the way how the policy output and the 
different provisions are translated into concrete action by various actors and 
stakeholders. Monitoring is an essential part of the policy cycle and co-
responsible for creating increasing returns. The continuum of the intended 
goals, policy output, policy outcome, and the inherent monitoring processes 
associated with the policy outcome constitute the basis for an explanation of 
how increasing returns can unfold (and how incremental change is facilitated). 
Derived from such considerations, monitoring processes ensure that the policy 
output is executed within the prescribed legal parameters and the information 
derived from such an assessment is fed back into the institutional matrix, 
contributing to a policy feedback. Integral parts of the policy cycle are hence 
based on monitoring mechanisms, which are subsumed as learning and 
coordination effects. Once a certain path is established, the network 
externalities, the learning process of institutions, and “the historically derived 
subjective modelling of the issues reinforce the course” (North 1990:99). 
Hence, the expansion of the regulatory authority’s competences was an 
important contribution to enhance the institutional framework and led to more 
institutional stability and deeper integration. The Second Electricity and Gas 
Directives were also more ambitious in terms of the transpositions of the 
provisions than their predecessors. In terms of the level of the process of 
integration, the difference between the First and the Second Energy Package 
serves as evidence for a moderate increase in integration. The envisioned 
implementation of the Electricity and Gas Directive required that by 1 July 
2004, at the latest, all non-household customers should be allowed to choose 
their retail suppliers; and by 1 July 2007, all customers (including residential 
customers) should be allowed retail competition – which means a market 
opening of 100% in total. 
 
In sum, the 2003 Gas and Electricity Directives addressed the criticisms of the 
First Energy Package on access to the networks through new measures on 
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unbundling and regulation and by excluding the less liberal approaches on 
network access. However, in terms of the policy outcome, a criticism of the 
Energy Package was based on the fact that the provisions were not explicit 
about breaking up the dominant national companies and wholesale markets 
(Thomas 2005).  
 
When assessing the policy outcome and the implementation of the Directives, 
due to the very ambitious policy provisions, Member States have been slow to 
meet the requirements, which necessitated that industrial consumers could 
benefit from free supplier choice by 1 July 2004. Therefore, the Commission 
sent letters of formal notice in October 2004 to 18 Member States asking them 
to speed up the process and to transpose the Directives on the internal 
markets into national law, proving endogenous momentum to speed up 
change. Loyola de Palacio, then vice-president of the Commission, and 
Commissioner for Energy and Transport, emphasised that some of the 
Member States had partially transposed the Directives and liberalised their 
markets, however, the proceedings should ensure that missing elements 
would be included (Agence Europe 2004a). In November 2005, based on a 
report that was adopted by the Commission, several infringement proceedings 
against different Member States were instigated and six of them were cited 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ): Spain, Luxembourg (electricity 
and gas), Estonia and Ireland (gas), and Portugal and Greece (electricity).  
 
Overall, progress towards market liberalisation was rather slow. Several 
Member States were nearly one year behind the envisioned schedule, 
whereas others took a minimalist approach to the transposition into national 
law (Agence Europe 2005). An additional factor hampering real competition 
was the incorrect use of existing infrastructure and, in case of electricity, the 
lack of interconnections between Member States. Therefore, the Commission 
announced to continue the inquiry to determine which solutions would be the 
most appropriate to create a well-functioning internal market (ibid.). A thorough 
analysis of energy markets revealed that, although the basic concepts of the 
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internal energy market had become embedded in terms of the legal framework, 
institutional arrangements and the physical infrastructure, barriers to 
meaningful competition still existed in many Member States – only some, often 
uneven, progress had been achieved and price differences still existed. In 
many cases, customers simply did not have the possibility to change suppliers; 
even customers who changed supplier were often not satisfied with the range 
of offers they received and stakeholders did not display a high level of 
confidence in the internal market. Such hindrances were based on regulated 
prices preventing entry from new market players, insufficient unbundling of 
TSOs and DSOs which did not guarantee their independence, discriminatory 
TPA to the network (preferential access being granted to incumbents with 
historical long term contracts), insufficient competences of the regulators, and 
lack of information given to the Commission. An additional obstacle to 
competition was the absence of a European regulatory framework addressing 
the challenge of investing in the right level of new infrastructure in support of 
the internal market (European Commission 2007a).  
 
The Commission launched 34 infringement procedures against 20 Member 
States for violation and the lack of transposition of the existing Gas and 
Electricity Directives (ibid.). On the electricity wholesale markets, for instance, 
the three biggest generators still controlled more than 70% of generation 
capacity in 15 Member States. A moderate concentration of the electricity 
market (serving as evidence for more competition) was only given in eight 
Member States. The situation on the gas sector was even worse (as one might 
assume) - the gas sector, not only liberalised later then the electricity sector, 
but also showed more resistance to change as explained in the section on the 
First Gas Directive. Here, the three largest wholesalers controlled up to 90 % 
of the market share in 12 Member States. For electricity retail markets, 80 % 
in 14 Member States were controlled by the three largest companies, for gas 
retail markets, the market was only moderately concentrated in one Member 




5.1.4. The Third Energy Package 
 
The Commission was determined to make use of all available means to limit 
the power of energy monopolies and to foster completion on the internal 
market. Neelie Kroes, the then Commissioner for Competition, was highly 
critical of the limited advancement achieved in terms of competition and 
blamed many of Europe’s top gas and electricity companies. Kroes warned 
that she would make full use of her powers over mergers, government 
subsidies and anti-trust abuses to tackle the lack of competition in the sector 
(Agence Europe 2007a). Companies like RWE and E.ON in Germany, ENI in 
Italy and GDF in France had been subject to the Commission’s anti-trust 
investigations, focussing on mergers, direct and indirect state aid and price-
fixing. Hence, market concentration was a major obstacle for the success of 
the liberalisation process.  
 
It was not only market integration that had failed to meet expectations, other 
concerns also had to be addressed. The EU was still short of an all-embracing 
regulatory framework that was suited to govern the different levels of energy 
policy. The challenges of climate change, increasing import dependence, and 
higher energy prices were all factors contributing to the need for a holistic 
approach to address energy policy in its entirety. From an HI perspective, 
these exogenous factors had an impact on the institutional trajectory and 
contributed to the creation of a new set of preferences within the institution. 
Moreover, due to the increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of 
Member States in the energy sector, a power failure in one country had 
immediate effects on the supply situation in other countries (European 
Commission 2007e).  
 
Therefore, in January 2007, the Commission envisioned a reinforced 
institutional path by determining a new set of intended goals, which, as 
elaborated in detail in the theory section, is part of the institutional policy cycle. 
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The communication ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ included a vast package on 
energy and climate change, including many proposals to transform the Union 
into a low carbon economy in the long term. In total, 10 documents were 
issued, including two on the internal market. Then President of the 
Commission Jose Manuel Barroso emphasised that he fully supported “the 
emergence of a post-industrial revolution to make the Union into a low carbon 
economy” (Barroso as cited in Agence Europe 2007b: 1). Within the 
overarching goal to fight climate change, the Commission proposed an 
integrated common energy policy on the basis of three central pillars: 
promoting growth and jobs through an integrated energy market, combating 
climate change, and limiting the EU’s external vulnerability to imported 
hydrocarbons (European Commission 2007e). In order to underline the 
urgency of a common approach, and to emphasise that the issue of a common 
energy policy facilitating secure and affordable energy was on the table for 
already more than 50 years (and agreed upon but not realised), the document 
started with a quote from the Messina declaration of 1955 (which was analysed 
in the Chapter III). Similar to the Commission’s working document The Internal 
Energy Market (European Commission 1988), in which the Commission used 
a quote from the 1960s to emphasise the inertia that the institution was 
subjected to, the document reminded the Council that if a common energy 
market were not achieved, deeper integration in this sector may severely be 
jeopardized. Based on the Messina Declaration, the Communication 
prominently stated that, 
"(t)o these ends, the ministers have agreed on the following 
objectives:... putting more abundant energy at a cheaper price at the 
disposal of the European economies..." (Messina declaration as cited in 
European Commission 2007e: 3). 
 
According to the communication, and as a consequence of the slow 
advancement of liberalisation of the energy markets evident in the vast amount 
of infringement procedures against Member States, the Commission issued 
new proposals in September 2007, which addressed the shortcomings of the 
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Second Energy Package. The assessment of the policy outcome based on the 
policy output highlighted several shortcomings in the effectiveness of the policy 
regime. Existing unbundling measures were not successfully ensuring a well-
functioning energy market. Although several Member States created a totally 
separate company for network operation, others opted to create a legal entity 
within a vertically integrated company. The former ensured the transmission 
operation was neutral, however, where the TSO was a legal company within a 
company, several issues arose. The reasons were threefold. Firstly, the TSO 
was prone to treat its affiliated companies better than competing third parties, 
or as a matter of fact, even tried to make market entry for new participants 
harder. Legal and functional unbundling was simply not enough, as the 
independence of the TSO was impossible to monitor without intrusive 
regulation. Secondly, non-discriminatory access to information could not be 
guaranteed as there was no effective means of preventing TSOs 
communicating market sensitive information to the generation or supply 
branch of the integrated company. Lastly, investment incentives were distorted 
as vertically integrated network operators had no incentive to further create 
network capacities in the overall interest of the market and, hence, facilitating 
market entry by competitors; quite the opposite, under such circumstances, 
the integrated companies limited investments benefitting their competitors and 
were disinclined to increase interconnection or gas import capacity (European 
Commission 2007b-d). 
 
In order to overcome these shortcomings, the Commission made it clear that 
their preferred option was full ownership unbundling regarding network 
operations. Barroso warned that, “the less ambitious we are in terms of 
separation, the more ambitious we will have to be for regulations” (Barroso as 
cited in Agence Europe 2007b: 2). This meant that, unlike in the Second 
Energy Package, which required the legal and functional unbundling for 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) from any other parts and activities of 
a vertically integrated undertaking, the new proposal endorsed that the same 
person or persons could not exercise control over both a supply undertaking 
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and over a TSO or a transmission system (or vice versa). Nevertheless, based 
on the diverse preconditions that existed between Member States, the 
Commission also proposed an alternative option for Member States – they 
could opt for a so-called ‘Independent System Operator’ (ISO). Opting for this 
model meant that vertically integrated companies could retain ownership of 
their network assets, but it required that the transmission network itself should 
be managed by an ISO – an undertaking or entity that was fully separate from 
the integrated company. The ISO was tasked with performing all the functions 
of a network operator and should be monitored permanently based on a 
regulatory framework. The Commission emphasised that, although progress 
towards Ownership Unbundling (OU) was more advanced in the electricity 
sector, the two options should apply to both the electricity and the gas sector. 
Moreover, publicly as well as privately owned companies should be affected 
by the new legislation (European Commission 2007b-d).  
 
The proposals required the effective unbundling of TSOs and supply and 
production activities on both the national and EU level. In addition, in terms of 
third country access, addressing the external dimension of internal market 
provisions, the proposals made it clear that the same rules of unbundling would 
also apply to non-EU companies. The Commission wanted to ensure that the 
proposals translate into legal provisions that create a market environment in 
which all participants respect, and act in accordance with, incumbent market 
investor principles. Hence, companies from third countries would have to fully 
comply with the same legal regulatory system as EU-based undertakings and, 
as a consequence, EU-wide market integration would be further facilitated and 
competition would be promoted. To this end, the Commission proposed that 
third country individuals and third countries could not acquire control over a 
Community transmission system or TSO unless it was permitted by an 
agreement between the EU and the third country (ibid.). 
 
From an HI perspective, the evolution from the First to the Third Energy 
Package, evident in both the subject matter of intended goals and the policy 
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output, fully supports claims about incremental change and the establishment 
of an institutional environment where Member States are exposed to 
unintended consequences. Although it took 10 years to formulate ambitious 
policy proposals regarding the opening of energy markets, Member States had 
to deal with policy proposals they would never have previously considered. An 
assessment from an HI perspective suggests that, the institution itself shaped 
the preferences of the actors and constrained their possible policy choices, as 
opposed to an analysis based on a pure rational choice approach in which 
actors always have primacy regarding their institutional decisions. In this vein, 
the institution shaped available policy options: policy proposals that would 
have been politically inviable a few years earlier were now up for discussion. 
Member States had to negotiate policy instruments some of them would not 
have seen as a possible policy option after signing the SEA, substantiating the 
claim that unintended consequences unfold over time. 
 
Another very important policy development in regard to institutional stability 
and the continuation of the institutional path was the proposal for the creation 
of an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). North (1990) 
argues that once an institution is established, learning effects apply due to the 
opportunity set provided by institutions, and coordination and expectations will 
be ‘streamlined’ as the prevalent contractual environment creates stability 
(ibid.). The proposition to create ACER serves as evidence for such 
coordination effects of established institutions as the regulatory agency was 
meant to “complement at European level the regulatory tasks performed at 
national level” (European Commission 2007d: 11) and “play a crucial role in 
the development and implementation of European gas and electricity market 
rules” (ibid.: 12). Path dependent processes and incremental change were also 
prevalent as the agency built on a previous institutional setting, the ‘European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas’ (ERGEG).  
 
This independent advisory group on electricity and gas was established by the 
previous energy package in 2003 and was tasked with facilitating consultation, 
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coordination and cooperation between the national regulatory authorities in the 
Member States. However, based on increasing returns - the notion that due to 
the institutional matrix and heightened interdependence the political and 
economic output of an institution is disproportionally increased – institutional 
capacities to regulate energy markets had reached its limits. The Commission 
stated that the energy sector had become “more complex and detailed, and 
involve[d] to a greater extent different financial interests” (European 
Commission 2007d: 10). Therefore, ERGEG was not suited to deploy the 
necessary regulatory capacity. A solution to the shortcoming was conceived in 
the form of the ACER. ACER was meant to provide a framework for national 
regulatory agencies (NRAs) to work together and to streamline their respective 
‘grid-codes’, the national technical and market codes that electricity and gas 
companies must operate under and which differed considerably between 
Member States. The Commission itself considered these tasks outside its 
remit and did not have expertise in such activities. Moreover, the Commission 
had no legal rights to call upon the staff of NRAs to make the necessary 
amendments to the grid codes of the Member States. Therefore, the agency 
was conceived as a separate institutional body to facilitate the alignment of 
network codes - independent and outside of the Commission, and consisting 
of the different NRAs of the Member States in form of a Regulatory Board.  
 
Regarding the measures proposed by the Commission, a significant number 
of Member States held the view that effective separation of supply/generation 
activities from transmission network activities could be best achieved through 
Ownership Unbundling (OU) of the TSO (Council of the European Union 
2007). These Member States believed that OU was the best way to overcome 
the problems that arose when the TSO is a legal entity within an integrated 
company (ibid.). According to Batzella (2018), who did an extensive study on 
the preferences of the different Member States regarding OU of gas markets, 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Spain 
were all in favour of unbundling to break vertically integrated companies and 
to boost competition on European energy markets. The countries in favour of 
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OU also did not show any concern in terms of the third country aspect (the 
requirement that companies of third countries cannot control a transmission 
system or a TSO unless agreed to at EU level). The United Kingdom, for 
instance, pointed out that OU would not have allowed upstream companies or 
third country supplier companies to control the network in the Member States 
(ibid.). 
 
However, several Member States questioned “the proportionality of the 
proposed provisions for ownership unbundling or ISO” (Council of the 
European Union 2007: 4) as they deemed the measures infringed on property 
rights. Hence, they suggested an alternative to these two options “without 
interfering with property rights and in line with the European Council 
conclusions” (ibid.). Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia sent a letter on 30 January 2008 containing their 
‘third way’ addressed to the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the EU and 
the European Commission (Agence Europe 2008a). According to the eight 
Member States who opposed radical liberalisation, ‘Effective and Efficient 
Unbundling’ (EEU) was an alternative approach to OU and the ISO option that 
would be better suited to ensuring competition. Instead of requiring that the 
TSO had to be fully ownership unbundled, the EEU proposal suggested a set 
of measures in order to guarantee free access to infrastructure and the 
independence of investment decisions of the TSO (Agence Europe 2008a). 
These measures would have gone much further than the legal unbundling 
provisions set by the second internal market package, as they would have 
imposed strict obligations monitored by a compliance officer and public 
authority (ibid.). The rationale behind this alternative option was based on the 
fear of some Member States that OU would weaken the position of their 
national companies in relation to those of third countries. France in particular 
was anxious about such developments (Batzella 2018). Germany was also a 
fierce opponent of further unbundling, as it regarded such obligations would 
infringe on property rights, due to the specific nature of transmission systems 
in Germany, which were privately held (Del Guayo et al. 2010). France and 
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Germany led the faction of Member States who regarded EEU as their 
preferred alternative (Agence Europe 2008b).  
 
A third group of Member States were also against OU but did not join the group 
of Member States proposing an alternative option, included Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. They were 
concerned that OU would have a negative impact on their gas markets, 
because they were not properly interconnected, with centralised and limited 
gas markets, or were heavily dependent on one external supplier (ibid.). 
 
Interestingly, and very much detrimental to the side opposing OU7, the large 
German energy utility E.ON announced in February 2008 that is was selling 
off its power grid to an operator that had no interest in the generation of 
electricity. This decision came after an investigation into the energy sector 
conducted by the Commission (DG COMP), which concluded that E.ON was 
guilty of anti-competitive behaviour. To avoid a large fine, the largest electricity 
utility in Germany planned to sell its transmission network, whereby the 
Commission would suspend its anti-trust procedure (Agence Europe 2008c). 
Germany criticised the behaviour of the Commission, presuming that it was in 
reaction to the proposed Effective and Efficient Unbundling (EEU) approach. 
Similarly, the German electricity giant RWE announced in May 2008 that it was 
selling its German gas distribution network, in response to an investigation 
launched by the Commission in May 2007, in order to improve competition 
conditions on the German gas market (Agence Europe 2008d). Hence, 
endogenous momentum was created by large private actors who were in 
favour of the suggested provisions of the Commission. Andris Piebalgs, then 
Commissioner for Energy, pointed out that the Commission was willing to 
negotiate EEU under the condition that strict guarantees were respected, 
because as it stood, the ‘third way’ (EEU) did not guarantee independence of 
the TSO and non-discriminatory access to the network. In addition, the 
 
7 The group spearheaded by France and Germany. 
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Commission emphasised that effective unbundling must apply to both 
electricity and gas (ibid.).  
 
From an HI perspective, the institutional design entrenched various actors and 
constrained the possible range of policy options available to them. In this case, 
although Member States were still in the process of negotiating new 
institutional rules, structural preconditions determined possible policy choices, 
which were also reinforced by powerful agents in the private sector. The 
Commission did not rule out EEU and the ‘third way’ per se, but made it clear 
that certain commitments to liberalise energy markets (for both electricity and 
gas) had to be fulfilled. Member States had heterogeneous preferences 
regarding OU: some demonstrating fierce opposition or a great deal of 
scepticism. Nevertheless, their preferences were eventually constrained and 
altered by institutional boundaries. Hence, as HI would suggest, institutions 
both constrained actors and shaped their preferences. 
 
On 06 June 2008, the Energy Council agreed on the key points of the Third 
Energy Package, reaching a consensus on the effective unbundling of 
production/supply and network/transmission activities. The Council reached a 
compromise regarding the modalities of an alternative to ownership 
unbundling – the ITO (Independent Transmission Operator) model which 
allowed vertically integrated companies to keep ownership of transmission 
networks on the condition that they were managed by an independent TSO, 
adhering to a strict set of conditions. The Council decided that this option 
should be available for both the electricity and gas sector. Two unresolved 
issues remained: a clause on fair competition (creating a level playing field) 
and the ‘third country clause’ (or ‘Gazprom clause’), which was finally resolved 
in October 2008 (Agence Europe 2008e).  
 
As the Council and the European Parliament had different views on the 
proposals, informal talks were held between the Council, the European 
Parliament, and the Commission. For instance, the Parliament rejected the 
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Commission’s ISO option and endorsed the ITO model, however, 
incorporating a requirement that an independent Trustee should be appointed 
by the regulatory authority to safeguard the independence of the TSO. The 
Council, on the other hand, endorsed all three options – full Ownership 
Unbundling, the option of an Independent System Operator, and the option of 
an Independent Transmission Operator. Moreover, the Council did not 
endorse the appointment of a Trustee regards the ITO model. In terms of the 
third country aspect, the Council introduced a new article which ensured that 
TSOs of third countries had to respect the same unbundling rules as 
Community TSOs. The article also introduced the requirement that the security 
of energy supply should be taken into account when deciding whether a third 
country TSO could operate in the network of a Member State (Batzella 2018). 
 
In the end, ownership unbundling became the main stumbling block for 
reaching an agreement, discussions in second reading became bogged down 
at the beginning of 2009. However, during a final European Parliament / 
Council / Commission trilogue, the five rapporteurs for the Third Energy 
Package reached an informal compromise, under the Czech presidency in late 
March 2009. The Parliament came into line with the political agreement of the 
Energy Council of October 2008, endorsing all three options of unbundling for 
the electricity and gas sector, however, obtaining additional provisions for the 
third option (ITO), in order to ensure the independence of the TSO on 
investment and governance. Moreover, the Parliament also obtained 
additional provisions to ensure greater independence of national regulators 
and managed to have consumers’ rights strengthened (Agence Europe 
2009a). Finally, at the second reading in April, the Parliament agreed to the 
amendments concerning the five texts of the legislative package by a large 
majority. The vote in the Parliament validated the informal compromise that 
was reached in March (Agence Europe 2009b).  
 
Hence, after almost two years of intense negotiations, the Council formally 
adopted the Third Energy Package on 25 June 2009 and approved all the 
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amendments adopted by the Parliament (Agence Europe 2009c). The 
legislative package was then published on 14 August 2009 (EP/Council 2009b-
f). 
 
As previously noted, the most important (and controversial) aspects during the 
negotiations were Ownership Unbundling (OU) and third-party access. The 
final policy output provided the following provisions. In terms of unbundling, 
the first choice Member States can opt for is full ownership unbundling, as 
suggested by the proposal in 2007, which was also the preferred option for the 
Commission. As explained, under this regime, Member States have to ensure 
that the same person or persons are not allowed to exercise control over a 
production or supply undertaking and at the same time exercise control over a 
TSO or a transmission system (EP/Council 2009b, 2009c). The second option 
is to designate an Independent System Operator (ISO) upon a proposal from 
the transmission system owner. Under this model, the vertically integrated 
undertaking can retain its ownership of network assets but must leave the 
entire operation, maintenance and investment to an independent company 
(ibid.). The last option – the ‘third way’, as advocated by Germany and France 
and six other Member States - also grants the vertically integrated company 
the option to keep its gas or electricity networks but must leave operation to a 
subsidiary. An Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) should be tasked 
with such undertakings. The ITO would allow the TSO to remain part of the 
integrated undertaking but would provide for very detailed rules to ensure their 
independence (Del Guayo et al. 2010). The ITO must have effective decision-
making rights, independent from the vertically integrated undertaking, with 
regard to assets required to operate, maintain and develop the transmission 
system. In addition, the ITO should have the power to raise money on the 
capital market in particular through borrowing and capital increase (EP/Council 
2009b-c). 
 
In terms of third party access, national regulatory authorities (NRA) are 
responsible for the certification if a person or persons from a third country or 
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third countries want(s) to acquire control of a transmission system or the 
transmission system operator. The NRA can refuse permission if an 
undertaking does not fulfil general requirements for unbundling and does not 
comply with Community law. Certification can also be withheld if the security 
of energy supply of the Member State or the Community’s energy supply is 
threatened. In any case, the NRA must inform the Commission about its 
decision and request an opinion from the Commission. Subsequently, and 
before adopting a final decision, “the national regulatory authority shall take 
utmost account of the Commission’s opinion” (EP/Council 2009b: 108; 
EP/Council 2009c: 70).  
 
In addition to OU and third party access, the creation of an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) was the third very important 
institutional change introduced with the third liberalisation package. According 
to the regulation, the agency should act independently from any market 
interests, the Commission, Member States and any public or private entity. 
The Agency was conceived as a means “to fill the regulatory gap at Community 
level and to contribute towards the effective functioning of the internal markets 
in electricity and natural gas” (EP/Council 2009d: 2). ACER should ensure that 
regulatory functions conducted by the NRAs concerning the common rules for 
the internal market in gas and electricity are properly coordinated and, where 
necessary, completed at the Community level. Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, 
establishing ACER, states that the agency has to be independent from 
electricity and gas producers, transmission and distribution system operators, 
and consumers, and has to ensure the conformity of its actions with 
Community law (ibid.). It should monitor regional cooperation between TSOs 
in the electricity and gas sectors as well as the performance of the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), and the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G). 
Participating in the development of network codes, monitoring the 
implementation of these codes, analysing the progress regarding the creation 
of new interconnector capacity and monitoring the implementation of 
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Community-wide network-development plans fall within the remit of the ACER. 
Indeed, ACER was conceived as a new powerful institutional node which 
enhanced the regulatory capabilities of the institution matrix considerably.  
 
Another important task of the agency addresses the facilitation of cooperation 
between NRAs and between regulatory authorities at regional and Community 
level. Moreover, ACER is tasked with monitoring the performance of the 
internal markets in electricity and natural gas (in particular the retail prices), 
access to the network (including access to electricity produced by renewable 
energy sources), and compliance with consumer rights (EP/Council 2009d). 
By creating new institutional nodes, like the ACER, ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G, 
the institutional matrix was widened, conferring important institutional functions 
to these structures. Their operations, in the shape of coordination processes, 
are an integral part of path dependent processes based on increasing returns, 
and help to shape and monitor the implementation of the policy output. 
Coordination helps to overcome collective action problems (Pierson 2000).  
 
To complement the assessment of the Third Energy Package, the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), and the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) 
also offer interesting insight. The inception of ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G were 
a means to increase cooperation between TSOs and to ensure the optimal 
management of the gas and electricity transmission networks in the 
Community, ultimately creating a pan-European transmission system. Both 
associations were tasked with creating “network codes for providing and 
managing effective and transparent access to the transmission networks 
across borders, and to ensure coordinated and sufficiently forward looking 
planning and sound technical evolution of the transmission system in the 
Community, including the creation of interconnection capacities, with due 
regard to the environment” (EP/Council 2009e: 37; EP/Council 2009f: 15). The 
regulations set out: non-discriminatory rules for access conditions to natural 
gas transmission systems; rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity (thus 
 209 
enhancing competition); rules for access conditions to LNG facilities and 
storage facilities; and facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning and 
transparent wholesale market with a high level of security of supply in gas and 
electricity. Regarding the network codes, upon request from the Commission, 
ACER is tasked with the development of a framework guideline setting out 
clear and objective principles which are based on a priority list created by 
ACER, ENTSO-G&E (hereafter ENTSO) and relevant stakeholders. Based on 
this framework, ENTSO is tasked with delivering a network code, which is in 
line with the relevant framework guideline. ACER subsequently reviews the 
code, during which it might consult relevant stakeholders. Based on the 
position of the Agency, ENTSO amends the code accordingly and re-submits 
it to the agency. Once the Agency is satisfied, it submits the code to the 
Commission and may suggest that it be adopted within a reasonable time 
period (ibid.).  
 
The so-called network codes are sets of very complex operational and 
technical rules to facilitate coordination and harmonisation, integration and 
efficiency of European energy markets, and to develop these further. These 
rules can be regarded as the ‘software’ upon which cross-border trade 
depends; they are the set of institutional rules that increasingly bind actors to 
the regulatory framework of the institution, as they are required to internalise 
these new standards and guidelines. As decision-making, operational, and 
technical standards converge over time, and as actors become part of a 
connected energy grid, adaptive expectations unfold as actors endeavour to 
maximise their benefits according to their investment. Network codes (the ones 
that are developed at this point), are grouped into code families. For instance, 
ENTSO-E clustered them into Connection Codes (Demand Connection Code, 
High Voltage Direct Current Connections, Requirements for Generators), 
Operations Codes (Operations, Emergency and Restoration), and Market 
Codes (Electricity Balancing, Forward Capacity Allocation, Capacity Allocation 
& Congestion Management) (ENTSO-G n.d.). Similarly, ENTSO-G has 
network codes (NCs) for capacity allocation, balancing, interoperability and 
 210 
data exchange, congestion management, transparency guidelines, 
functionality processes to reach solutions regarding operational and 
implementation issues, and NCs for monitoring processes (ENTSO-E n.d.).  
 
From an HI perspective, the development of these codes, the ‘software’ the 
energy grid is governed by, supports the assumption that over time, the 
institutional structure is not only widened by new institutional nodes, but also 
deepened with stronger institutional rules. Without going into too much detail, 
these network codes deliver a very powerful regulatory regime to align 
operational and procedural standards of the different TSOs, assure that the 
completion and the functioning of the internal market is promoted, that cross-
border trade runs as smoothly as possible, and that the rules for access to 
transmission systems are set in a non-discriminatory manner. Moreover, in 
order to provide an overview of existing infrastructure and the integrated 
network, and to provide an institutional platform for further operational and 
infrastructural development, both ENTSOs are required to develop non-
binding Community-wide ten-year network development plans (TYNPs) on a 
biannual basis. As we can see, the new institutional design did not only govern 
and monitor the existing trajectory, but also set options for possible institutional 
development in the future. The network development plans, which cover a ten-
year horizon, should build on national investment plans, taking into account 
regional investment plans and Community aspects of network planning; 
integrate long-term commitments from investors regarding cross-border 
interconnections; and identify investment gaps of infrastructure planning 
(EP/Council 2009e; EP/Council 2009f). In a nutshell, the objective of the 
TYNPs is to describe the foreseen developments of the European 
transmission capacities, whilst assessing the ability of transmission operations 
to meet the requirements of the energy market to satisfy demand and to 
provide a secure supply of energy (ENTSO-G 2010; ENTSO-E 2010).  
 
Based on the evidence, the Third Energy Package improved the institution 
structurally, and widened and deepened the institutional design after the 
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adoption of a large set of operational, technical, and economic rules. The 
package introduced signifiant provisions regarding the governance of both the 
electricity and the gas sector. Provisions addressing ownership unbundling, 
third country aspects, the creation of a new agency and associations, and the 
development of network rules all contributed to a more coherent policy 
package governing the internal market for energy, and reinforcing the 
institutional path. Comparing the policy outcome of the First, the Second, and 
then the Third Energy Package, reveals that institutional change happened in 
a stepwise manner. A bigger institutional step was taken between the First and 
the Third Package (and even more so, between the Third package and the 
time before the SEA). However, if we compare the First to the Second, and the 
Second to the Third package, it becomes apparent that the institution was 
gradually modified and the institutional matrix expanded. This, therefore, 
supports the third hypothesis that in the absence of a critical juncture within an 
institution subjected to low stickiness, a process of moderate integration can 
be observed. Change to the institutional makeup - manifesting itself in the form 
of the three liberalisation packages - was not achieved by completely and 
abruptly overhauling the institutional design. Rather, the institution matrix 
changed incrementally. Hence, when measuring the DV as the difference 
between policy outcomes in different points in time, moderate integration can 
be attested. Thus, the third hypothesis can be confirmed: 
H3: If no critical juncture occurs in a setting of low institutional stickiness, 
moderate integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form of 
incremental change of secondary legislation. 
 
The rationale for the creation of the internal market was based on economic 
considerations. The preferences of the different actors concerned can be 
reasoned through the calculus approach, with the notion of rational choice 
decision-making. However, we have also shown that endogenous momentum 
was present to alter institutional rules. Rules can be based on strategic 
calculations (see Shepsle 2006) or they can be of normative origin - put 
differently, they can be based on ideas of how specific aspects of the political 
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sphere (see Eising 2002) or how markets should be governed (Hall & Lamont 
2013). The decision to agree to the SEA, and consequently to the SEM 
programme, was based on the calculus approach, reinforced through 
endogenous ideas of how to achieve a single European market. As suggested 
by HI, actors had initial primacy regarding their decisions in the institutional 
context. However, as we have shown, over the subsequent years, and 
although the primacy of actors in terms of the range of possible policy choices 
was initially high, these specific decisions slowly entrenched the different 
actors, over time, due to the structural institutional design. Eventually, their 
policy choices became more and more constrained. Unintended 
consequences unfolded due to initial policy choices (to liberalise the markets 
with the help of specific policy instruments; to strengthen certain procedural 
rules; etc.). These specific policy instruments gradually evolved, in some 
instances to a degree that actors might not have anticipated at the point of 
their inception. These policy measures became more and more stable and 
rigid over time. For instance, in the proposal of the Commission regarding the 
First Gas Directive, the Commission suggested complete ownership 
unbundling, a proposition which, at the time of the implementation of the 
directive in the late 1990s, was inconceivable and foredoomed to failure. 
However, ten years later, ownership unbundling became a reality, together 
with the choice to opt for an Independent System Operator (ISO) or an 
Independent Transmission Operator (ITO). 
 
 
5.2. The external Dimension of Energy Policy in the 2000s 
 
After the implementation of the SEA, and the creation of an internal market for 
energy based on the SEM, the EU “mainly used liberal tools to a liberal effect—
in building and extending the Single Market for energy” (Andersen et al. 2017: 
21). Energy policy was not formally incorporated within the pillar of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and no legal basis existed for the 
development of a common external policy (Youngs 2009). Consequently, other 
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than the areas of energy policy that fell within the remit of the internal market, 
decisions had to be made unanimously, hence, were exposed to high 
institutional stickiness. At the same time, the internal dimension demonstrated 
low institutional stickiness and was subject to incremental change. Based on 
path dependent processes and increasing returns, adaptive expectations, 
coordination effects and continuous monitoring, moderate integration of the 
institutional matrix was possible. The analysis of the three liberalisation 
packages, and the incremental institutional change they facilitated, serve as 
evidence of these assumptions. The packages did not introduce rapid bursts 
of policy innovation, but rather a stepwise transformation of the institution 
towards deeper integration. 
 
As the Community did not have formal competence regarding the external 
dimension of energy policy, the only viable approach to address relations with 
third countries was via internal market provisions. Hence, policy provisions 
regarding the security of supply could only be subsumed under the umbrella 
of the liberal market doctrine and had to be incorporated within the framework 
of the liberalisation packages. Unlike at the time of writing, when the “EU-
Russia political relationship is … at its lowest ebb since the end of the Cold 
War” (Judge et al. 2016), geopolitical concerns and supply shortages from 
Russia were not on the table, and the Community considered “a certain 
increase in dependence on that country” (European Commission 2000: 44) as 
inevitable. Supplies from the former Soviet Union, and in particular Russia, 
where considered a ”testimony to an exemplary stability” (ibid.). Hence, the 
market paradigm was conceived as a means to address the security of supply8.  
 
At the end of the 1990s, the Union came under more and more pressure, as 
the price of crude oil rose significantly (it tripled within a year from 1999 to 
2000), due to the growing energy dependence of the EU as well as the 
 
8 For instance, Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, which was part of the first liberalisation package, stated that “the internal market in 
electricity is particularly important to increase efficiency in the production, transmission and 
distribution of this product, while reinforcing security of supply” (EP/Council 1996).  
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forthcoming Eastern enlargement. Within this context, the Commission 
published the Green Paper titled Towards a European strategy for the security 
of energy supply (European Commission 2000). Energy Security was now 
considered an important issue that needed to be properly addressed to ensure 
the well-being of EU’s citizens and the proper functioning of energy markets 
and the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on 
the market, at a price that is affordable for all consumers, while at the same 
time addressing environmental concerns and achieving sustainable 
development. The Commission warned that without an active common energy 
policy, energy requirements covered by imported energy products would rise 
from 50% in 2000 to 70% in 20 to 30 years. From an economic standpoint, 
costs were heavy: 45% of oil imports came from the Middle East and 40% of 
natural gas from Russia, which cost the Union about 240 billion Euros in 1999, 
and accounted for 6% of total imports. The Commission warned that the EU 
had too few resources and lacked instruments at its disposal to tackle the 
issues of import dependence and the erratic increase of oil and gas prices. 
Hence, a coherent energy policy at Community-level should be promoted 
(ibid.).  
 
The Green Paper initiated an intense debate in the different Member States 
about the structural weaknesses and geopolitical, social and environmental 
shortcomings of the EU’s energy supply (European Commission 2002). The 
conclusions from a consultation of Member States, companies, consumer 
associations and NGOS, which asked 13 questions as part of the Green Paper 
was virtually unanimous in its understanding that energy consumption must be 
steered. Energy demand management – demand-side management (DSM) - 
was seen as key to improving energy security and bringing down overall 
energy consumption. The Commission instantly made some well-received 
proposals “involving actual legislation and not just encouraging words or 
exchange of good practice” (ibid.: 3-4), addressing electricity production from 
renewable sources, energy saving in buildings, and the promotion of biofuels. 
Based on the applied theoretical model, a new set of intended goals was 
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defined. However, in terms of supply strategies and how to effectively 
approach third country suppliers, other than in the area of DSM, the 
conclusions were rather vague, suggesting that the dialogue with Russia would 
determine the best way to deal with long-term supply and production 
agreements, as “representatives of the industry expressed some major 
concerns” (ibid.: 4). 
 
It took another two years to implement the first advancement in terms of legal 
provisions addressing gas security. Directive 2004/67/EC, concerning 
measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply, published on 29 April 
2004, introduced the initial steps that directly addressed the external 
dimension of energy policy and set out the path for further institutional 
development (Council of the European Union 2004). However, from an HI 
perspective, the directive can be regarded as a small step rather than a huge 
leap towards the successful implementation of effective provisions addressing 
security concerns. In contrast to the packages on market liberalisation, which 
were decided by the co-decision procedure between the EP and the Council, 
the directive addressed the external dimension of energy policy, which was not 
within the remit of the Community, and was therefore decided in the Council. 
 
 Article 100 EC (under the “Approximation of Laws” chapter), was the legal 
basis for the directive, which required the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission, to decide unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee. The security directive was reasoned 
through the “completion of the internal gas market”, which necessitated “a 
minimum common approach to security of supply” (Council of the European 
Union 2004: 92) and the concomitant need for an undisrupted supply of gas to 
ensure the functioning of the internal market, safeguarding economic activity 
and avoiding market distortions. However, due to the requirement for a 
unanimous vote, it only constituted the smallest common denominator, as 
Member States would merely have to “specify adequate minimum security of 
supply standards” (ibid.: 93). Overall, the directive was formulated quite 
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vaguely and policy instruments were not exhaustively discussed. Other than 
framing an effective policy on a supranational level, the directive claimed that 
“[b]ilateral agreements between Member States could be one of the means to 
contribute to the achievement of the minimum security of supply standards” 
(ibid.: 92). The Commission was given a rather minor role: it should monitor 
the overall supply situation based on reports from Member States and was 
given auxiliary and administrative tasks. 
 
 
5.2.1. External factors and their impact on the institutional trajectory 
 
The reason why the policy was formulated in such a vague manner is owed to 
the fact that at the time of negotiating Directive 2004/67/EC, interruptions of 
the gas supply were unimaginable. Therefore, the Commission’s first proposal 
was met with complete opposition and had to go through substantial 
amendments (Brutschin 2016). However, things changed when in March 2005 
a gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine started to unfold. Ukraine is not 
only the most important transit country for Russian gas, but also a significant 
gas producer itself. Both Ukrainian gas import prices and transit fees for 
Russian exports to Europe were set in bilateral agreements, and at prices 
below European levels. Throughout 2005, Moscow accused Kiev of refusing 
to negotiate seriously on prices and, in addition, Gazprom complained that 7.8 
bcm of gas had disappeared from storage facilities in the Ukraine – the issue 
was ultimately resolved by paying for the gas. The peak of the conflict was the 
breakdown of negotiations on import prices for 2006. In the last three months 
of 2005, Gazprom officials insisted that Ukrainian import prices would be set 
at European levels, therefore causing the dispute to be unresolved on 1 
January 2006 and leading to the suspension of gas supplies from 1-3 January 
(Pirani 2007). 
 
The interruption of the flow of Russian gas to the Ukraine and the EU 
demonstrated that Directive 2004/67/EC and its uneven implementation by 
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Member States was not suited to sufficiently prepare for, and respond to, a 
serious gas supply crisis. In addition, there was a clear risk that measures that 
were taken unilaterally by Member States in response to the crisis could 
jeopardise the functioning of the internal market (Roggenkamp et al. 2016). As 
a direct and instantaneous consequence of the gas dispute, the so-called ‘Gas 
Coordination Group’ (GCG), which was actually introduced by Directive 
2004/67/EC, met for the first time on 4 January 2006 (Agence Europe 2006a), 
although the directive would have required the group to exchange information 
on security of gas supply on a regular basis and “should consider aspects 
relevant in the context of a major supply disruption" (Council 2004: 93). The 
group included representatives from all Member States and was presided over 
by the Commission (Agence Europe 2006a). It was reinforced and structurally 
improved by a Commission decision in November 2006. The decision was 
meant to provide the EU with the means to speak with a single voice when 
discussing matters of energy security with third countries, facilitate the 
coordination of security of supply measures at Community level, and assist 
Member States in the event of a supply disruption in coordinating measures 
taken on a national level (European Commission 2006b). 
 
Following the gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine, an intense and 
serious debate about energy security in the EU was initiated, as gas supplies 
fell by 40% in Hungary, and by over 30% in Austria, Slovakia and Poland 
(Agence Europe 2006b). The Commission published another Green Paper 
titled ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, 
which was initiated by European Council summits in October and December 
2005. The paper asked Member State to act urgently at a Community level, 
since unilateral measures and individual energy policies by Member States 
were not enough to tackle new challenges on energy markets. Therefore, new 
impetus was needed and the paper put forward different options to form a new 
comprehensive energy policy. Interestingly, alongside the need to complete 
the internal market (with the help of grid codes, better connected infrastructure, 
etc.), diversify the energy mix, and develop an integrated approach to tackle 
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climate change, the Green Paper also suggested the development of policy 
instruments that would enhance solidarity between the Member States in an 
event of a supply disruption and ensure assistance when a countries’ 
infrastructure was damaged. The Green Paper additionally proposed the re-
examination of existing legal provisions on the security of supply (for instance, 
Directive 2004/67/EC) (European Commission 2006a). 
 
From a HI standpoint, it is interesting to see that the institution moved away 
from a pure market based approach to address supply disruptions towards one 
that also allowed for normativity. Incorporating ‘solidarity’ to tackle market 
failure serves as strong evidence that the institution and its associated 
markets, could not deliver solutions based on pure market instruments during 
a crisis. Here, markets do not sustain Member States’ economies. During a 
supply disruption, it is quite the opposite. Member States’ economies must 
help each other in order to sustain the markets. In the words of Stefan Moser 
(2018), Head of the Security of Supply Unit in DG Energy, 
“If you have a functioning energy market, necessary cross-border 
connections, and if energy markets run smoothly, you can to a large 
extent cope with a normal crisis. But you can never exclude that there 
is an extraordinary event where the market stops to work. And for this 
event you need instruments that must be fully based on solidarity 
between Member States. If not, everybody goes alone” (Interview 3, 
2018). 
 
As we can see, the policy output Directive 2004/67/EC addressing gas security 
and the external dimension displayed low effectiveness as it was not able to 
alleviate the impact of the gas dispute between Russia and then Ukraine in 
2006. Secondary law, without being explicitly addressed in primary law and 
subject to QMV, will only reflect veto player’s willingness to agree to the lowest 
common denominator. However, as the following chapter will show, the 
directive was overhauled and substantially improved based by the Lisbon 
Treaty, which bestowed the institution with extended competences to react to 
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exogenous threats. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty changed the institutional 
environment for energy policy to a considerable degree. The following chapter 
will elaborate in detail how the Lisbon Treaty informed and impacted energy 




Chapter VI: Another Critical Juncture and the Energy 
Union 
 
In the last chapter, we discussed the impact of the SEA on the internal energy 
market, exogenous threats and security of supply issues, and identified some 
factors as the catalyst for institutional development. An initial analysis suggests 
that the Lisbon Treaty constituted a significant step for further institutional 
change. Therefore, in this chapter we will test the fourth hypothesis. 
 
H4: If a situation of critical juncture occurs within a setting of low institutional 
stickiness, high integration can be expected. Integration will occur in the form 
of a non-incremental change of primary legislation. After the critical juncture 
occurred, the institution falls back into equilibrium and a process of moderate 
integration of secondary law can be expected. 
 
 
6.1. The Lisbon Treaty 
 
In the Lisbon Treaty energy policy was directly and explicitly addressed in 
primary legislation for the first time and had its own title (Title XXI). Energy 
policy was now one of the Union’s shared competences. Decision-making is 
based on the ordinary legislative procedure (formerly known as co-decision), 
which means that neither the European Parliament nor the Council may adopt 
legislation without the assent of the other, and the Council takes decisions by 
QMV (Article 4). This has two important implications for decision-making. 
Firstly, “QMV essentially means Member States do not exercise veto power” 
(Birchfield 2011: 247), and secondly, as a vast number of policy areas are now 
subjected to the co-decision procedure, energy policy amongst them, “the EP 
has essentially obtained veto power” (ibid.: 250). Before the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force, the EU had no legal competences in formulating energy policy 
and energy issues were addressed through linking energy policy with 
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provisions regarding the internal market (Article 95 EC), competition provisions 
(Articles 81-88 EC) and environmental protection (Article 175 EC) (Vedder 
2010). Although energy legislation was implemented under internal market 
and environmental considerations, with the adoption of an energy chapter in 
the Lisbon Treaty, energy policy became a formal competence. This meant 
that “no longer could initiatives by the Commission be questioned as lacking a 
legal basis” (Duffield & Birchfield 2011: 6). 
 
The Lisbon Treaty set out four overarching goals for the EU’s energy policy. 
Article 194 states that, 
 “[i]n the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning of the internal 
market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote 
energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of 
energy networks” (Lisbon Treaty 2007).  
 
Furthermore, Article 122 stipulates that the Council, based on a proposal by 
the Commission and “in a spirit of solidarity between the Member States” 
(ibid.), might take measures to mitigate repercussions if severe difficulties arise 
in the supply of certain products, especially in the area of energy. This 
provision confirmed the Union’s competence to take preventive measures if 
issues of the security of supply arose and strengthens the Union’s ability to 
react to security threats. Hence, far-reaching measures could be expected in 
the case of a threat to supply security, based on Article 122, and executed in 
a spirit of solidarity (Braun 2011: 2). 
 
Regarding trans-European networks, in order to create an area without internal 
frontiers, Article 170 requires the Union to contribute to the establishment and 
the development of networks in the area of energy, and to promote the 
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interconnection of national networks and the free access to such networks 
(Council of the European Union 2007). Poland insisted on a new energy 
solidarity clause, representing one of its threats to veto a new Treaty mandate. 
However, the reference to energy policy needing to be in accordance with “a 
spirit of solidarity between Member States” was less committal and specific 
than Poland had wanted (Youngs 2009, Talus 2013). 
 
As we can see, the Lisbon Treaty codified a number of significant aspects of 
energy policy. However, Article 194 also “entails prominent legal 
shortcomings” (Braun 2011: 2) and "provides a somewhat double edged sword 
in the sense that it both strengthens the EU’s competence and confirms the 
fact that responsibility for the energy mix is firmly at the national level” (Van 
Hulten & Sitter 2017: 225). This shortcoming is owed to the fact that Article 
194 specifies that a Member State retain its right “to determine the conditions 
for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources 
and the general structure of its energy supply” (Council of the European Union 
2007). Hence, Member States retain their right to conduct their bilateral energy 
relations with third countries as they deem appropriate (Braun 2011.). 
Furthermore, measures in the field of energy taxation are subject to unanimous 
voting in the Council (Council of the European Union 2007), and the 
Parliament’s role in the decision-making process is only advisory in nature 
(Van Hulten & Sitter 2017). The energy title in the Lisbon Treaty can be 
understood as a codification of the distribution of energy policy between EU 
institutions and Member States (ibid.). As Andoura et al. (2010) explain, 
“[t]he final text of the Energy Title is a carefully crafted compromise 
between national sovereignty over natural resources and energy 
taxation on the one hand and shared EU competence for other areas 
on the other” (Andoura et al. 2010).  
 
Despite the shortcomings, the Lisbon Treaty paved the way for secondary 
legal provisions that, without the appropriate legal basis, would have been very 
difficult to realise. Dr Dieter Borchardt, Deputy Director-General of the 
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Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) at the European Commission, 
emphasises the importance of the Lisbon Treaty, stating that,  
“Article 194 is a game changer in the sense that this is our basic legal 
basis for all the legislation, all the measures that we are taking. The 
result of that was the security of supply Regulation 994/2010. Which 
now has been revised. When the gas crisis in 2009 happened, then 
immediately the Commission had to make a proposal in only 6 or 8 
months after the crisis and the directive was there. And it made already 
a difference when we came to 2014, we were also on the edge of a gas 
crisis. 994/2010 needed Article 194 in the Lisbon Treaty because 
otherwise we would not have the legal basis to take these measures” 
(Interview 11, 2018). 
 
As the empirical evidence suggests, high integration in the form of non-
incremental change of primary law can be attested. When comparing the 
Lisbon Treaty to the SEA, the SEA displayed moderate integration, providing 
the institutional means to incrementally alter secondary law concerning the 
internal dimension of energy policy. However, it proved to be incapable of 
effectively addressing the external dimension of energy policy as evident in the 
policy outcome of Directive 2004/67/EC (Roggenkamp et al. 2016) to 
safeguard the security of supply during the first gas crisis of 2006. The Lisbon 
Treaty, on the other hand, provided the Commission with legal tools that went 
beyond addressing the internal market, and equipped it with the means to 
address the external dimension more directly (Braun 2011). Hence, we will 
now turn towards an assessment of secondary legislation that enhanced the 
regulatory regime of external energy policy substantially, before analysing the 
proposals for the Energy Union. 
 
 
6.1.1. Regulation 994/2010 
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Although Member States were aware of the potential risks posed by supply 
disruptions, it took an additional gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine 
as a serious external shock to reach agreement between Member States and 
implement a regulation addressing the security of supply of natural gas. In fact, 
in January 2009 gas flows from Russia to the EU via the Ukraine were once 
again interrupted due to an unresolved commercial dispute between Naftogaz 
(Ukraine) and Gazprom, and outstanding payments from the Ukraine, which 
gradually built up from late 2007 onwards. On 2 January 2009, gas deliveries 
to several Member States were affected, amongst them Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and most significantly Bulgaria and Romania. The situation 
intensified over the following few days, culminating in all gas deliveries to the 
EU being stopped from 6-20 January 2009, engulfing the EU in a grave energy 
crisis (European Commission 2009). The major obstacle to responding to the 
severe situation was a lack of important technical information about gas 
systems and gas flows on a national and EU level. There was simply not 
enough reliable information about gas flows, how much gas was in the system, 
and about demand patterns. The situation was a result of the qualitatively 
different systems that existed across Member States, with unequal access to 
information by different market players, stakeholders, and public authorities. 
As the Third Energy Package was just recently adopted, which included an 
obligation to publish data on gas flows and other technical information, no 
provisions regarding this sort of data had yet been put into practice, 
exacerbating the crisis (ibid.). 
 
As a direct consequence and response to the stark gas crisis, Regulation (EU) 
994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply was 
implemented under the Lisbon Treaty, and entered into force on 2 December 
2010. The content was characterised by shifting more power and competences 
to EU level and was adopted as a regulation instead of a directive (like its 
predecessor). The role of the Commission was enhanced, the level of detail 
increased (especially when comparing it to Directive 2004/67/EC) and the 
coordination of various issues at regional and EU level was enhanced (Talus 
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2013). The fact that a regulation is legally binding at the date of its adoption 
and has to be applied in the same way across the EU, whereas a directive is 
a legal act that sets out goals to be achieved with leeway for Member States 
to decide how to achieve them, suggests that the EU needed to create a level 
playing field across Member states, removing all potential ambiguities. 
 
As a recurrent motive in much of the new legislation adopted after the Lisbon 
Treaty, Regulation 994/2010 “buil[t] heavily on the solidarity approach” (Talus 
2013: 805); it “formalize[d] the response mechanisms at state, regional, and 
EU level, all in the spirit of solidarity” (ibid.) Moreover, the institution had 
increased its capacities to react to exogenous factors: the Lisbon Treaty, which 
will be discussed at a later point, incorporated an article on energy policy 
(Article 194), entailing the provision to ensure the security of supply. As the 
empirical data suggests, in order to have the capacity to effectively react to 
exogenous events addressing the external dimension, primary law must 
address the policy area under concern and QMV must be the voting rule. 
Together with the two crises as exogenous factors, the institution now had the 
formal capacity to amend its trajectory more effectively. 
 
The regulation sets out clear procedures and objectives to be met in order to 
enhance the security of gas supply and to strengthen the regulatory framework 
of the institution. The regulation established Preventive Action Plans (PAPs) 
and Emergency Plans (EPs) on both national and Community level, based on 
risk assessments, which were conceived to remove or mitigate identified risks 
(PAPs), and, in case of a supply disruption, the impact of such an incident 
(EPs). The risk assessments should be carried out by ‘Competent Authorities’, 
who were national governmental authorities or national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs), designated by each Member State by no later than 3 December 2011, 
and who should ensure the overall implementation of the measures defined in 
the regulation. The Commission should carry out continuous monitoring of the 
security of supply measures implemented by Member States, through 
Directive 2009/73/EC (concerning the internal gas market), and based on the 
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information provided by the risk assessments, the PAPs and EPs (EP/Council 
2010). In addition, at the request of a Competent Authority, the Commission 
may declare a Union Emergency or a regional emergency for a specifically 
affected geographical region. 
  
The regulation also reinforced the role of the Gas Coordination Group (GCG), 
consisting of representatives of Member States and their respective 
Competent Authorities, ACER, ENTSO-G (established by the Third Energy 
Package) and representative bodies of the industry. Compared with the first 
directive on security of gas supply, the remit of the GCG was increased to a 
large extent. For instance, GCG should be consulted by the Commission as 
the main body in regard to the establishment of the PAPs and EPs. For cross-
border interconnections between Member States, transmission system 
operators (TSOs) should submit a proposal for bi-directional capacity 
concerning the reverse direction (reverse flow capacity) to their Member States 
or Competent Authorities. This means that gas could be transported in both 
directions, which would help shippers to swiftly re-route gas deliveries within 
the internal market if a supply disruption occurred. However, TSOs were also 
granted the power to request an exemption from the obligation to enable 
reverse flow capacities if: a) the reverse flow capacity would not significantly 
enhance the security of supply of any Member State, or b) the investment costs 
would offset the prospective benefits in terms of the security of supply.  
 
In terms of infrastructure security requirements, Member States or the 
competent authority, had to ensure that the necessary measures were taken, 
so that by 3 December 2014 (at the latest), in the event of a disruption of the 
single largest gas infrastructure, the remaining infrastructure (determined by 
the so-called n – 1 formula) was able to satisfy total gas demand of the 
calculated area during a day of exceptionally high gas demand (occurring with 
a statistical probability of once in 20 years). In addition, the regulation initiated 
an information exchange mechanism during a possible emergency 
(concerning the daily gas demand and forecast, and cross-border gas flows). 
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It also required Member States communicate existing intergovernmental 
agreements with third countries that had an impact on gas infrastructure and 
supplies (Council/EP 2010).  
 
As Boersma (2015) contends, the overall impact of the regulation was 
moderate rather than a full success in terms of creating a coherent external 
energy policy. A unified understanding across Member States regarding a 
common standard of energy security did not exist. Perceptions of energy 
security differed between Member States, and so did the levels of their import 
dependence. As the HI framework would suggest, integration never happens 
in sudden bursts (unless in the event of a critical juncture), but institutions 
change incrementally. The empirical evidence would corroborate such 
assertions. The effectiveness of the policy output, the policy outcome of 
2004/67/EC, was very low compared to the intended goals, but Regulation 
994/2010 already improved the regulatory environment to a higher degree. 
The regulation starkly contributed to increased transparency and the overall 
level of information shared between the different actors (Boersma 2015). The 
Ukrainian crisis of 2014, and the geopolitical unrest caused due to the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, induced the Commission to conduct a 
stress test in anticipation of a possible supply disruption. In general, Member 
States were much better prepared to face a supply crisis due to the Preventive 
Action and Emergency Plans, and the requirement to meet a supply and 
infrastructure standard (European Commission 2016p). Indeed, shortcomings 
still existed, and the Commission addressed these in a new proposal for a 
regulation concerning the security of gas supply within the Energy Union 
package. However, we will discuss these measures in more detail later in the 
chapter. 
 
Compared to the first directive concerning measures to safeguard security of 
gas supply, Regulation 994/2010 was an important step in terms of improving 
the institutional framework of the EU. Not only did the regulation provide 
preventive action and contingency plans, and strengthened the role of 
 228 
institutional bodies, it also increased the EU’s ability to speak with one voice 
in the case of a supply disruption. The regulation directly addressed the 
external dimension of energy policy, reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, as 
opposed to the liberalisation packages, which aimed at tackling external issues 
via internal market instruments provided for by the SEM programme. Hence, 
the institutional design was strengthened insofar as the policy framework was 
widened – it added new components to the regulatory framework; but  it was 
also deepened - the regulation constituted a considerable step-up from the 
previous directive of 2004, which proved incapable of regulating the EU’s 
response to the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. It also further entrenched actors 
into the structural makeup of the institution and embedded them more deeply 
into the institutional framework. The regulation set out precise operational and 
technical rules that actors had to adhere to and which had to be implemented 
evenly across the different Member States. This in turn instigated positive 
feedback processes: constant monitoring, the acquisition of information (and 
exchange between the actors), technical and infrastructural requirements (that 
needed considerable investment), and adaptive expectations (due to the 
manifold resources that were invested by the actors). The feedback, in turn, 
further bound actors to each other and the institution. 
 
When assessing the process of integration between Directive 2004/67/EC and 
Regulation 994/2010, both addressing the external dimension of energy policy, 
an increase of effectiveness of the policy output can be identified. The level of 
integration is measured and defined as the difference between different levels 
of policy outcome (effectiveness of the policy output) at different points in time. 
Whereas Directive 2004/67/EC was not able to govern the sector in the event 
of an energy crises, Regulation 994/2010 improved the institutional capacity 
(European Commission 2016p). What changed in terms of the prerequisites 
that made it possible to increase the scope and depth of Regulation 994/2010 
compared to Directive 2004/67/EC? As previously stated, according to 
Borchardt, Regulation 994/2010 needed Article 194 in the Lisbon Treaty, which 
addressed energy policy for the first time in primary law, and provided the legal 
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basis to propose new provisions (Interview 11, 2018). This supports the 
premise that, in order to have the capacity to react to specific developments in 
a sector – in this case to efficaciously react to exogenous factors in form of 
supply crises - the specific aspect of the sector must be addressed in primary 
law, to create preconditions that make institutional change possible. 
 
In the case of Directive 2004/67/EC such assumptions did not materialise. 
Under the shadow of a veto due to Article 100’s requirement of a unanimous 
vote, which laid the legal foundation for the directive, the Energy Council 
drained the Commission’s proposal of any substance, by omitting all the 
provisions that were meant to create a Community framework. In fact, the 
Council changed the draft directive of the Commission from guaranteeing a 
strong regulation to enhance supply security of its internal gas market, to 
merely providing an adequate level of supply to the energy market. It removed 
all provisions on the harmonisation of national legislation and left it to Member 
States to choose the instruments they deemed appropriate to ensure supply 
security (Agence Europe 2003a). Via the stratagem to not directly address the 
internal market in the amended proposal, the Council was able to change the 
voting system based on Article 95 - co-decision and majority of votes in the 
Council - to Article 100, which meant that the Council decided alone by a 
majority of votes (Agence Europe 2003b). For the Council, the absence of 
provisions on the internal market in the proposal justified the change of the 
legal basis, which in turn resulted in a change of the decision procedure, with 
the EP being excluded (Agence Europe 2004b). 
 
The strategy of the Council to disregard the internal market in a provision that 
addressed the external dimension of energy policy resulted in an ineffective 
directive that came down to the lowest common denominator of the Member 
States. As the evidence demonstrates, the directive was not equipped to 
successfully react to, and alleviate, the serious social and economic 
consequences of the 2006 and 2009 crises. As primary law did not provide 
any provisions addressing the external dimension of energy policy, Member 
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States were not constrained through, and steered by, the institutional 
regulatory framework in terms of their policy choices. 
 
The behaviour of the Member States can be interpreted as an effective 
strategy to exclude the external dimension of energy policy from being 
incorporated into the institutional framework in the mid 2000s. However, this 
was no longer  possible once the Lisbon Treaty was implemented, as Article 
194 states that “Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to […] ensure security of energy supply in the Union”. 
Article 194 also refers back to the internal market (and environmental policy). 
However, it clearly addresses the external dimension as the “Lisbon Treaty 
reinforces a formal European energy security mandate. […] DG Energy now 
leads on the external dimensions of energy policy” (Youngs 2011: 46). As 
Borchardt confirmed, without the energy article in the Lisbon Treaty, it would 
have been very difficult to implement Regulation 994/2010 in the form in which 
it was eventually realised (Interview 11, 2018).  
 
A brief counterfactual analysis can be undertaken based on the hypothetical 
situation whereby an energy title was already introduced into treaty law prior 
to the negotiations leading to Directive 2004/67/EC. Under such premises, 
diluting the proposal might not have been accomplished that easily, as the 
institutional framework - in the form of treaty law - would have constrained the 
possible policy options for actors (to dismiss the proposal), and obliged them 
to adhere to institutional rules. Moreover, under the Lisbon Treaty, the 
decision-making procedure could not have been altered as was the case for 
Directive 2004/67/EC; energy policy became a shared competence between 
the EU and the Member States, co-decision became the voting procedure and 
decisions are now made by Qualified Majority Voting in the Council. As a result 
of these structural amendments, the Commission’s policy initiatives could no 




6.1.2. Decision 994/2012  
 
As the internal market did not deliver optimal instruments in regard to 
governing external affairs and providing effective means to respond to energy 
crises, such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes, the European Union 
chose to address the external dimension of energy policy more directly. The 
policy discourse in the EU shifted from a purely market-based approach 
towards a more security centred approach regarding the energy supply 
situation, external energy policy, and the role of the EU in the International 
Political Economy of energy (Boersma & Goldthau 2017). The Lisbon Treaty 
offered new opportunities regarding external representation to advance 
cooperation and dialogue with third countries and regions. It delivered the legal 
basis for aspirations to go beyond purely internal market provisions towards 
presenting a political face to the external dimension (Braun 2011). Regulation 
994/2010 was the first step in this direction, delivering improvements regarding 
the security of supply. As discussed in this chapter, one of the constituent parts 
of the Regulation was the obligation of Member States to inform the 
Commission about existing and future Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) 
between Member States and third countries by 3 December 2011(Council / EP 
2010b). However, a shortcoming of the provision was owed to the omission of 
any exchange of information between Member States. Hence, the issue of a 
lack of information and transparency on IGAs was not solved by the regulation 
(Batzella 2018).  
 
In order to address the consistency and coherence of the EU’s external 
relations in energy more effectively, in February 2011, the European Council 
invited the Commission to submit a communication on security of supply and 
international relations by June 2011. Embedded within these wider objectives, 
the European Council also invited the Member States to inform the 
Commission about all their existing and new bilateral agreements with third 
countries from 1 January 2012 onwards. The Commission should 
subsequently make this information available to all the other Member States, 
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however, it should protect commercially sensitive information (European 
Council 2011). The Commission took on the task and, based on a public 
consultation, published a proposal for a decision setting up an information 
exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between 
Member States and third countries in the field of energy. Congruent with the 
theoretical framework, the European Council invited the Commission to 
propose a new set of intended goals. As outlined, exogenous factors, such as 
the gas crises, impacted the institution and played an important role for the 
formulation of these goals. Moreover, the institution strived to enhance 
information exchange among different actors to improve the efficiency of 
institutional settings. 
 
The proposal suggested that only clear obligations regarding the information 
exchange mechanism would improve the transparency required for 
coordination at EU level. Voluntary measure did not prove to be effective in 
guaranteeing the type of exchange of information necessary to ensure 
contractual obligations between Member States and third countries are lawful. 
Member States should, therefore, submit all existing and provisionally agreed 
IGAs to the Commission, at the latest three months after the decision entered 
into force. The Commission should then make the documents accessible to all 
other Member States, excluding confidential commercial information, per 
request by the concerned Member State (which did not apply to the 
Commission, who should have access to all information). Not only might the 
Commission, on request by the Member State, assist the Member State during 
negotiations - about which the Commission should already be notified - but 
also have the right to participate as an observer in the negotiations and be 
informed regularly about the ongoing negotiations (European Commission 
2011). The rationale for information exchange during the course of the 
negotiations was based on the fact that once IGAs were concluded and 
ratified, they were very hard to alter and would need to be re-negotiated with 
the third country. Many of the IGAs were long term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts 
with third countries: to buy a predefined quantity of gas, or to pay a specific 
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amount if the gas was not consumed to compensate for the loss. Moreover, if 
Member States had surpluses of gas, these could not be resold. Under these 
circumstances, the supplier always has a hold over the buyer, and some of the 
IGAs can be seen as far-reaching adhesion contracts. Therefore, the EU 
stepped in to alter this situation. The IGA decision itself was reasoned through 
the Third Energy Package and the functioning of the market (Interview 1, 
2018). Most importantly, and this was a very controversial point during the 
legislative procedure, the Commission proposed an ex-ante assessment of 
agreements before they were concluded. This meant that after the closure of 
the negotiations, and before the IGA was signed, the Commission, on its own 
initiative, would have to assess the compatibility of the negotiated agreement 
with Union law (ibid.). 
 
Overall, the Commission proposal was very ambitious and an important step 
from Regulation 994/2010 in terms of the advocated provisions. It is thus no 
surprise that the proposal encountered strong opposition in the Council 
(Euractiv 2012). Krišjānis Kariņš, who was the rapporteur on the proposal in 
the European Parliament, stated that most of the countries did not like the 
proposal and, thus, it was diluted to secure a majority of support in the Council 
(ibid.). Of the EU’s six largest countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain 
and Poland), three were major importers of Russian gas – Germany, France, 
and Poland - and Germany and Italy had privileged relations with Gazprom. 
As a matter of fact, the only big Member State that supported the proposal by 
the Commission was Poland, as they wanted to create a level playing field for 
all market-participants (Interview 8, 2018).  
 
Poland sought to increase its influence in the EU, solve energy security issues 
together with other Member States, with the aim of diminishing energy 
dependence on Russia; Poland retained a rather cautious stance towards 
Moscow (Badgonas 2011). However, Poland was only supported by smaller 
Member States, Lithuania and Latvia amongst them. Italy, France, Germany, 
Belgium, and the UK were opposed to the original proposal by the Commission 
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(Batzella 2017). In the words of Giles Chichester, British MEP and 
Conservative spokesman on energy in the European Parliament, “[o]ur energy 
arrangements are member states' own business, not the commission's. This 
is an attempt to control and interfere with our individual trading interests on a 
new and deeply worrying scale” (Giles as cited in Vasconcelos 2011). In the 
end, the decision was considerably diluted, as Member States took a hard line 
during the negotiations. According to German MEP Bernd Lange (2012), 
“[he had] never witnessed anything like this before, namely that the 
Council has taken a heavy-handed position, seeking to blackmail 
Parliament by saying: take it or leave it. I have never known the 
Council’s chief negotiator to get up and leave a trialogue before” (Lange 
as cited in European Parliament 2012). 
 
Considerable amendments were made to the final decision. For instance, the 
obligation to inform the Commission before or during negotiations on an 
intergovernmental agreement with a third country, was omitted and replaced 
by a voluntary option to notify the Commission (Art. 3-3). Member States, who 
had to submit all existing IGAs to the Commission by 17 February 2013 (Art. 
3-1), also had the freedom to indicate whether any part of the information was 
confidential and whether it could be shared with all other Member States or not 
(Art. 4-1). Access to information should not be restricted for the Commission 
(Art. 4-2). Member States could also request the assistance of the Commission 
in negotiations if considered beneficial (Art. 5). In the case that a Member State 
had indicated that information may be shared, the Commission should make 
the information accessible to all Member States in a secure electronic form, 
with the exception of any confidential parts (Art. 3-3). When a Member State, 
under Article 4-1, notified the Commission that information should not be 
shared, a summary should be provided to the other Member States (Art. 3-7).  
 
Most importantly, the ex-ante mechanism was discarded in its entirety, unless 
a Member State explicitly asked for an assessment during negotiations (Article 
6); If a Member State was unable to reach a firm conclusion on whether an 
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IGA was compatible with Union law or not, it could ask for an appraisal by the 
Commission. Instead, an ex-post mechanism was implemented in Decision 
994/2012, which implemented the requirement that, by 1 January 2016, a 
report on the application of Decision 994/2012 should be published on whether 
the decision promoted compliance of IGAs with Union law and whether it had 
an impact on Member States’ negotiations with third countries (Art. 8-1&2). 
The decision faced stark opposition from Member States who were unwilling 
to endow the institution with the competence to influence negotiations with 
third countries. This behaviour can be explained by rational choice decision-
making / the calculus approach in which Member States protected their 
interests. Nevertheless, although Member States were reluctant to concede 
considerable powers to the institution, they had to address the policy area, as 
they were obligated by primary legislation to do so. As we will see, this in turn 
triggered unintended consequences later in the sequence, as the decision was 
revised in 2017 with considerably stronger provisions. 
 
Powerful Member States with beneficial relations with third countries did not 
want to renounce their advantageous positions in terms of future contractual 
arrangements, in favour of a wider European approach, where all Member 
States enjoy a level playing field regarding gas contracts. From a utilitarian 
standpoint, which is endorsed by rational choice theory, this can be explained 
as individual actors strive to get the most out of their economic decisions. The 
Member States with favourable economic ties with producer countries did not 
want to have their agreements scrutinised ex-ante by the Commission, 
because this might have had consequences due to possible incompatibility 
with Union law. In a nutshell, ex-ante disclosure and assessment of information 
before and during the negotiations for IGAs might result in some Member 
States having to adhere to Union law in a stricter manner than in the case of 
an ex-post assessment. The ex-ante assessment might have an effect on the 
preferential treatment that some Member States enjoy vis a vis lower prices 
and better contractual conditions. This in turn might decrease their expected 
return on investment, and diminish their revenues over a considerable amount 
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of time, since IGAs are long-term bilateral contracts. However, once IGAs 
between Member States and third countries are concluded, they are subject 
to international trade law and are therefore very hard to amend. 
 
As we will see in the upcoming section, Decision 994/2012 was reviewed 
within the policy package of the Energy Union. The revision of Decision 
994/2012 granted Brussels a much tighter oversight over IGAs. Most 
importantly, the reviewed decision introduced a compulsory ex-ante 
compliance check with Union law, before an IGA is signed. Therefore, 
incremental institutional change and path dependent processes entrenched 
actors further in the institutional makeup, the longer they proceeded on this 
institutional path. Early decisions influenced the possible range of policy 
choices of later decisions and lead to unintended consequences. Later 
provisions entailed features that were not anticipated, or were rejected at an 
earlier stage, and therefore inadvertent policy outputs arose for different actors 
(dependent on their preferences). For instance, the decision to address the 
exchange of information in a dedicated article in Decision 994/2010 
subsequently led to the implementation of an independent decision concerning 
the information exchange on IGAs. Although Member States were initially 
willing to support such undertakings, in the end, and with a few exceptions, 
Member States displayed stark reluctance to support the ambitious proposal 
by the Commission. However, the decision set the institution on a particular 
path that entrenched Member States and restricted their policy choices. Five 
years after the implementation of the original decision, the legislative act was 
revised, and they agreed on conditions they would not have approved when 
the first decision on IGAs was negotiated. This evidence suggests, that path 
dependence is a considerably strong factor in the institutional matrix. Path 
dependent processes increasingly bind actors to the institution over time, and 
based on these processes, the institution delivers a policy output, which actors 
might not have agreed to in the past. 
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In terms of the level of integration, based on measuring the difference of the 
policy outcome over a period of time, the new decision showed moderate 
integration; the policy output was not particularly effective in terms of the 
intended goals. The problem was that around one third of the notified IGAs did 
not comply with EU law with regards to questions of the Third Energy Package, 
and competition law, and no Member State was able to terminate or 
renegotiate the non-compliant IGAs under scrutiny (European Commission 
2016 d). As explained in the methodology section, the policy outcome is 
understood as the degree to which the policy output proves to be effective in 
attaining a set of predefined goals. In this regard, the policy outcome of 
Decision 994/2012 showed a moderate level of effectiveness. Compared with 
the situation in the mid 2000s, where virtually no exchange of information on 
IGAs occurred, the regulatory framework can be understood as developing 
from a low level of effectiveness to a moderate level of effectiveness. Thus, a 
process of moderate integration can be identified from the mid 2000s to 2012. 
 
 
6.2. The Energy Union 
 
If we want to take account of the driving factors and the rationale behind the 
proposal for the Energy Union, certain explanations come into play, among 
them, the need to eventually complete the internal market, the argument to 
decarbonise the economy and enhance energy efficiency. These goals were 
based on former policy instruments that should be strengthened through the 
project of the Energy Union. Path dependent processes led to further 
development of these provisions. However, the most compelling impetus for 
the initial proposal to create an Energy Union, and for institutional change, can 
be identified as an exogenous threat. Geopolitical instability in the Ukraine, 
inflamed through the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, raised 
concerns of supply security once again and the EU’s stark dependence on 
imports of gas from Russia. In 2014, the EU imported 53% of its energy, worth 
around 400 billion Euros (more than € 1 billion a day), making it the largest 
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energy importer in the world (European Commission 2015a). As for the gross 
inland energy consumption, petroleum products accounted for the biggest 
share (34,4%), followed by gas (22%), solid fossil fuels (16,1%), nuclear heat 
(13,6%) and renewables, which account for 13% (Eurostat 2017b). Energy 
imports accounted for more than a fifth of total EU imports. Energy import 
dependency related to oil (almost 90%), natural gas (66%), solid fuels (42%) 
and nuclear fuel (40%) (European Commission 2014a).  
 
Starkly contributing to the ambitions to form a European Energy Union, and as 
shown in Table 8 below, Member States like Estonia, Bulgaria, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia imported 100% of their gas requirements from Russia 
and three of them used natural gas for more than a quarter of their total energy 
needs. Other Member States, like the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Greece, 
Poland, Hungary, and Austria, also imported more than 50% to various 
degrees (Commission 2014a). Total Russian gas imports declined from 34.6% 
in 2005 to 26.8% in 2010. However, in 2013 they peaked again at 32.4% and 
were just below 29.7% in 2014 (Eurostat 2017a) when the Crimea crisis took 
place. Thus, the ‘gas leverage’ that Russia holds over the EU is quite 
considerable and creating the possibility that Russia might exploit this 
dependence to pursue its own geopolitical ends. Negative effects might not 
only be triggered by possible disruption to supply, due to geopolitical instability 
in transit countries, but the dependence on one supplier might cause market 
distortions and weaken the EU’s ability to react to geopolitical events, exposing 
the EU’s policy making to ascendancies from outside of the EU (Austvik 2016).  
The developments in the Ukraine were a stark reminder of the vulnerability of 
the EU regarding energy security and the stable supply of gas. As far as energy 
efficiency in relation to supply security is concerned, the Commission 
estimated that every additional 1% increase in energy savings would cut gas 
imports by 2.6% (European Commission 2014b). 
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Table 8 Dependency on natural gas supplies from Russia 
 
Source: European Commission 2014a 
 
Certain other driving factors for the proposal for the Energy Union should be 
mentioned at this point, as they complete the picture of why the need for an 
Energy Union emerged. Firstly, electricity retail prices for end consumers were 
high. Although wholesale electricity prices in the EU are quite low, they are still 
30% higher than in the US, and post-tax electricity prices for households 
increased by over 4% from 2012 to 2013 alone (European Commission 
2015a), highlighting the dysfunction of the energy markets. Secondly, many 
new or recent gas-fired power plants were mothballed as priority was given to 
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Renewable Energy Sources (RES) regarding grid access and support 
schemes paid for by the end consumer (Vinois 2016). Thirdly, the price of gas 
was too high, together with low carbon prices, provoking the re-emergence of 
coal. Finally, national policies, based on security concerns and consumer 
protection, became more numerous and, thus, infringed on the common 
objectives of an internal market (ibid.). 
 
 
6.2.1. First steps towards the Energy Union – the proposal  
 
As mentioned previously, substantial impetus to create an Energy Union was 
instigated through geopolitical unrest in the Ukraine, fuelling energy security 
concerns. Based on the insights acquired by empirical evidence in the former 
chapters, this thesis suggests that exogenous events can only have an impact 
on the institution if the institution has the capacity (enshrined in primary law) 
to react to such events. Lisbon codified the obligation to secure the supply of 
energy and the functioning of the energy market. Against this backdrop, in April 
2014, Donald Tusk, then Prime Minister of Poland, proposed an Energy Union, 
which in essence should resemble the European Banking Union or the EU’s 
atomic energy union, Euratom. At the heart of this union, and based on 
solidarity and common economic interests, Tusk suggested the creation of a 
single European body in charge of buying gas from third country suppliers. The 
Commission should take part in and supervise all new negotiations. Solidarity 
between Member States should be strengthened, the EU’s energy 
infrastructure should be enhanced (as some Member States were dependent 
on a single supplier), and the use of fossil fuels should sustainable, including 
coal and shale gas. In addition, Tusk suggested engaging with new partners 
and emerging suppliers, harnessing LNG technology to transform the situation 
on the European energy market, and to strengthen and extend the Energy 
Community eastwards, to boost security not only for the EU but also for Europe 
as a whole (Tusk 2014). Tusk’s proposal was based on security concerns and 
the implications these have on energy markets and political stability in Member 
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States, urging Member States to transfer considerable decision-making 
powers to supranational institutions. Although the single buyer idea found little 
favour among Member States, decision makers perceived the need to address 
energy policy more coherently as “wider developments acted as a catalyst for 
renewed thinking about the EU’s role in energy” (Buchan & Keay 2015: 2).  
 
As Austvik (2016) points out, the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) welcomed Tusk’s proposal for the Energy Union (and its inherent call 
for more interventionist measures), since for CEECs, issues of supply security, 
solidarity between the Member States, and concerns regarding the Russian 
gas imports are paramount. From an HI standpoint, the formation of these 
Member States' preferences can be explained as being endogenously given, 
and displaying a strong normative component, highlighted by the reference to 
solidarity. As laid out in the first chapter, institutions are, apart from arbiter 
between actors’ different interests, carriers of ideas about how actors perceive 
the world, providing a link between institutional and cognitive factors (Fioretos 
et al. 2016). On the other hand, Western European countries framed the issue 
differently, based on exogenously given preferences, with an emphasis on 
“markets and institutions” (ibid.: 380), and with the primary goal of completing 
the single market, creating a low carbon economy and ensuring environmental 
sustainability. The heterogeneous preferences among Member States is 
based on the fact that Western European energy markets are more developed, 
thus, they face less security of supply issues. Moreover, their relations with 
Russia are more distant, geographically speaking, than Member States who 
were part of the former Soviet Bloc (ibid.). Creating a common policy for energy 
poses certain difficulties due to the divergent preferences of Member States, 
based on the size of their economies, import independence, size of their major 
energy companies, and strategic relationships with suppliers. Members States 
are firstly concerned with their national supply security – associated with 
political stability - before they are willing to turn their attention to other energy 
policy strategies, such as environmental issues or the proper functioning of the 
internal energy market (Pointvogl 2009).   
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Tusk’s proposal framed the approach to energy policy away from the focus on 
the single market and towards bolstering energy security with the help of 
domestic fossil fuels. In his initial proposal, security concerns were 
emphasised over environmental issues as “we need to fight for a cleaner 
planet but we must have safe access to energy resources and jobs to finance 
it” (Tusk 2014). Perceptions of Member States showed considerable variation 
as, for instance, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic addressed the 
Energy Union in a non-paper calling for less supranational powers in energy 
policy. Germany on the other hand, in another non-paper, stressed the need 
to collaborate closely in the fields of energy efficiency and climate change 
(Zachmann 2015).  
 
In the end, Tusks original propositions to completely shift energy issues 
towards the domain of energy security did not materialise, as the final proposal 
stressed the need to “move away from an economy driven by fossil fuels” 
(European Commission 2015a: 2). Moreover, the option to collectively 
purchase gas during a crisis, and where Member States are dependent on a 
single supplier, was amended to be a voluntary option (and in line with 
prevailing legal provisions laid out by the WTO and EU competition rules) 
(ibid.). The option for joint purchasing is now framed as a regional option for 
those Member States that fear being blackmailed by Gazprom. Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Western European countries in general were sceptical 
about the joint gas purchasing facility (Oroschakoff 2015), as this would mark 
“a break with EU’s fundamental liberal idea of an internal market with 
competition, and free movements of goods and services as a premise” (Austvik 
2016: 379).  
 
The energy industry was divided over the issue, as some West European 
energy companies had solid long-term contracts with Gazprom and, therefore, 
wanted as little involvement of the Commission as possible. Nevertheless, the 
proposal was broadly welcomed by the industry as the diversification of supply 
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creates business opportunities in the Mediterranean neighbourhood (as 
stressed by the CEO of Italy’s energy company Claudio Descalzi), and some 
CEECs companies also welcomed the prospect of enhanced bargaining power 
of the Commission (Oroschakoff 2015). Some agendas were re-framed whilst 
others can be found within the final proposal of the Commission. Tusk’s bold 
call for the Energy Union did managed to draw attention to the EU’s stark 
dependence on Russian gas and, as a consequence, the need for 
diversification of energy suppliers and the strengthening of security measures. 
 
On 25 February 2015, the Commission proposed the Energy Union, based on 
three Communications forming the “Energy Union Package”: “A framework 
strategy for a resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change 
policy” (European Commission 2015a), “Achieving the 10% electricity 
interconnection target: making Europe's electricity grid fit for 2020” (European 
Commission 2015b), and “The Paris Protocol – A blueprint for tackling global 
climate change beyond 2020” (European Commission 2015c). In a nutshell, 
the Energy Union is based on three main objectives that have surrounded the 
EU’s energy policy in recent decades. Firstly, the Energy Union should 
address issues regarding the security of supply, to ensure the reliable 
provision of energy to every part of the EU, whenever it is needed. Secondly, 
to create a competitive environment for energy providers to ensure affordable 
prices for households, businesses and industry. Thirdly, to tackle issues of 
sustainability, which translates into lowering greenhouse gas emissions, 
pollution, and fossil fuel dependence (European Commission 2017a). In order 
to reach these goals, five mutually supportive and closely interrelated 
dimensions are addressed in the proposal. As we will see, all the dimensions 
of the proposal are recurring themes of the EU’s energy domain, however, for 
the first time they have been embraced by one single proposal. Based on the 




(1) Energy security, solidarity and trust to be facilitated through the 
diversification of supply (energy sources, suppliers and routes); close 
collaboration between Member States, transmission system operators (TSOs), 
the energy industry and related stakeholders to facilitate a high level of energy 
security for citizens and companies and to improve the EU’s economic weight 
on global energy markets; more transparency on Intergovernmental 
Agreements (IGAs) related to the buying of energy from third countries. (2) A 
fully integrated European energy market to be created through an 
improvement of electricity and gas transmission systems, especially with 
regards to cross-border connections; a strict enforcement of existing energy 
legislation, especially the full implementation of the Third Energy Package with 
regards to the unbundling and independence of regulators; enhanced regional 
cooperation; a wider choice of suppliers for consumers to choose from; and to 
diminish energy poverty. (3) Increasing energy efficiency contributing to 
moderation of energy demand to reach 27% of improving energy efficiency in 
2030 (when compared to the projected use of energy in 2030). This goal 
should be attained through focusing on energy efficiency in the building sector; 
and an energy-efficient transport sector as this sector represents 30% of final 
energy consumption in Europe. (4) Decarbonising of the economy by 40% 
domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 and by 
utilising the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS); and becoming the world 
leader in renewable energy with a share of 27% of renewable energy 
consumed in the EU in 2030. (5) Finally, a focus on Research, Innovation and 
Competitiveness will help to bring about the next generation of renewable 
technologies and storage solutions. Moreover, harnessing and further 
improving smart grid and smart home technology, clean fossil fuel and clean 
transport, and the world’s safest nuclear generation will facilitate economic 
growth, jobs and competitiveness. A better coordinated and aligned research 
strategy of the Member States and the EU will help to achieve common goals 
and deliverables more effectively (European Commission 2015a). 
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The proposal for the Energy Union suggests a holistic approach towards 
energy policy and embraces several interrelated dimensions, facilitating close 
collaboration of Member States and information sharing to improve energy 
security and trade, empowering consumers to take full advantage of the 
internal market, addressing fuel poverty and the social dimension of energy, 
improving measures to enhance environmental sustainability, and taking 
advantage of technological innovations and smart technology in the energy 
sector. The institution based the project around energy security, markets and 
trade, and, at the same time, strengthened ideational components like 
environmental sustainability, solidarity and collaboration, and social concerns. 
The proposal built on preceding steps and policy instruments. In the words of 
Dr Florian Ermacora, Head of the Internal Energy Market Unit in DG Energy,  
“[we were] not founding something genuinely entirely new compared to 
what [we had] before, but we re-evaluated policies and labelled it 
Energy Union” (Interview 4, 2018).  
 
These claims were also substantiated by Prime Minister of Latvia, Arturs 
Krišjānis Kariņš, who was part of the Committee on Industry, Research and 
Energy (ITRE) in the European Parliament.  
“I think what has been going on for a good number of years is based on 
infrastructural development - cross border connections strengthening 
the connection of different regions – and the regulatory environment: 
starting with the Third Energy Package, where the big state monopolies 
were dismantled and competition was introduced. The way I see it is 
that the proposals for the Energy Union are just a continuation of these 
measures […] And the ultimate goal is to open up the markets even 
more” (Interview 2, 2018). 
 
In order to achieve these goals, the Commission proposed a coherent plan for 
an integrated governance and monitoring process, as part of the policy cycle 
discussed in Chapter II, in order to ensure that actions taken at European, 
regional, national and local level all contribute to the Energy Union’s 
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objectives. Moreover, annual reports on the state of the Energy Union to the 
European Parliament and the Council should address key issues and foster 
dialogue between the different institutions and stakeholders (ibid.).  
 
 
6.2.2. The Summer Package 
 
In July 2015, the Commission presented the so-called energy ‘summer 
package’, which was the first set of proposals to launch the redesign of the 
European electricity market, to revise the EU ETS system, to update energy 
efficiency labelling and to deliver a new deal for energy customers. The 
revision of the ETS scheme was justified through the 2030 Climate and Energy 
Policy Framework (European Parliament 2015), and endorsed in the 
conclusions of the European Council in October (European Council 2014). The 
European Council promoted a binding EU target of at least 40% reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 (which in practise 
meant a 43% reduction of GHG emissions in sectors covered by the ETS). The 
key tool for achieving this was a reformed and well-functioning ETS scheme. 
Thus, the annual factor to reduce the cap on the allowed permissions should 
be changed from 1.74% to 2.2% from 2021 onwards (European Council 2014), 
to increase the carbon price and encourage investment in renewable or low-
carbon energy sources. In addition, under the summer package umbrella, 
energy labelling was revised, in order to make it easier for consumers to take 
well-informed purchasing decisions (European Commission 2015e). 
Regarding the demand side, energy consumers should become better 
informed through transparent billing rules, price comparisons and enhanced 
bargaining power to take full advantage of the internal market. Lastly, a re-
design of the energy market would improve cross-border connection, 
encourage greater investment in energy infrastructure, promote and integrate 
RES, harmonise retail and wholesale prices, improve the EU’s regulatory 
framework and ensure supply security (European Parliament 2015). As an 
interviewee contended, 
 247 
“Energy infrastructure is an essential part of the functioning of the 
internal market. However, in some cases it seems that powerful 
lobbying groups of some Member States try to hamper the development 
of infrastructure in order to protect their own share in domestic markets” 
(Interview 2, 2018). 
 
The proposals were an “important step towards implementing the Energy 
Union strategy with a forward looking climate change policy” (European 
Commission 2015d: 1) and gave “prominence to the ‘energy efficiency first’ 
principle and put households and business consumers at the heart of the 
European energy market” (ibid.). Here, we can see normative factors playing 
a key role in the development of the policy. The term ‘Efficiency First’ denotes 
the fundamental principle around which the European energy system should 
be designed, underpinning the entirety of the Energy Union project. Energy 
efficiency should be treated as an energy source in its own right, measured 
through the value of energy it saves (European Commission 2015a). Efficiency 
First is understood as a policy measure, 
“[to consider] the potential value of investing in efficiency (including 
energy savings and demand response) in all decisions about energy 
system development – be that in homes, offices, industry or mobility. 
Where efficiency improvements are shown to be most cost-effective or 
valuable, taking full account of their co-benefits, they should be 
prioritised over any investment in new power generation, grids or 
pipelines, and fuel supplies” (European Climate Foundation n.d.: 2). 
The Commission emphasised energy efficiency as a central principle of the 
Energy Union, as it is an effective way to cut greenhouse gas emissions, helps 
all customers to save money, and enhances the EU’s supply security due to 
decreased imports (European Commission 2015d). 
 
 
6.2.3. The State of the Energy Union I 
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The proposal for the Energy Union sets requirements to closely monitor energy 
related actions at European, regional, national and local level and to annually 
inform the Parliament and the Council on the state of the Energy Union, in 
order to define key issues and foster a policy debate (European Commission 
2015a). Based on the theoretical framework, monitoring mechanisms are 
important to help readjust the way how the policy output (albeit here 
understood as progress made towards implementing legislation addressing 
the Energy Union) is translated into concrete action by various actors and 
stakeholders. Monitoring is an essential part of the policy cycle, and co-
responsible for creating increasing returns. Integral parts of the policy cycle 
are based on monitoring mechanisms, which are subsumed as learning and 
coordination effects. Therefore, the Commission presented a communication 
titled “State of the Energy Union 2015” on 18 November 2015 (European 
Commission 2015f). Maroš Šefčovič, the Vice President of the European 
Commission and in charge of the Energy Union, in a speech at the European 
Parliament on the state of the Energy Union, on 24 November 2015, put forth 
four key issues that needed special attention. The EU must keep its position 
as a global leader towards a low carbon society and further develop financing 
instruments, making them more suitable for financing needs. Secondly, in 
order to make the transition towards an Energy Union feasible, it has to be 
socially just and consumer centred. Moreover, geopolitical matters remain a 
concern for an integrated energy policy, therefore, such issues must be tackled 
with well-adjusted policies towards suppliers, transit partners and routes. 
Regarding Nord Stream 3 and 4, Šefčovič emphasised that “[t]hese pipelines, 
if built, will have to comply fully with EU law” (Šefčovič 2015, para. 3). 
Moreover, he pointed out that the Nord Stream Project will not become a 
project of common interest (PCI) as it would make the EU more reliant on 
Russian gas, which in turn would adversely affect the EU’s Energy Security 
Strategy, that is based on a diversification of energy sources, suppliers and 
routes (ibid.). Without going to go into too much detail about the project itself, 
Nord Stream 2 is a contested pipeline that should transport gas from Russia 
to Germany, bypassing the Ukraine. In this regard, unintended consequences 
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unfolded for Member States partaking in the project as, over time, much 
resistance towards the project emerged. Fourthly, Šefčovič introduced a 
governance mechanism that should bring transparency and predictability to 
investors and businesses through an annual State of the Energy Union report, 
biannual reports on National Energy and Climate Plans, and through sector-
specific legislation (specifically with regard to the 2030 targets) (Šefčovič 
2015).  
 
In sum, the first State of the Energy Union Report assessed the progresses 
that was made, and defined further intended goals, regarding the five core 
dimensions addressed in the proposal for the Energy Union. The report set out 
the way forward in these dimensions, concerning the decarbonisation of the 
economy, energy efficiency and moderation of demand, a fully integrated 
energy market, energy security, solidarity and trust, and research and 
innovation and competitiveness (European Commission 2015f). To this end, 
the implementation of the Energy Union should be facilitated through national 
energy and climate plans, which were deemed necessary tools for a more 
strategic approach to planning, and for the achievement of the 2030 targets. 
Therefore, Member States should present National Plans in 2017, with a view 
to finalising their National Plans in 2018, so that they could be fully operational 
before 2021. To track the progress, the Commission proposed a coherent 
methodology for measurement, a transparent monitoring system “based on 
key indicators” (ibid.: 16). Alongside the State of the Energy Union report, 
several other Energy Union deliverables and reports were adopted and 
published; among them a second list of Project of Common Interest, an oil 
stock summary, a report on the implementation of the EU Energy Security 




6.2.4. The Sustainable Energy Security Package 
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The next incremental step for delivering the Energy Union was the Sustainable 
Energy Security Package presented in February 2016; a collection of 
proposals addressing the security of gas supply, transparency of 
Intergovernmental Agreements, EU strategy on LNG and gas storage, and the 
EU strategy on Heating and Cooling (European Commission 2016a). The 
energy security dimension can be regarded as one of the cornerstones of the 
Energy Union strategies. The package contains a revision of the provisions on 
the security of gas supply 994/2010 (European Commission 2016b). The 
proposal itself is framed under Article 194 TFEU which “recognises that a 
certain level of coordination, transparency and cooperation is necessary as 
regards EU Member States' policies on security of supply” (ibid.: 3). The 
Commission proposed stronger regional coordination facilitated through closer 
collaboration of Member States within their regions when conceiving security 
of supply measures (based on standardised risk assessments). The respective 
action plans and emergency plans should then be peer-reviewed and 
approved by the Commission. 
 
Although the original regulation 994/2010 had improved the security of gas 
supply in Europe, serious shortcomings were still identified regarding the 
cooperation between the Member States, as the predominately national 
measures were not well suited to deal with supply disruptions. A stress test 
conducted in the summer of 2014 revealed that a disruption of gas supplies 
from the east would heavily affect the EU (European Commission 2014c). 
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Figure 2. Modelling approach: 6-months Russian supply disruption under a 
non-cooperative scenario 
 
Source: ENTSOG 2014 
 
As we can see in Figure 2., the stress test, conducted by ENTSOG, confirmed 
that South-Eastern European, Central-Eastern, and Baltic states are starkly 
reliant on imported gas from Russia (ENTSOG 2014). The Commission’s 
communication ‘On the short term resilience of the European gas system’ 
(European Commission 2014c) stated that in the absence of cooperation 
between Member States, supply shortages of 40% (in some cases up to 100%) 
could affect Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in both scenarios of a Ukraine transit 
and full Russian supply disruption. Finland, Estonia and Lithuania would be 
affected to almost the same degree, if Russian gas imports were to cease. 
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Poland and Hungary would also be affected, to a slightly lesser degree, 
however, still accounting for shortfalls of 20% and 30%, respectively (ibid.).  
 
The Commission also emphasised the need to improve physical infrastructure. 
During the gas crisis of 2009, the Member States would have had the 
necessary capacities of gas available, however, it was impossible to transfer 
gas to the affected Eastern European Member States. Member States should 
therefore fulfil the so-called N-1 rule (an obligation introduced with Regulation 
994/2010 and to be fully implemented from 3 December 2014 onwards), which 
states that if they are dependent on a single supply pipeline, in case of a failure 
of the gas supply, they must still be able to satisfy demand on extremely cold 
days. Although 20 Member States already provided the necessary 
interconnections (Sweden, Luxembourg and Slovenia are exempt due to their 
small and isolated gas markets), Greece, Bulgaria and Lithuania did not fulfil 
the obligation in 2013 (European Commission 2014d).  
 
The second tool addressing shortcomings, in terms of infrastructure, is the 
further implementation of the permanent bi-directional capacity; the so-called 
physical reverse flows. This means that gas can be transported in both 
directions, which helps shippers to swiftly re-route gas deliveries within the 
internal market if a supply disruption occurs. Here, the empirical evidence 
shows how initial policy steps in the form of Regulation 994/2010, which 
introduced bi-directional capacity, resulted in further steps deepening the 
policy framework. The amount of bi-directional cross-border interconnectors 
increased from 24% in 2009 to 40% of all interconnection points in 2014. 
However, the Commission emphasised that the flexibility of the gas grid still 
leaves room for improvement (European Commission 2014d). Along these 
lines, the proposal for a revision of regulation 994/2010 called for further 
extension of the infrastructure standard (the N-1 rule) to not only account for a 
capacity-based-approach but also provide a more thorough analysis to capture 
gas flows. It also promoted the extension of the provisions on reverse flows, 
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to enable a permanent reverse flow capacity of interconnection points 
(European Commission 2016b).  
 
The proposal additionally incorporated a new ‘solidarity principle’ to the supply 
standard to ensure a continued supply of energy to protected customers9, if a 
Member State has declared a state of emergency. In this case, neighbouring 
countries will be obliged to supply gas to the Member State in distress, which 
might imply that they have to decrease their own supply standard, in terms of 
supply to customers, rather than protected customers in their respective 
countries (for instance, large scale enterprises). Here, a strong normative 
connotation based on ideational factors can be perceived. Member States are 
not only encouraged, but are legally obliged to help each other in the event of 
an energy crisis. Furthermore, supply contracts between natural gas 
companies and third country suppliers were not sufficiently transparent and 
the Commission called for additional transparency measures, to create 
coordination effects within the institution. Gas companies will be required to 
notify the national competent authority and the Commission when contracts, 
relevant for the security of supply, are signed or amended. This applies to 
contracts that together (or on their own) concern more than 40% of the annual 
gas consumption in the Member State (ibid.).  
 
The package furthermore proposed an amendment of Decision 994/2012 with 
regard to IGAs in the field of energy (European Commission 2016c), as “[a]n 
important element in ensuring energy (and in particular gas) security is full 
compliance of agreements related to the buying of energy from third countries 
with EU law” (European Commission 2015a: 7). Here, strong path dependent 
processes are visible. The revision would contribute to the proper functioning 
of the internal market and energy security, and enhance the cost-effectiveness 
of the EU’s energy supply and solidarity between Member States (European 
Commission 2016c). The adoption of Decision 994/2012, setting up an 
 
9 The term was introduced by decision 994/2010 and denotes households and essential 
services. For instance, healthcare and district heating. 
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exchange mechanism for information, obliged Member States to inform the 
Commission about existing and new bilateral energy agreements with third 
countries. Around one third of the notified IGAs did not comply with EU law 
with regards to questions of the Third Energy Package (for instance, 
unbundling, third party access and tariff setting) and competition law 
(prohibition of market segmentation). However, no Member State was able to 
terminate or renegotiate the non-compliant IGAs under scrutiny. This 
predicament is owed to the complex legal situation created by IGAs as, once 
these agreements are signed, they are legally binding under public 
international law and it is almost impossible for the Member State concerned 
to terminate or renegotiate the IGA without the agreement of the third country, 
in the absence of a termination or suspension clause. This practically tied the 
hands of the Commission even if a contract infringed on compliance with EU 
law (European Commission 2016d). The proposal for an amendment of 
Decision 994/2012 concluded that the IGA Decision in its current form is not 
efficient (in particular due to the legally binding ex-post assessment of IGAs) 
and did not result in transforming non-compliant IGAs into compliant ones, nor 
did any Member State submit a draft agreement to the Commission for a 
voluntary ex-ante check. The Commission considered Decision 994/2012 not 
effective and, hence, proposed the Commission’s involvement before 
agreements are concluded, as by an ex-ante assessment potential conflicts 
between obligations of Member States under international treaty law and EU 
law would be remedied. Member states shall therefore not conclude proposed 
intergovernmental agreements or amendments until the Commission informed 
the Member State of any doubts and its opinion. The Member State thereafter 
“shall take utmost account of Commission's opinion” (European Commission 
2016c:8).  
 
A third proposal within the package addressed an EU strategy for liquefied 
natural gas and gas storage. The Commission highlighted the requirement to 
take full advantage of gas storage and international LNG markets to make the 
supply system more flexible and resilient, due to geopolitical challenges and 
 255 
the EU’s stark dependence on gas imports. Missing infrastructure for both LNG 
and gas storage hampered such aspirations; regional differences existed in 
terms of access to LNG gas supply and some Member States were dependent 
on a single supplier. Improvements of the infrastructure creating access to 
international LNG markets, the completion of the internal market to attract LNG 
and investment in infrastructure, and to engage in close cooperation with 
international partners to promote free and transparent markets were conceived 
as a means to exploit the growing international LNG market and to attract new 
investment (European Commission 2016e). In addition, and interlinked with 
LNG, EU’s gas storage facilities needed to be improved in order to balance the 
system, enhance gas security and the resilience of the gas supply (particularly 
in regard to supply disruptions). Therefore, a number of key projects of 
common interest (PCI) were identified, including transmission, LNG terminals 
and storage, to end single source dependency and to give all Member States 
access to LNG. As only a limited number of Member States had sufficiently 
developed LNG markets, Member States together with national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) should aim to complete the internal market, remove the 
remaining regulatory, commercial and legal barriers, and provide equal access 
to these markets for all participants. Moreover, transmission tariffs to and from 
storage varied substantially between Member States and therefore EU-wide 
network codes should be adjusted and further developed (ibid.).  
 
Lastly, the Commission presented a fourth proposal concerning an EU strategy 
on heating and cooling. This focuses on the decarbonisation of buildings, as 
heating and cooling consume half of the EU’s energy and 75% of the fuel it 
uses comes from fossil fuels. The goal should be achieved through the 
renovation of existing building stocks, together with increased efforts in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, bolstered with the help of green electricity 
and district heating (European Commission 2016f). The communication sets 
out solutions based on reviews of existing legislation, the Energy Performance 
of Buildings Directive (EPBD) (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2010a) and the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) 
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(EP/Council 2012a). The reviews seek to further improve national energy 
efficiency action plans to reduce demand for heating and cooling, and to 
enhance the energy performance of building stocks. The review of the EED 
also strives to ameliorate metering and billing information for consumers on 
energy consumption, as the frequency of metering and billing information may 
still not be sufficient to provide consumers with accurate real- / near- time 
consumption data (European Commission 2016f). This will enable consumers 
to make better informed decisions about their energy consumption and 
effectively regulate their energy use. Intelligent metering systems also enable 
frequent billing based on actual consumption (European Commission 2012a). 
In addition, the review of the Renewable Energy Directive (EP/Council 2009a), 
together with the EED and the EPBD, seeks to promote renewable energy to 
speed up a replacement of fossil fuels used in boilers, district heating and 
combined heat and power (CHP) (European Commission 2016f). Smart 
systems, smart grids, smart metering, smart homes and buildings should 
complement the measures to tackle decarbonisation and should be promoted 
by a modern market design (ibid.).  
 
 
6.2.5. The Winter Package 
 
On 30 November 2016, the Commission presented another important package 
of measures in order to create a stable framework necessary to facilitate a 
clean energy transition, which should in turn significantly contribute to the 
creation of the Energy Union. In addition, the package aimed to speed up 
growth and job creation in the energy sector. The objectives of the winter 
package are subsumed in the Commission’s communication ‘Clean Energy for 
all Europeans’ (European Commission 2016o). As laid out in the 
communication, the package should bring about EU leadership in clean energy 
technology and renewable energies; it should enable the EU to deliver the 
commitments agreed upon in the Paris Agreement (which was ratified on 5 
October 2016), put energy efficiency first, provide a fair deal for customers and 
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improve the competitiveness of the whole economy. By mobilising 177 billion 
euros of public and private investment per year, from 2021 onwards, the 
package could generate an increase of up to 1% of GDP over the next decade 
and create 900.000 new jobs (ibid.). 
 
The proposals can be grouped into three different categories: proposals 
amending existing market provisions, proposals addressing existing climate 
change provisions; and proposals for entirely new measures (Hancher & 
Winters 2017). Some of the proposals are so-called ‘recasts’, meaning that a 
full revision of the legal provision is intended (ibid.) The first category entails a 
proposal for a new directive addressing the internal electricity market and 
repealing Directive 2009/72/EC (Electricity Directive) (European Commission 
2016g), a regulation addressing the internal electricity market and repealing 
Regulation 714/2009 (E-Regulation) (Europrean Commission 2016h), and a 
new regulation on the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) and repealing Regulation 714/2009 (European Commission 2016i). 
These legal acts were all part of the Third Energy Package, adopted in 2009. 
The recast of the three acts should enhance “[…]legal clarity. Recourse to an 
amending act may have been inadequate to address a wide set of new 
provisions. The choice of the instrument thus calls for a revision of rules 
already adopted and implemented, as a natural evolution of current legislation” 
(European Commission 2016g: 12). 
 
The second set of legal provisions addresses climate change goals and how 
these should interact with the new market design (Hancher & Winters 2017). 
This set entails a proposal for a new Energy Efficiency Directive amending 
Directive 2012/27/EU (European Commission 2016j), and a revised 
Renewable Energy Directive amending Directive 2009/28 (European 
Commission 2016k). In addition, a proposal for a directive concerning the 
energy performance of buildings was put forward, amending existing Directive 
2010/31 (European Commission 2016l). The third set of proposals 
implemented entirely new measures (Hancher & Winters 2017). A proposal for 
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a regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector was published 
(European Commission 2016m), as well as a regulation on the governance of 
the Energy Union (European Commission 2016n). The winter package can be 
seen as a substantial step towards the realisation of the Energy Union, as it 
introduced novel legal provisions and provided the legal instruments for a 
redesign of Europe’s electricity market, hence deploying a new set of intended 
goals for the sector. 
 
 
6.2.6. The State of the Energy Union II 
 
Shortly after the package was published, and in line with the obligation to 
report annually on the state of the Energy Union, the Commission published 
the Second Report on the State of the Energy Union, on 1 February 2017 
(European Commission 2017b). The report highlighted the progress that was 
made since the publication of the first State of the Energy Union in November 
2015, representing the monitoring process within the policy cycle. In addition, 
the Commission also published an accompanying document – a staff working 
document (SWD) - that refined a set of specific key indicators that were 
conceived to monitor and analyse the progress on meeting the Energy Union 
objectives. The monitoring approach and methodology in this document built 
on a former SWD, which was originally developed for the first State of the 
Energy Union package, and can be understood as a progression of the 
feedback processes. It was a first attempt to “aggregate a set of relevant key 
indicators to quantify and measure progress on EU energy and climate 
objectives and targets” (European Commission 2017c: 6). The new SWD built 
on these initial steps and was based on feedback from Member States, 
together with stakeholder opinions gathered from reports and events. It 
modified and amended the list of indicators, replaced certain indicators with 
new ones or adjusted them to metrics and data sources, and highlighted where 
new indicators and better statistical data were needed (European Commission 
2017c). Overall, the working document was meant to serve as a powerful tool 
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to coherently and uniformly assess the progress made in every single Member 
State regarding the five key dimensions defined in the Energy Union proposal. 
 
The second State of the Energy Union report highlighted trends and policy 
observations that were of significance for attaining the Energy Union. The 
report emphasised that overall good progress was made on delivering the 
Energy Union goals, in particular regarding the 2020 energy and climate 
targets. It underlined that the Energy Union should be about more than energy 
and climate alone but a holistic project striving to accelerate the modernisation 
of the EU’s entire economy, making it low carbon and energy efficient, in a 
socially fair manner (European Commission 2017b). From and institutional 
standpoint, this can be understood as a widening and deepening of the matrix 
over time. In addition, the report emphasised the stark importance of the 
recurring theme of external energy policy, as a fast changing and volatile 
geopolitical environment that requires a coherent approach to energy 
diplomacy to secure the long term economic interests and the well-being of 
Europe and its citizens (ibid.). 
 
In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, in 2015 they were 22% below the 1990 
level, and despite a short peak in 2015, carbon emissions followed a 
decreasing trend. Regarding the renewable sector, and based on data from 
2014, 16% of the EU’s gross final energy consumption was generated by 
renewables (ibid.) and an estimated share of close to 16.4% in 2015. Thus, 
the EU was well on its way to reaching its 20% target by 2020. However, the 
Commission urged Member States to maintain momentum to reach their 
national goals. For the EU, renewable energy played a key role for the EU 
economy, with a turnover of 144bn Euro in 2014 and employing more than one 
million people (European Commission 2017d). A further important trend was 
that the EU continued to decouple its economic growth from its greenhouse 
gas emissions. As depicted in the second report, during the period from 1990-
2015, the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 50 %, whereas carbon 
emissions, as already mentioned above, decreased by 22% (European 
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Commission 2017b). With regards to reaching the 20% energy efficiency 
target, the EU managed to lower its energy consumption significantly, as final 
energy consumption (the use of energy by end users such as residential 
consumers, industry, services sector excluding energy used by the energy 
sector) had reached its 2020 target by this point. In 2014 the EU consumed 
1062 Mtoe, which was already 2.2% below the targeted 1086 Mtoe as 
proposed in the 2020 goals (European Commission 2017e).  
 
However, the report also stressed the necessity to empower consumers more 
effectively, as many consumers still could not participate in the market and 
additional measures had to be provided to protect vulnerable customers. An 
assessment of infrastructure revealed that certain interconnections and 
internal lines to further integrate the internal market were still missing or 
underused (e.g. Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic). In addition, the 
next State of the Energy Union report (the third) should single out Projects of 
Common Interests (PCIs) – a list of key infrastructure projects that link energy 
systems of different countries and which was published for the third time - 
where insufficient progress has been made. The report also stressed the 
necessity to intensify efforts on investment to reach the EU’s climate and 
energy targets, as about 379 billion Euro would be needed every year. To this 
end, different investment funds – including the European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI) and the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) 
- and other flexible investment platforms should help to advance the work on 
investments (European Commission 2017b). On the external dimension, not 
only global leadership should be attained in the field of climate action, but its 
rule-based liberal market principles should be strengthened in multilateral fora 
and bilateral agreements to endorse the functioning, integration and the reform 
of international energy markets (ibid.).  
 
 
6.2.7. The Clean Mobility Packages 
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The next building blocks of the Energy Union Project were two ‘Clean Mobility 
Packages’ (European Commission 2017f; European Commission 2017g), 
published on 31 May 2017 and 8 November 2017, respectively. Although these 
proposals shall not be thoroughly assessed, as they lie outside the scope of 
this thesis, they are mentioned briefly to depict the multileveled nature of the 
Energy Union and the high issue density it creates (Pierson 2004). The 
“consequence of issue density is the oft‐cited process of spillover: the 
tendency of tasks adopted to have important consequences for realms outside 
those originally intended” (Haas 1958, as cited in Pierson 1996:14). Pierson 
elaborates further that the integration of certain aspects of complex modern 
societies begets integration in other components, as it proves hard to 
effectively isolate one unit from the other. In addition, the more tightly coupled 
different policies are, the higher the likelihood of unanticipated effects and that 
policy actions in one realm will affect another. “As the density of EC 
policymaking increases, such interaction effects become more prevalent, 
unintended consequences multiply, and the prospect of gaps in member‐state 
control will grow” (ibid.: 14). Moreover, as Keohane puts it,  
“one substantive objective may well impinge on another and regimes 
will achieve economies of scale, for instance in negotiating procedures 
that are applicable to a variety of potential agreements within similar 
substantive areas of activity” (Keohane 1982: 340). 
 
An analysis of the two proposals renders the interconnectedness of different 
policy areas visible. The first set of proposals from March 2017 labelled 
‘Europe on the Move’ (European Commission 2017f), proposed a wide set of 
initiatives that will make traffic safer, encourage smart road charging, reduce 
CO2 emissions, air pollution and congestion; cut red-tape for businesses; fight 
illicit employment and ensure proper conditions and rest times for workers. 
Ultimately, the “long-term benefits of these measures will extend far beyond 
the transport sector by promoting growth and job creation, strengthening social 
fairness, widening consumers’ choices and firmly putting Europe on the path 
towards zero emissions” (ibid.: n.p.). The proposals are reasoned through the 
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Energy Union strategy of 2015 (European Commission 2015a), which sets the 
transition to a low carbon, energy efficient transport sector as one of its key 
areas. The second set of proposals, from November 2017, address the 
reduction of CO2 emissions of new passenger vehicles and vans, to accelerate 
the transition to low and zero emission vehicles. Along these lines, the average 
CO2 emissions of new cars and vans will have to be 30% lower in 2030, 
compared to 2021 (European Commission 2017g).  
 
 
6.2.8. The State of the Energy Union III 
 
Shortly thereafter, on 23 November 2017, the Third Report on the State of the 
Energy Union was published (European Commission 2017h). The report 
expounds that the Commission has nearly published all proposals necessary 
to strengthen the EU’s leadership in climate action, the energy efficiency first 
principle, and to provide a good deal for energy costumers. In this regard, the 
share of renewable energy in the overall energy mix of the EU is still on track 
to deliver the 20% target in 2020. The cost of renewables is falling (onshore 
and offshore wind, photovoltaic), which depicts investor’s confidence in the 
technological progress, well-conceived policies and the electricity market 
reforms. The decoupling of Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and 
greenhouse gas emissions has continued. Between 1990 and 2016 the EU’s 
GDP increased by 53%, whereas total emissions fell by 23% (European 
Commission 2017h); compared to a 50 % GDP growth and 22% emission 
decrease in 2015 (European Commission 2017b). Final energy consumption 
already reached its 2020 goal in 2014 (European Commission 2017e). The 
third State of the Energy Union report highlighted that primary energy 
consumption decreased by 2.5% compared to 1990, however, between 2015 
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and 2020 the EU still needs to decrease its primary energy consumption by 
3.1% to reach the 2020 energy efficiency target.10 
 
The Commission warned that, although many positive developments occurred 
in the energy sector, due to fossil fuel subsidies, a transition to clean energy 
may be hindered. These distorting practises comprise of subsidies to 
uneconomic coal mines, capacity mechanisms for emission intensive power 
plants, tax relief for diesel fuel or company cars and other similar measures. 
In addition, subsidising fossil fuel also increases the risk to investment in 
stranded assets, which need to be replaced before the end of their lifespan 
(European Commission 2017h). According to the report, the Commission has 
published most of the proposals necessary to facilitate the Energy Union 
project. However, further important action is needed to complete the Energy 
Union as the project has reached a “critical juncture” (ibid.: 17)11. Member 
States should therefore accelerate their respective integrated national energy 
and climate plans to create a hospitable environment for investors, hence 
generating certainty and confidence in the markets, and the co-legislators 
should accelerate their efforts to reach swift agreement concerning the 
proposals. Maroš Šefčovič, the Vice President of the European Commission 
and in charge of the Energy Union, emphasised that the focal point should now 
be placed on the European Parliament and the Council negotiations based on 
the Commission’s proposals, to ensure that the Energy Union is “no longer a 
policy but a well-framed reality” (Politico 2017). Miguel Arias Cañete, the 
Commissioner responsible for climate action and energy, also stressed the 
necessity to step up, and stated that “[w]e, at the moment, are in the most 
difficult part, in acting like honest brokers between the Council and the 
Parliament” (Politico 2017). 
 
 
10 Primary energy consumption is the energy supplied to industry, households, transport, 
agriculture and transport including the energy transformation sector and the energy industries 
themselves (European Commission 2017e). 
11 Not to be understood as the same sort of critical juncture used in the model proposed in the 
theory section of this project. 
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6.3. Taking account of progress – what has been achieved 
 
By the summer of 2019, 14 legal provisions had already been adopted. In 
regard to institutional endowments, a Member State Official stated that,  
“[t]he project of the Energy Union considerably strengthens the powers 
of the Commission. It gives them an additional reference point, an 
additional argument. And I wouldn’t say that it strengthens the position 
of the Member States. It’s rather used as a vehicle to transfer more 
competence to the EU level” (Interview 9, 2018). 
 
It not only strengthens the institution, it also perpetuates an efficient path. As 
the empirical evidence suggests, the Energy Union seems to provide benefits 
for Member States, not only from a security standpoint furthering normative 
obligations (as discussed earlier in this chapter), but also from a market 
perspective. A Member State Official from the Central and Eastern European 
region contends, 
“The Energy Union project as such is a very important achievement. We 
see a lot of benefits that an Energy Union can give us. Our energy policy 
and our own views are aligned with the topics of the Energy Union and 
how to move forward, and we also believe in the importance of regional 
cooperation. And we see a lot of benefits in it. Not only in security of 
supply but also in costs. If we work together we can produce cheaper 
energy. If our neighbours produce renewable energy much cheaper, 
and more efficiently, why should we do it in our own country if it is 
expensive? We want to do it in a cost-efficient way” (Interview 10, 2018). 
 
Among the adopted provisions for the Energy Union is a revision of Decision 
994/2012, the information exchange mechanism on intergovernmental 
agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy. 
Moreover, Decision 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard the security 
of gas supply was also revised. These two cases were picked for deeper 
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scrutiny as they were analysed in great detail in previous sections. In addition, 
as the proposal for Decision 994/2012 faced fierce resistance by Member 
States, the case provides valuable insight on how path dependent processes 
entrench actors deeper into the institutional makeup. 
 
 
6.3.1. Provisions regarding security of gas supply 
 
We will now turn to an assessment of these two provisions. Their content 
covers sensitive issue areas, which the co-legislators came to terms on 
following demanding negotiations and which helped to bolster the framework 
of the Energy Union with promising results. These legal provisions are 
especially suited to analyse how certain assumptions of HI play out ‘in practice’ 
and how policy development unfolds over time within an institution, in terms of 
the process of path dependency, the short-time horizons of policy makers 
(where they cannot address future developments based on present 
opportunities) and the inability of Member States to foresee how decisions at 
a certain point in time might affect and shape decisions in the future (the 
phenomenon of unintended consequences). 
 
As discussed in this chapter, Regulation 994/2010 was not a game-changer. 
From an HI perspective, it was a moderate step in the direction of granting the 
Commission more competences to influence the external dimension of energy 
policy and security of supply. As already discussed in the section on the 
‘Sustainable Energy Security Package’, the regulation did not yield the 
anticipated outcomes and there was still considerable scope to strengthen the 
EU’s preparedness and ability to effectively respond to a gas supply crisis 
(European Commission 2016p). An impact assessment in 2016 showed that 
the problem was threefold: behavioural biases (purely national approaches 
when designing security of supply policies), external factors (the behaviour of 
third country suppliers was not factored into the design of security measures 
and the lack of commercial information about the emergency situations), and 
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technical issues (infrastructure not sufficiently available or not sufficiently 
protected). This meant that the gas system remained vulnerable to external 
shocks (ibid.). Some of the deadlines prescribed in Regulation 994/2010 were 
not adhered to, especially regarding the submission of Preventive Action and 
Emergency Plans. Moreover, concerning the reverse flow obligation, 32 
interconnection points were still not equipped with bi-directional capacity (out 
of 53 in total). The proposal for a revision of the provisions on the security of 
gas supply 994/2010 (European Commission 2016b) addressed these issues. 
 
The revision of the Regulation on Gas Security of Supply (EU) 994/2010 was 
one of the actions identified and framed within the dimension of ‘energy 
security, solidarity and trust’, which is one of the five key dimensions in the 
Energy Union package (European Commission 2016p). Regulation (EU) 
2017/1938 was signed on 25 October 2017 and entered into force on 1 
November. The legal text is of considerable scope compared to its 
predecessor; the document is more than double the size of Regulation 
994/2010. Provisions concerning the various aspects of supply security are 
addressed in great depth, including a considerable amount of complexity and 
a much broader scope than its former incarnations. 
 
In a nutshell, all the policy instruments of the former regulation were 
incorporated in Regulation 2017/1938, however, provisions were formulated in 
much greater detail and with less leeway for misinterpretation. Hence, path 
dependent processes can be attested. The regulation reinforces the role of 
‘Competent Authorities’ (Article 3) and the Gas Coordination Group (GCG) (to 
facilitate the coordination of measures of Member States concerning the 
security of gas supply) (Article 4). Article 5 addresses the infrastructure 
standard (the N-1 formula and bi-directional capacity), however, with a much 
more complex methodology and a high degree of technical specifications 
regarding their calculation (as further specified in different annexes). 
Proposals for enabling or enhancing bi-directional capacity, or for seeking 
exemption, must be accompanied by detailed cost-benefit analyses based on 
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multiple indicators. Investment decisions are taken by all Member States if bi-
directional capacity is not required by the market, but if considered necessary 
for the security of gas supply purposes. In order to align risk assessments, and 
the Preventive Action and Emergency Plans in different Member States (which 
was a big issue for Regulation 994/2010), the regulation puts forward specific 
provisions that have to be strictly fulfilled. For instance, it includes a Union wide 
simulation of gas supply and disruption scenarios, and action and emergency 
plans have to be clearly defined, transparent, proportionate, and non-
discriminatory (Articles 6-10). Regional cooperation is fostered as, based on 
the identification of major transnational risks to the security of supply, 13 
regional risk groups are established, reflecting the main European gas supply 
routes. These groups should serve as the basis for enhanced regional 
cooperation and should carry out a common assessment on ‘risk group level’ 
(Article 7-2). Different levels of crises – three in total, with different levels of 
impact - were defined in order to ensure that the respond to a crisis is 
appropriate (Article 11). From an HI standpoint, these groups provide a 
mechanism for feedback processes on the basis of coordination, resulting in 
the adaptation of expectations regarding the performance of the institution. 
 
Most intriguingly, an Article on solidarity was introduced in the regulation. 
Based on this solidarity principle - in turn founded on Article 194 in the Lisbon 
Treaty - in the event of a severe gas supply crisis, neighbouring countries 
would have the legal obligation (as a binding legal mechanism!) to assist each 
other to guarantee the secure supply of gas to protected customers (including 
households). This is a fascinating example of how ideational factors permeate 
an institution, even in a policy area which displays both a very strong notion of 
market forces and security concerns, associated with ‘high politics’. Moreover, 
under such circumstances, Member States who provide another Member State 
with gas must “take the necessary measures to ensure that the gas supply to 
customers other than solidarity protected customers in its territory is reduced 
or does not continue to the extent necessary and for as long as the gas supply 
to solidarity protected customers in the requesting Member State is not 
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satisfied” (Article 13). This means that a Member State is legally obliged to 
decrease the supply to its own commercial entities to satisfy the gas demand 
of protected customers in another Member State. Indeed, a strong provision 
that instigates ideational momentum and displays a strong normative 
connotation. Of course, such measures are only be taken as a last resort and 
when market-based measures and measures defined in emergency plans are 
exhausted. From an economic standpoint, it is intriguing that in terms of the 
exchange of information, the regulation also requires Member States to 
communicate all contracts with suppliers that account for 28% of annual gas 
consumption in a specific Member State. This obligation applies to commercial 
undertakings, however, the “notification obligation shall not cover price 
information” (Article 14). Self-evidently, the Commission has to monitor the 
implementation of Regulation 2017/1938, report the outcome to the European 
Parliament and the Council, and, when necessary, recommend the 
amendment of the regulation (Article 17). 
 
Compared with the previous regulation, even a critical voice must admit that 
the new legislation is significant. The regulation is the spearhead of attempts 
to foster security of supply and enable the Union to act in the case of a supply 
crisis. When comparing the first security of supply decision of 2004 to this 
regulation, the very first policy instrument appears weak, with no added value 
for the institution. From a HI point of view, the gradual and incremental 
development regarding instruments addressing the security of supply is 
invaluable evidence of incremental change and path dependent processes. 
 
6.3.2. Provisions concerning energy related intergovernmental agreements 
 
The provisions on the information exchange mechanism on intergovernmental 
agreements and the security of gas supply regulation offer especially 
fascinating cases for further examination, as they directly affect the EU’s 
capacity to shape the contracts and the relations of Member States with third 
country suppliers. Both considerably strengthen the legal powers at the EU’s 
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disposal and touch upon energy policy apprehended as high politics. They 
address certain aspects of supply security, for instance, the dependence on 
gas supply from Russia and energy prices associated with the supply 
contracts. Member States (at least some of them) have vested interests to 
keep such contracts within the intergovernmental sphere of energy policy. 
These contracts directly address and affect the basic functions of a Member 
State and they define whether certain Member States obtain more favourable 
conditions than other Member States. Energy prices for both wholesale and 
retail markets are heavily affected by these contracts and directly correlate 
with the productivity of Member States, prices on the retail sector (with 
vulnerable consumers amongst them), the attractiveness for investors and the 
welfare of a Member State in general. In this regard, both decisions constrain 
Member States’ possible options regarding how to engage with third country 
suppliers and strive to foster the creation of a level playing field for all 28 
Member States12. 
 
In order to fully understand the importance of Decision (EU) 2017/684 
(EP/Council 2017), we must turn our focus to its predecessor Decision 
994/2012. In hindsight, an assessment of the effectiveness of Decision 
994/2012, establishing an information exchange mechanism regarding 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with third states, which was adopted by 
the Council and the European Parliament on 25 October 2012, shows quite 
mixed results. As already laid out in a previous section, the decision obliged 
Member States to inform the Commission about all existing bilateral 
agreements with third state suppliers. Decision 994/2012 should enhance 
transparency, and create solidarity and confidence between Member States. 
The decision was conceived to ensure that IGAs are strictly aligned with EU 
law, that they respect and follow existing internal market rules, and that IGAs 
bolster and reinforce the EU’s energy security strategy. After submitting an 
IGA to the Commission, the Commission would then have nine months to 
 
12 Please note, at the time of writing, Brexit, whilst imminent, had not yet occurred. 
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assess whether the agreement was in-line with existing legal provisions or not. 
In addition, Member States “should have the option of informing the 
Commission of a new intergovernmental agreement with a third country before 
or during the negotiations thereof” (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2012a: 14). The Commission should also have the option, on 
its own request, to participate as an observer, however, only if the Member 
State under scrutiny agrees. Member States, on their part, should have the 
possibility to invite the Commission to assist them during negotiations with third 
countries. The decision also obliged the Commission to report the 
effectiveness of Decision 994/2012 to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee (ibid.). 
 
The crux and serious shortcoming of Decision 994/2012 was the ex post 
assessment of IGAs, where Member States had to report the IGAs only after 
the agreements were concluded. As these agreements are subject to 
international law, under the regime of Decision 994/2012, if an IGA was found 
to violate EU energy law, it was very difficult or even impossible to renegotiate 
these agreements, due to political factors and legal reasons. Based on an 
impact assessment carried out by the Commission as required by Decision 
994/2012 (Art. 8), around one third of the notified IGAs, which were highly 
relevant, contained provisions that were not compliant with EU law13. In 
addition, some of these non-compliant IGAs created very complex legal 
situations within Member States, between Member States, and with third 
countries (European Commission 2016q). In terms of effectiveness of the IGA 
decision as the policy outcome, the Commission concluded that while the 
decision was generally useful to identify IGAs that were incompatible with EU 
law (ibid.), it did not manage to transform concluded non-compliant IGAs into 
compliant ones. Moreover, the decision did not directly impact Member States’ 
negotiations with third countries (European Commission 2016d). 
 
 
13 For instance, those related to energy infrastructure or the supply of energy commodities. 
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Member States fiercely opposed the decision as they deemed it to heavily 
infringe on their sovereignty given the delicacy of the subject matter during the 
negotiation process. They worked hard during negotiations to retain their 
power (Interview 1, 2018). As we can see, Decision 994/2012 was a double-
edged sword in terms of its effectiveness. On the one hand, the Commission 
tried to ‘get a foot in the door’ regarding Member State’s agreements with third 
countries. It established a legal provision that shifted energy policy away from 
a market-centred approach (addressing the external dimension of energy 
policy via the internal market), towards an approach that bestowed legal 
powers upon the Commission, that would grant it a more assertive role in the 
external dimension. On the other hand, and as the obligatory assessment has 
revealed, although the provision represented a novelty in terms of its content, 
it showed no effectiveness in terms of creating a level playing field for all 
market participants, since the IGAs could not be altered in hindsight. Solidarity, 
a binding force emphasised in the provision, was hence not properly 
addressed. 
 
The revised version on IGAs, Decision (EU) 2017/684 (EP/Council 2017), is a 
completely different kind of animal in this respect. According to Roeben (2017), 
“the Commission’s oversight has been strengthened, procedurally and 
substantively. The reformed decision provides for obligatory ex-ante 
review of binding agreements on gas and oil, which will have a 
suspensory effect. Member States remain able to sign the agreement 
but will have to take the ‘utmost account’ of the Commission’s opinion” 
(ibid.: 222-223). 
 
This development can be seen as very strong evidence supporting the claim 
of HI that unintended consequences affect actors when embedded in an 
institutional setting. Some very powerful Member States, with Germany, Italy 
and France amongst them, were against an ex-ante assessment of 
intergovernmental agreements, when the first Decision was negotiated in 
2012. However, due to the Energy Union project of 2015 (European 
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Commission 2015a), which itself was heavily strengthened by the conclusions 
of the European Council in December 2015 (European Council 2015), the 
revision had to be much more ambitious than its predecessor. The European 
Council decision of December 2015 made unmistakably clear that all further 
legislation must be aligned with the Energy Union goals and the decision 
strengthened the obligation to embrace the notion of solidarity where energy 
provision is concerned. In addition, the Parliament pushed for strong 
provisions in the decision and the President of the European Parliament's 
Energy Committee, Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland) praised the excellent 
proposals of the Commission (Agence Europe 2016). Thus, formerly reluctant 
Member States had no choice but to agree to the proposed amendments of 
the Commission. As Member State Official stated, 
“the Energy Union project is more than the sum of its constituent parts. 
And the European Council decision of December 2015 was the catalyst 
to help the IGA decision come to life” (Interview 8, 2018). 
 
Decision (EU) 2017/684 was adopted on 5 April 2017(EP/Council 2017) and 
improved the institutional framework to a considerable degree. This time, it did 
not face the strong opposition from Member States that it had during the 
negotiations of the first decision due to constraints of possible policy options. 
The reviewed decision introduced a mandatory ex-ante assessment of IGAs 
concerning their compatibility with EU legislation by the Commission (Article 
3-2). The European Parliament suggested a broader approach in terms of its 
application, addressing all IGAs related to gas, oil, and electricity. However, a 
compromise was reached. Only IGAs related to electricity will be subject to ex-
post compliance checks for the moment, however, a review clause leaves 
room to introduce ex-ante checks at a later stage (European Parliament 2019).  
 
As Jacek Liegman, DG Energy, who took part in the legal design of the 
decision, states, 
“The key revision is the mandatory ex-ante mechanism for gas and oil. 
The mandatory ex-ante mechanism was certainly the most difficult part 
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to negotiate. Because you have to see that it is very important and a 
powerful tool. Compliance with our EU law ensures the security of 
supply, so it is not purely a legal exercise. The revision ensures that the 
IGAs not only comply with the Third Energy Package but also with other 
pieces of EU acquis” (Interview 5, 2018). 
 
Diverging from the first decision, Member States now have the obligation to 
inform the Commission before they enter into negotiations with third countries 
to conclude or amend an IGA (for both gas and oil), and have to keep the 
Commission up to date about the progress made (Art. 3-1). When a Member 
State gives the Commission notice of negotiations, the Commission has the 
option to provide it with advice on how to ensure compatibility with Union law; 
such advice might also include optional model clauses and guidance (Art. 4-
1). As soon as an agreement has been reached, but before the closure of the 
formal negotiations, the full text should be sent to the Commission for an ex-
ante assessment (Art. 3-2). Consistent with the first decision, the obligation to 
notify the Commission does not apply to commercial entities (Art. 3-6). The 
Commission should then inform the Member States within five weeks whether 
it has any doubts as to the compatibility with Union law (Art. 5-1). The Member 
State shall not sign, ratify, or agree to the draft IGA until the Commission has 
informed the Member State of any doubts (Art. 5-4). “The Member State 
concerned shall take utmost account of the Commission's opinion” before 
signing, ratifying, or agreeing to an IGA (Council / EP 2017: 8).  
 
As the evidence suggests, Decision (EU) 2017/684 turned the tide in favour of 
the Commission and strengthened the institutional matrix. Of course, the 
effectiveness of the decision can only be assessed in hindsight when, based 
on Article 10, the Commission will publish a report on its application which will 
contribute to further feedback. In the words of Borchardt (2018), 
“[r]egarding the intergovernmental agreements, we strengthened our 
role because now Member States have to notify us before they conclude 
an agreement. I think we can work with the revision. Not all IGAs were 
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compatible with our third energy package in 2013. And we were 
preparing infringement procedures. That was the first shock and the 
Russians made a big fuss. Decision 994/2012 was also based on Article 
194 of the Lisbon Treaty, as is all energy legislation. If you have the 
competence internally then you can exercise it externally.” (Interview 
11, 2018) 
 
In summary, the empirical evidence supports the fourth hypothesis that if a 
situation of critical juncture occurs within a setting of low institutional stickiness, 
high integration can be expected. Integration occurred as non-incremental 
change of primary legislation in the form of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty 
altered the institutional trajectory to a significant degree, as different 
dimensions of energy policy were incorporated. After the critical juncture 
occurred, the institution fell back into institutional equilibrium and a process of 
moderate integration of secondary law was triggered. Secondary law was 
amended in the form of revisions of the gas security regulation and the 
decision on the information exchange mechanism concerning IGAs. Moreover, 
the Lisbon Treaty strengthened institutional capacities as exogenous factors 






This research project addressed the question under what conditions does 
integration occur in the policy area of energy over time and tested four 
hypotheses to answer the question. The question, which was broad in its 
scope, sought to identify general preconditions that must be met in order to 
facilitate further development of the institutional matrix in EU energy policy. 
Most importantly, an emphasis was placed on the temporal processes and how 
historical contingency influences policy-making in the energy sector (as 
opposed to research that focuses on the analysis of decisions at a specific 
moment in time).  
 
This research project offers a significant theoretical contribution to the 
literature on Historical Institutionalism in three distinct areas. Firstly, it develops 
a succinct approach to the operationalisation of key concepts, specifically the 
notions of path-dependence, increasing returns and positive feedbacks, 
institutional stickiness and institutional lock-in. Secondly, this research offers 
a typology for critical junctures. And, thirdly, it advances a framework that 
incorporates both rational choice and normative factors as determinants of 
energy policy decision-making. Although concepts of path dependence are 
explored by different HI scholars (see Arthur 1988, North 1990, Thelen & 
Steinmo 1992, Pollack 1996 & 2008, Pierson 2000 & 2004, Peters et al. 2005, 
Fioretos et al. 2016), attempts to operationalise these processes have often 
fallen short of methodological rigour. Moreover, different scholars attribute 
different meanings to each concept, or use some of the terminology 
interchangeably. To address these challenges, this project’s first contribution 
to HI theory is the development of a typology of institutional stickiness and a 
systematic approach to operationalise path dependent processes. It offers a 
means by which to operationalise a complete institutional lock-in, where the 
institution is incapable of altering its institutional trajectory, and a way to 
demonstrate path dependence, in which the institution is still inert, but capable 
of slow and gradual change. The project offers a comprehensive 
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methodological approach to measuring path dependence, by developing a 
model of a full policy cycle, dependent on the analytical dimensions of intended 
goals, policy output and policy outcome, and their relationship with positive 
feedback processes involving monitoring and different institutional players. 
The project advances an approach to operationalise increasing returns, which 
are themselves based on learning effects, coordination effects, the 
development of adaptive expectations, and network effects. The institutional 
matrix and specific institutional players instigate such developments, and 
these phenomena in turn contribute to path dependence. 
    
Secondly, this project identifies different forms of critical junctures. Critical 
junctures, which play an important role in many contributions to HI, and which 
are part of the notion of a punctuated equilibrium, are a valuable approach to 
conceptualising institutional change. This research shows that different forms 
of critical junctures exist. In this sense, the theoretical model moves away from 
a binary conceptualisation of critical junctures, in which a critical juncture either 
occurs or does not. Critical junctures exist on different levels: they can affect 
the institutional framework in its entirety, and as a consequence of their impact, 
amend primary legislation and lead to fundamental reform of the institutional 
matrix. However, smaller critical junctures also exist for specific sectors: they 
can have an impact on the lower level(s) of an institution but will not change 
the wider institutional framework. These smaller critical junctures are important 
for a specific policy area, but do not lead to an amendment of the institution 
and its rules in the form of primary legislation. Consequently, they will lead to 
an amendment of secondary law, but will leave the overall institutional 
framework unaltered. In order for smaller critical junctures to unfold their full 
potential, primary law must address the sector which is affected. External 
shocks (for instance, oil crises) can create critical junctures that impinge on 
secondary legislation. But it is important to note that the institution’s capability 
to absorb / react to these external factors and shocks, thus creating a critical 
juncture for a policy sector, is dependent on primary legislation.      
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The project’s third contribution to HI is its advancement of a framework that 
bridges the dichotomy of rational motivations vs ideational motivations in terms 
of preference formation, which has created a long-standing rivalry between 
Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. Such 
considerations greatly enrich our understating of institutional continuity and 
change, and what kind of logic informs the formation of preferences during the 
decision-making process. How preferences are formed is a very important 
question within the institutional literature, as it explains whether actors make 
specific choices on the grounds of calculated self-interests (the calculus 
approach) or whether decisions are informed by ideational factors and norms 
and values (the logic of appropriateness). This research shows that the 
formation of preferences is dependent on the context of a specific situation. 
For instance, in the early days of energy policy we saw a highly rigid 
institutional framework based on primary legislation, which structured the 
behaviour of actors. Decision-making was very much based on rational 
calculations of actors who behaved in a self-interested manner. In addition, 
events like the oil shock of 1973/74, together with the institutional framework, 
created a situational context in which the formation of actors’ preferences were 
informed by strategic calculations – they deemed bilateral agreements more 
advantageous than strengthening the institutional framework and acted 
accordingly. However, this situational context changed over time – most 
importantly, via institutional amendments in primary law. The introduction of 
QMV made the institution more agile and flexible, and more responsive to 
exogenous factors and endogenous ideas. Under new institutional rules in the 
form of the SEA, and later the Lisbon Treaty, the situational context changed 
considerably, and addressing the external dimension under the normative 
notion of solidarity in Article 194 TFEU, broadened the scope of what could be 
achieved at the EU level. Hence, the normative obligation to demonstrate 
solidarity in times of crises represents a significant shift in this respect. It was 
easier to react to the gas crisis in 2009 than during the first two oil shocks in 
the previous decades, when virtually no solidarity existed. The project of the 
Energy Union was framed around solidarity between Member States and the 
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obligation to work together to improve energy security. Hence, this project has 
shown how the situational preconditions (the institutional context but also 
exogenous factors) define whether actors base their decisions on self-
interested calculations or whether they are also guided by ideational factors, 
such as solidarity.  
 
 
7.1. The Four Hypotheses 
 
The thesis was based on four hypotheses which tested assumptions about the 
factors that lead institutions at times to be rigid, and at other times to be 
susceptible to change. Chapter III tested the first hypothesis, which posited 
that, in the absence of a critical juncture, a locked-in institution - displaying 
high institutional stickiness measured with the help of the proxy variable of 
unanimous voting - will rigidly stay on its institutional path. The hypothesis was 
confirmed. The evidence analysed shows that the institution was incapable of 
generating almost any policy output from the 1950s to the 1980s, although 
intended goals were defined. Interestingly, although exogenous events in the 
form of two serious gas crises impacted the institutional matrix, they had limit 
impact on the regulatory framework. The reason identified in the analysis is 
the fact that the energy sector, apart from coal and gas, was subject to 
unanimous voting in the Council. Hence, almost all far-reaching policy 
proposals were bogged down, making it impossible to implement a common 
policy approach. 
 
Chapter IV tested the second hypothesis, which proposed that when a critical 
juncture occurs within a setting of high institutional stickiness, moderate 
integration of primary law can be expected. Supporting this hypothesis, the 
evidence highlights that both exogenous and endogenous factors led to a 
critical juncture, and to the SEA as an outcome and a change of primary 
legislation. This finding is significant as it enhances our understanding of the 
constituent parts leading to critical junctures for primary law in the context of 
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the EU. Exogenous factors presented themselves as economic pressure 
exerted by fierce competition outside of the Communities on global markets, 
and a second oil shock that contributed to insecurity of energy markets. 
Endogenous momentum was present in the form of ‘Eurosclerosis’, the 
institutional malaise, which took hold of the entire institution and contributed to 
an inefficient institutional setting. The Luxembourg Compromise, which 
created the requirement to reach decisions by unanimity, contributed to a 
locked-in institution and an ideational crisis based on the perception of the 
Communities own political identity unfolded. At the time of this critical juncture, 
the SEA was the solution to the institutional malaise, for decision-making in 
energy policy, and for the institution in general. Moderate integration in the 
form of non-incremental change of primary legislation under the SEA can be 
attested. The hypothesis is confirmed through the empirical evidence that, 
although energy policy could henceforth be addressed through market 
provisions and secondary legislation, it was not directly mentioned in primary 
legislation. 
 
Chapter V tested the third hypothesis, which proposed that if no critical 
juncture occurs in a setting of low institutional stickiness, a moderate level of 
the process of integration can be expected. The hypothesis was confirmed. 
Integration occurred in the form of incremental change of secondary legislation 
and no critical juncture punctuated the institution. Based on the empirical 
evidence, intended goals were formulated, leading to policy output that 
addressed the predefined set of goals. The effectiveness of the policy output 
was measured and it was shown that early decisions had less impact on the 
policy output than later decisions. In terms of the three energy packages, a 
gradual increase of the policy outcome, understood as the effectiveness of the 
policy output, can be measured. Hence, a moderate increase of integration 
over time is identified. The institution developed structural constraints and 
entrenched actors more and more into the institutional matrix. Although some 
Member States showed varying degrees of resistance to policy measures, they 
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ceded more and more powers to the institutional framework over time, 
agreeing to enhance the institutional matrix. 
 
Chapter VI tested the fourth and final hypothesis, which proposed that a critical 
juncture in a setting of low institutional stickiness leads to high integration in 
the form of change in primary legislation. This last hypothesis can be confirmed 
as well. The outcome of the critical juncture was the Lisbon Treaty, which 
overhauled the institutional framework. For the first time, energy policy was 
mentioned in primary legislation and was given its own title. Thus, measuring 
the difference of the level of integration between the SEA (where energy policy 
could be addressed but was not explicitly mentioned) and the Lisbon Treaty 
(where energy became a formal competence of the EU), shows that a high 
level of integration took place. Decisions addressing the dimensions of the 
internal market, energy security, energy efficiency and the promotion of 
renewables, and energy networks can now be made via the ordinary legislative 
procedure. However, after the critical juncture, the institution fell back into 
equilibrium and a process of medium integration was instigated. As the 
evidence has shown, an incremental increase of the effectiveness of the policy 
output (the policy outcome) can be measured. Secondary legislation was 
altered in a stepwise manner, based on former policy instruments, without 
introducing completely novel provisions. Moreover, unintended consequences 
unfolded for Member States, as the institution slowly tightened the institutional 
framework and entrenched actors over time: Member States agreed to 






This research project contributes to the wider debate about (European) 
integration, the functions that institutions fulfil, the motives of actors complying 
to institutional rules, and the factors that contribute to continuity on the one 
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hand, and account for change on the other. In a narrower sense, the project 
analysed energy policy as a particular part of the institutional matrix which, 
although showing a low level of integration at the beginning of the European 
Communities, became an important constituent part of the institution over time, 
cumulating in the inception of an Energy Union framework. An important 
driving factor for integration was identified as the demand for an integrated 
market and a secure supply of energy, steered and constrained by the 
institution. Derived from the empirical insights and theoretical contributions of 
this thesis, a picture was drawn that explains institutions on the basis of their 
inherent inclination to generate path dependent processes addressing markets 
and security concerns. If we consider the finding with regards to the 
contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of the conditions under 
which policy making takes places in the energy sector, a number of points 
warrant further discussion. Five analytical units will be emphasised as they 
were identified as the most important for policy development: the formation of 
preferences, institutional continuity and change, unintended consequences for 
involved actors, and critical junctures. 
 
Explaining preferences, institutional continuity and change 
 
As the analysis has shown, decisions in EU energy policy were very much 
dependent on earlier decisions. The empirical evidence presents a policy 
framework that is subject to incremental change (or at times even no change 
at all). The Historical Institutionalist scholar understands developments in the 
political world as events that have their roots in the past, which shape, enable 
and constrain the range of possible choices of decision makers in the future. 
This proposition is confirmed by the analysis in this project; the energy sector 
is no exemption from this rule. Contemporary policy instruments always had 
their roots in former decisions. Another important insight is the observation that 
decision-making is structured by, and contingent on, institutions that deliver 
functions based on formal rules that mediate between different actors and their 
interests (and preferences), but also on informal rules that help to shape 
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actors’ views about appropriate behaviour and enable actors to create new 
ideas about how to alter the path of the institution from within. 
 
This is a very contentious topic within the scholarly debate of Institutionalism 
as some researchers regard institutions as being governed by a logic of 
consequence / rationality (for instance Pollack 2008), whereas others 
emphasise that institutions provide moral and cognitive templates for 
behaviour, which ultimately creates the capacity to account for change from 
within (Steinmo 2008). However, this thesis goes beyond this dichotomy and 
aligns with the work of other scholars who have widened the historical 
institutional framework in both directions (Katznelson & Weingast 2005, 
Steinmo 2008). Specifically, this project sits within a growing body of HI 
scholarship that engages with both rationales, a more actor-centred approach 
(Sheingate 2003; Berk, Galvan, and Hattam 2013), and which allows for 
ideational values to be incorporated (Peters et al. 2005). A major contribution 
of this thesis is to account for variations in the situational context which defines 
whether actors follow rules/norms or whether they strive to maximise their own 
interests. As shown in the empirical chapters, how actors behave very much 
depends on the specific situational context, and which logic informs the 
formation of their preferences. Moreover, and this is a significant observation, 
the institution always needed some form of endogenous momentum to change 
the structural framework of the institution. It always needed endogenous ideas 
about how to change the institution. This most importantly also applied in the 
context of energy markets, in which preferences are regarded as exogenously 
given and governed by rational decision-making.  
 
Indeed, an important motive for deeper integration was identified as economic 
deliberations based on the goal-oriented behaviour of actors, who were not 
satisfied with the status-quo in the 1980s (Giersch 1985), which led to the SEA. 
Since energy plays such an important role for modern economies and welfare 
states, economic calculations played a prominent role in decision-making. 
Market-based policy instruments were seen as the appropriate means to 
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regulate the sector and to create a level playing field that governs both the 
internal and external dimension. Indeed, the energy packages and their 
regulatory capacities can be regarded as effective policy instruments that 
administer the internal energy market. Starting as provisions that showed 
moderate effectiveness of the policy output, they gradually developed towards 
a regime that was considerably tightened, strengthened, and much more 
effective. Based on rational decision-making and deeper economic integration 
over time, the provisions in secondary legislation addressed a multitude of 
economic issues and technical and operational procedures in order to facilitate 
sectoral integration. Within the boundaries of institutional preconditions and 
constraints, policy was incrementally changed. 
 
However, the evidence analysed also suggests that endogenous momentum, 
founded on ideational factors and novel ideas about how to govern markets, 
was important in the context of instigating change within the institutional 
framework. A strong account for normative factors permeating energy policy is 
the notion of solidarity embedded in institutional rules. Mentioned in Directive 
2004/67/EC for the first time, and subsequently implemented in primary 
legislations, the notion of solidarity amongst Member States in times of a crises 
incorporates a strong endogenous ideational building block in the regulatory 
framework. In times of crisis, markets reach their regulatory limits in terms of 
energy security, yet need to be stabilised, as energy is a strategic and 
politicised commodity. Not only from an economic, but also socio-economic 
standpoint, where protected customers need to be satisfied at all times, energy 
must be supplied even in the most difficult scenarios. As a consequence of 
such deliberations, solidarity as a normative value was woven into the 
institutional framework to ensure a secure energy supply. Member States now 
even have the legal obligation to help each other in times of crisis. 
“[T]here is also a normative requirement for a common energy policy. 
The European Union Treaty is more than an economic treaty. It also 
fosters cohesion and solidarity between member states. There is no 
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point in having a Union if some of its members literally leave others in 
the cold” (Andoura et al. 2010: 7). 
 
As discussed in the theory section, institutional change will occur when 
powerful actors have the political determination to alter the institution in favour 
of new ideas and re-interpret the institutional status quo (Hall 1989; Hall 2010; 
Steinmo 2008; Blyth et al. 2016). Not only can these ‘new ideas’ be 
implemented to overcome collective action problems (in the case of the single 
market programme), but ideational factors also play a role in the form of 
normative implications for the institutional makeup. Ideational factors are 
embedded in the institutional matrix, and played a role in the context of the 
decision-making procedure agreed upon for the implementation of the single 
market programme (Eising 2002; Eikeland 2011b). As discussed in the section 
on Preferences informing policy making after the SEA, in Chapter V, it was 
agreed that directives concerning the gas and electricity sector should be 
decided in accordance with Article 100a EEC, which was a consensus-based 
decision-making procedure.  
 
Although DG COMP strived for a much more aggressive approach, based on 
unilateral action, large parts of the Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament opted for a stepwise procedure and a more inclusive approach of 
the co-decision procedure, that required both the European Parliament and 
the Council to agree to a new directive. In the end, this view was shared by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) who ruled against the position of DG COMP. 
Moreover, this normative approach based on reaching a consensus was not 
only applied to the decision-making procedure but also the norm for reaching 
decisions within the Council. Although QMV could be used by Member States 
to outvote each other on salient issues, the Council strives for consensual 
solutions that are acceptable for all actors. Hence, the evidence provides a 
strong account that endogenous institutional norms also influence the 
institutional trajectory and must be considered for a thorough assessment of 
an institutional matrix.  
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As explored in Chapters V and VI, after the SEA change was also not easy to 
facilitate as the institution became rigid and developed a form of institutional 
inertia that contributed to resisting spontaneous alterations of the institutional 
framework. Merely incremental steps were possible within the institutional 
setting. The institutional design, initiated by actors, prohibited any swift 
amendments; the framework was designed in a way that pre-empted fast 
alterations to purposefully lend it more stability and so that it could not be easily 
altered by actors with diverging preferences. This institutional rigidity is 
moreover based on, and reinforced by, increasing returns and path dependent 
processes which additionally entrench actors over time. Indeed, as the 
analysis highlights, decisions that were made at an early stage shaped the 
possible range of policy options later in the sequence. The research shows 
that once actors conferred powers to the institutional matrix, and once initial 
policy decisions were made, the development of policy instruments was 
contingent on initial decisions and the scope of competences conferred to the 
institution. 
 
If a policy area can be found in the intergovernmental domain, and primary law 
does not provide the slightest capabilities to address policy making in the 
specific sector, the ‘default condition’, the status quo is almost endlessly 
perpetuated (with only some minor exceptions). In this case, adaptive 
expectations and coordination effects were not triggered and, due to the 
absence of increasing returns, the institution itself was locked-in and 
dysfunctional (on the basis of the joint-decision trap), and sovereign interests 
dominated policy making. Institutional development in energy policy needed 
some degree of political will of decision makers, above all to define rules, at 
the expense of their own sovereign powers on how to govern the sector, 
enshrined in primary law. This willingness is considerably heightened as a 
result of critical junctures. In the case of a locked-in institution, as we saw in 
Chapter III, change is almost impossible to facilitate. Institutions fulfil specific 
purposes, amongst them reducing uncertainty, enforcing contractual 
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arrangements and reducing transaction costs. However, in the absence of 
willingness to cede powers to the institution - even if preliminary ‘pro-forma’ 
goals were agreed on as intended goals – no real momentum for institutional 
development was attained. As shown in Chapter IV and VI, in order for the 
institution to develop, willingness to shift powers to the institution must be 
accounted for in primary legislation, and unanimous voting must be 
suspended. For instance, the Council’s statement in the early 1960s that the 
“(e)xecutives need not confine themselves to the legal possibilities afforded by 
the existing treaties” (High Authority 1964a: 73), and to go beyond existing 
legal provisions, serves as evidence for Member States’ realisation that 
imminent issues in the energy sector had to be tackled. However, in the end 
“it proved to be impossible to secure the Council’s unanimous acceptance of 
the draft resolution” (ibid.: 78). 
 
Pollak and Slominski (2011) contend that “the existence of the joint-decision 
trap may help in understanding the difficulties involved in creating an internal 
energy market”, however, “it cannot explain the progress which has already 
taken place” (ibid.: 93). They argue that, “it has been the driving force of the 
European Commission which has been willing to exploit various formal and 
informal instruments at its disposal” (ibid.). This research project argues that it 
is not necessarily the Commission, but rather the design of the institution that 
facilitates the advancement of a policy area. If the above statement would be 
entirely plausible, the relentless Commission proposals over almost 40 years 
would have been more fruitful. Endeavours to create a common approach to 
energy only materialised in the 1990s. Whilst the Commission has the 
capability to improve the institutional rules, actors must agree to the 
institutional design, and bestow the Commission with the capacity to instigate 
change. Hence, the joint-decision trap is rather a symptom of a sub-optimally 
designed institution, as opposed to one in which certain actors are more 
important than others. 
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In order to have the capacity to react to specific developments in the sector – 
for instance, to efficaciously respond to exogenous factors such as supply 
crises - the specific aspect of the sector had to be addressed in primary law, 
to create preconditions that made incremental institutional change possible. 
This was the case for the internal dimension of energy policy, addressed by 
the three liberalisation packages as a consequence of the SEA. As soon as 
the internal dimension of energy policy was subsumed under the general 
internal market programme, the way was paved for the gradual development 
of secondary legislation on market liberalisation. However, it was more difficult 
for external energy policy, since external affairs were not part of the internal 
programme; no legal basis existed for a common external policy. Hence, the 
external dimension of energy policy had to be included under common market 
provisions; it was implicitly assumed that provisions on the internal market 
would also have the capacity to regulate external issues. As the analysis in 
Chapter V shows, in the case of the gas crisis of 2006, such assumptions did 
not materialise and the institution stayed rigidly on its path, although 
exogenous factors penetrated the institution. Institutional change was difficult 
to achieve. However, the Lisbon Treaty solved this shortcoming and made it 
possible to address the external dimension more directly, cumulating in a 
swiftly implemented Regulation on the security of supply, triggered by the 




The analysis highlighted that institutions led to outcomes that had inadvertent 
consequences for some actors and their initial primacy regarding their 
institutional choices was to some extent lost. For instance, the analysis of the 
development of the three market packages in Chapter V underlined how early 
provisions were much less ambitious than later ones. Over time, actors had to 
subscribe to policy measures which they initially rejected / resisted, as they 
were not aligned with their preferences. However, as actors pursued specific 
institutional paths rooted in earlier policy decisions, their available options 
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became more constrained. As a consequence, later decisions had a much 
greater magnitude and introduced policy measures that actors did not 
anticipate during the inception of the policy instruments.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism, which is a purely interest-based and actor-
centred framework, would suggest that actors are always in full control of their 
policy choices, with all the necessary information available (Shepsle 2006). 
From this perspective, institutions are equilibrium outcomes, arbiters between 
different actors, and ‘managers’ of their contractual commitments. However, 
based on the empirical evidence analysed, such assumptions are not fully 
supported. Without neglecting that rational decisions can be made, this 
analysis confirms that “configurations of institutions created in the past 
structure politics in the present and in ways that often run counter to the 
interests or preferences of individuals” (Fioretos et al. 2016: 6). A prevalent 
example of this is the decision on the information exchange mechanism for 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs).  
 
The initial proposal of 2011 faced fierce opposition from Member States due 
to the proposed ex-ante assessment of IGAs (which was eventually 
relinquished). However, the revision (after merely 5 years) successfully 
implemented such provisions. We could even widen the example and say: 
Member States would not have predicted that their IGAs would be scrutinised 
during the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, which created the preconditions 
for all decisions addressing energy security. Thus the decision on IGAs is an 
example of unintended consequences par excellence. However, as North 
(1990) contends, once an “adaptively efficient path” is pursued, as in the case 
of energy policy in the EU, a “maximum of choices under uncertainty” is 
provided by the institution (ibid.: 99). The ‘adaptively efficient path’ allowed for 
the “pursuit of various trial methods of undertaking activities, and for an 
efficient feedback mechanism to identify choices that are relatively inefficient 
and to eliminate them” (ibid.). Based on this research, although actors found 
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their choice of preferences constrained by the institution, in the end, the 
institution provided them with efficient outcomes. 
 
Explaining critical junctures 
 
The analysis of the empirical evidence has yielded a very important insight, 
which was not anticipated in the design of the theoretical model. From the 
analysis one can identify an important distinction regarding critical junctures. 
We must differentiate between critical junctures that affect primary law, and 
critical junctures that affect secondary law. The first creates a situation in which 
pervasive driving factors initiate structural reform and alterations to the 
fundamental design of the institution, in the form of a change in the treaties. 
Thus, punctuations of this sort instigate very extensive and deep alterations to 
the institution and very specific outlines and principles to govern the institution 
are set out. Primary legislation defines the fundamental features of an 
institution, the responsibilities of the different actors and how decisions are 
reached. In this case, the alterations are very powerful and change the 
institution in a way that affects the very core of the institution and fundamental 
rules for policy-making.  
 
In contrast, critical junctures for secondary legislation are understood as 
smaller events that punctuate the trajectories of (a) specific policy area(s) 
inherent to the institutional design, and which develop the capacity to alter 
secondary legislation. However, these smaller events do not generate enough 
impetus to affect the entire institution but rather influence specific components 
of the institution (for instance, secondary energy legislation). Moreover, 
smaller events and their respective impact on the institutional matrix are 
contingent on the prerequisite of whether primary law addresses the policy 
area to some extent or not. Secondary law, embodied in regulations, directives 
and decisions are grounded on, and govern the policies that are set out in, 
primary legislation.  
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Therefore, we can conclude that some very fundamental and pervasive 
formative moments create momentum for a change of primary law (due to 
strong critical events that affect the institution as a whole), and others, in some 
circumstances smaller events create momentum for change in secondary law 
but not in primary law. Hence, the latter creates momentum for institutional 
change on a ‘smaller scale’. This distinction is an important one as smaller 
events might have to be accounted for as a driving factor for a specific policy 
to change its path. For instance, Regulation 994/2010 on the security of gas 
supply and the proposal for the Energy Union are good examples for such 
assumptions. Both were instigated as a consequence of strong exogenous 
events14 impacting the institutional framework and the main driving factors for 
the respective policy proposals. However, these junctures did not have enough 
of an impact to change the institutional design in its entirety. In the phases of 
path dependency, and when the overall institution is in equilibrium, smaller 
critical junctures alter the trajectory of, or instigate new, specific policies. 
Especially exogenous events that affect the workings of a specific part of the 
institution, can create this form of critical juncture. The institution is punctuated 
by such ‘small’ events and therefore the trajectory of a specific part of 
secondary law is altered. 
 
 
7.3. Challenges and Potential Criticism  
 
One of the main challenges of this project was developing an analytical model 
for critical junctures. If asked whether this research has enabled the 
identification of critical junctures before they happen, the simple and 
straightforward answer would be: no. As the analysis has shown, the nature of 
a critical juncture, and the factors that contribute to it, are unique and therefore 
it is not possible to create rules which could be universally applied. Every 
critical juncture consists of idiosyncratic constituent parts, which develop as a 
 
14 Two gas crises for the former, geopolitical unrest following the annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula for the latter. 
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result of historical contingencies, and which are concatenations of events 
occurring in a particular sequence and within a particular context. This 
analytical opacity makes them difficult to grasp ex-ante. Nevertheless, critical 
junctures can be understood in hindsight, as the unique factors contributing to 
a critical juncture become clear and their causal relationship can be 
understood. That said, as supported by the empirical evidence analysed, we 
can conclude that critical junctures for the institution in its entirety are made up 
by both exogenous and endogenous factors. For instance, the events leading 
to the SEA were based on endogenous and exogenous factors. However, such 
claims would need to be investigated further.  
 
A second potential criticism is the focus on critical junctures affecting the 
institution in its entirety (leading to change in primary law), and the omission 
of a stocktake of critical junctures for secondary law. It could be argued that, 
in the case of energy policy, more critical junctures existed than are actually 
depicted in this research project. However, it should be noted that the goal of 
the project was not only to account for change in secondary law, but to explain 
the wider institutional context, which was the prerequisite for the overall 
conditions under which deeper and wider integration occurred. In virtue of this 
understanding of the institutional core in which energy policy is embedded, the 
analysis focused on the structural conditions guiding the formation of formal 
and informal rules. Based on these research aims, parameters had to be set 
in order to ensure the viability of the project. Indeed, it would not have been 
possible to provide a holistic overview of policy development over a 70-year 
period if greater focus had been placed on a narrower definition of the 
institution of energy policy. 
 
Another potential shortcoming that one might identify is the omission of an 
analysis of the effect that environmental protection and concerns had on 
energy policy. Based on growing pollutions levels and issues of sustainability 
in the 1970s, environmental concerns contributed to the development of an 
energy policy to a considerable degree, if not as much as did the market 
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programme to the institutional framework (see for instance Talus 2013, 
Schubert et al. 2016). In awareness of the magnitude of the policy area 
addressing climate change and renewable energy sources (RES), an early 
decision was made to exclude these prominent themes from the analysis in 
order to maintain explanatory depth to the units of analysis under investigation. 
Incorporating institutional rules governing climate change and environmental 
concerns would have expanded the scope of the thesis to a considerable 
degree, hence, these policy areas where merely touched upon every so often 
and not investigated in depth. 
 
 
7.4. Future Research 
 
Given the possible limitations of this research discussed in the previous 
section, based on the insights acquired through the assessment of the 
empirical data, the findings of this thesis allude to a potential expansion of 
some of the analytical units. The most significant avenue for further research 
would be an extension of the theoretical model concerning critical junctures 
and their impact on the institutional matrix. As proposed by the findings of this 
research, a more fine-grained definition could be applied to generate further 
hypotheses about change: critical junctures affecting the whole institution and 
critical junctures altering smaller components of the institutional matrix. The 
interplay of these typologies and their distinct effects upon the institutional path 
would be a fruitful endeavour for further analysis. In addition, as highlighted by 
the analysis, both exogenous and endogenous factors contributed to the 
punctuation of the institutional equilibrium, which led to an alteration of the 
path. Whether this account holds for every momentous change to the 
institutional setup would require further investigated. Indeed, there is scope for 
a clearly defined ontology of critical junctures which could enhance our 
understanding of critical junctures still further. 
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The second opportunity for further research addresses the interplay of both 
typologies of critical junctures and their impact on the institutional rules for 
energy policy in the wider context of the EU’s climate policy agenda and for 
renewable energy sources. It would be a fruitful undertaking to analyse the 
interplay of the SEA, understood as a critical juncture, and the environmental 
dimension of the policy area based on the proposed theoretical framework of 
this thesis. A multitude of contributions to the scholarly debate argue that one 
of the most influential avenues for promoting EU energy policy, and a main 
driving factor for strengthening the institutional setup, was reasoned through 
the attainment of environmental policy goals15. A next step could therefore be 
based on the examination of the policy sector in the context of the 
environmental dimension, and whether analytical units within the framework of 
HI could inform the generation of a set of new hypotheses addressing this 
particular part of the institution. Moreover, it would be of the greatest interest 
to see whether policy-making addressing the promotion of environmental 
goals follows similar notions of path dependence, increasing returns, policy 
learning and coordination effects, and unintended consequences. 
Furthermore, an investigation of how preferences are formed, whether they 
are based on rational calculations or ideational factors, and which logic is 
ultimately found to be most influential could yield interesting findings and 
complement this project. Such assertions could provide new insight into a 
policy sector, which is often said to be mainly dominated by strategic action. 
  
 
15 For further discussion see Tosun et al. (Eds.) 2015. 
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